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In this thesis I examine the question ‘What are the implications of our growing 
scientific understanding of moral phenomenon for ethics?’ I assess what moral 
philosophy can gain, if anything, from the rapidly growing body of literature on the 
evolutionary genealogy, psychology, and biology of morality. Historically, there 
have tended to be two kinds of responses to such questions: either great 
enthusiasm about the potential to revolutionise ethics followed by dramatic 
conclusions without adequate rationale; or empirical considerations are rejected 
as irrelevant by invoking ‘Hume’s law’ (that one cannot derive normative 
conclusions from descriptive facts) and not examined further.  
I argue for an approach that takes a middle ground; that our growing scientific 
understanding may have implications for a number of debates in moral philosophy, 
but that at the same time, there are few conclusions that are obvious or 
straightforward. Due diligence must be given to philosophical analysis to 
adequately assess relevant empirical research. There is in general no principle that 
allows us to determine whether empirical research is relevant to its related areas 
of philosophy, thus I argue that any such evaluation, at least initially, must be done 
on a case by case basis. I examine a number of case studies of different authors 
who try to derive implications for ethics from empirical research into morality. 
From looking at these cases I also evaluate what can be learned from these 
attempts and present the findings as a framework that can be used when assessing 





Chapter 1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Thesis Structure ............................................................................................................................ 9 
Chapter 2 Evolutionary origins of morality ........................................................................................... 16 
2.1 The evolution of morality ............................................................................................................ 16 
2.2 The evolution of cooperation ..................................................................................................... 17 
2.2.1 Inclusive fitness .................................................................................................................... 19 
2.2.2 Mutualism ............................................................................................................................ 22 
2.2.3 Cooperation ......................................................................................................................... 23 
2.2.4 Indirect reciprocity ............................................................................................................... 27 
2.3 Evolved normative guidance? ..................................................................................................... 30 
2.3.1 Morality and the evolution of language .............................................................................. 31 
2.3.2 Group selection and culture ................................................................................................ 36 
2.3.3 From sociality to morality – epistemic difficulties ............................................................... 40 
2.3.4 Adaptationism ...................................................................................................................... 41 
2.3.5 Questions we will never answer? ........................................................................................ 42 
2.3.6 “How possibly” explanations ............................................................................................... 47 
Chapter 3 Implications of the evolution of morality for ethics ............................................................ 52 
3.1 E. O. Wilson and Sociobiology ..................................................................................................... 54 
3.1.1 The metaphysics of morality ................................................................................................ 56 
3.1.2 The problem of altruism ...................................................................................................... 60 
3.1.3 Biological constraints on what we ought to do ................................................................... 63 
3.1.4 Naturalness and morality ..................................................................................................... 65 
3.2 Richard Joyce’s evolutionary debunking argument .................................................................... 68 
3.2.1 Belief Pills ............................................................................................................................. 69 
3.2.2 Truth tracking ....................................................................................................................... 73 
3.2.3 Moral naturalism .................................................................................................................. 78 
3.2.4 Harman’s challenge .............................................................................................................. 79 
3.2.5 Arguments against moral naturalism ................................................................................... 81 
3.2.6 Moral Naturalism and practical clout .................................................................................. 85 
3.2.7 Does Joyce’s debunking argument succeed? ....................................................................... 99 
3.2.8 Implications of error theory ............................................................................................... 100 
3.3 Sharon Street’s Darwinian dilemma ......................................................................................... 104 
3.3.1 Realist theories of value ..................................................................................................... 105 
3.3.2 Evaluative attitudes saturated by Darwinian influence ..................................................... 106 
3.3.3 The Darwinian dilemma ..................................................................................................... 109 
3.3.4 If evaluative facts are identical to natural facts, can the dilemma be avoided? ............... 115 
3.4 General responses to evolutionary error theories ................................................................... 117 
3.4.1 Capacity etiology versus content etiology debunking ....................................................... 117 
3.4.2 The reliability of moral cognition ....................................................................................... 122 
Chapter 4 Analysis of the implications of evolutionary arguments for ethics .................................... 126 
4.1 Are Wilson, Joyce, and Street’s arguments sound? .................................................................. 126 
4.2 Lessons from E. O. Wilson ......................................................................................................... 127 
iii 
 
4.3 Lessons from Richard Joyce’s debunking argument ................................................................. 129 
4.4 Lessons from Sharon Street’s Darwinian dilemma ................................................................... 130 
4.5 Developing a framework for evaluating empirical arguments in ethics ................................... 131 
Chapter 5 Moral psychology ............................................................................................................... 135 
5.1 Models of moral judgment ....................................................................................................... 135 
5.1.1 Rationalism......................................................................................................................... 136 
5.1.2 Emotivism ........................................................................................................................... 137 
5.1.3 Intuitivism .......................................................................................................................... 138 
5.2 Composite models of moral judgment ..................................................................................... 139 
5.2.1 Greene et al.’s model ......................................................................................................... 140 
5.2.2 Shaun Nichols’ sentimental rules model............................................................................ 142 
5.2.3 Jonathan Haidt’s social intuitionist model ......................................................................... 146 
5.2.4 Marc Hauser’s Rawlsian model .......................................................................................... 151 
5.3 Current models of moral judgment .......................................................................................... 153 
5.4 How are moral judgments made? ............................................................................................ 154 
Chapter 6 Moral psychology and ethics .............................................................................................. 155 
6.1 Methodological differences ...................................................................................................... 157 
6.1.1 Terminological differences between disciplines ................................................................ 160 
6.2 Shaun Nichols and moral rationalism ....................................................................................... 162 
6.2.1 Are Nichols’ rationalisms positions held by philosophers? ............................................... 163 
6.2.2 Empirical rationalism ......................................................................................................... 168 
6.2.3 Conceptual Rationalism and moral motivation ................................................................. 178 
6.3 Adina Roskies and moral motivation internalism ..................................................................... 187 
6.4 Social psychology and empirically based arguments against virtue ethics .............................. 195 
6.4.1 Normative and descriptive claims ...................................................................................... 197 
6.4.2 Does the evidence show what Doris and Stich claim? ....................................................... 200 
6.4.3 Differing conceptions of virtue .......................................................................................... 212 
6.4.4 The success of Doris and Stich’s argument against virtue ethics ...................................... 214 
Chapter 7 Further implications for a framework to assess empirical approaches to ethics .............. 216 
7.1 Are Nichols, Roskies, and Doris and Stitche’s arguments sound? ............................................ 216 
7.2 Lessons from Nichols on moral rationalism .............................................................................. 218 
7.3 Lessons from Adina Roskies on moral motivation internalism ................................................. 220 
7.4 Lessons from Doris and Stich on virtue ethics .......................................................................... 222 
7.5 Additions to a framework for assessing empirical approaches to morality ............................. 224 
Chapter 8 Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 229 
8.1 Empirical approaches to moral philosophy .............................................................................. 229 
8.2 Framework for assessing empirical approaches to ethics ........................................................ 230 
References .......................................................................................................................................... 233 






Over the course of writing this thesis I have had several supervisors who all deserve thanks. My first 
supervisor, Graham Macdonald, also gave the first philosophy lecture I ever attended and has 
continued to provide inspiration since that day. Derek Browne, Michael-John Turp, and Doug Campbell 
all provided supervision at various points over the years and gave valuable assistance, discussion, and 
encouragement. Carolyn Mason, who took over as my senior supervisor, deserves special thanks for 
her guidance, kindness, and endless patience throughout the thesis. Carolyn’s feedback was always 
helpful and she somehow managed to provide consistent encouragement (prodding!) whilst still being 
unwaveringly supportive.  
I also owe thanks to the friends, office mates, work colleagues, and fellow students who are too 
numerous to name individually but who have all helped, supported, and made things better in any 
number of ways over the years while writing the thesis.  
Finally, I would like to thank all of my family for their endless support and especially my parents, Robyn 





Chapter 1 Introduction 
In this thesis I examine what philosophical ethics or moral philosophy can gain, if anything, from the 
growing bodies of literature on the evolutionary genealogy, psychology, and biology of morality. In 
recent years a number of attempts have been made that argue that such research has relevance for 
ethics or that one can derive ethical conclusions from it. This empirical research includes work in 
disciplines such as evolutionary biology, evolutionary psychology and its predecessor sociobiology, 
various branches of psychology, neuroscience, anthropology, and others.  I look at whether such 
attempts have been successful and examine what makes successful attempts so, and where 
unsuccessful attempts fall down. I analyse what we can learn from these attempts and provide a 
framework for assessing or developing an argument from empirical ethics. 
Historically, there have tended to be two kinds of responses to attempts to draw ethical conclusions 
from empirical discoveries: either great enthusiasm followed by jumping to conclusions without 
adequate philosophical analysis; or such attempts are rejected as irrelevant by invoking considerations 
such as Hume’s law (that one cannot derive normative conclusions from descriptive facts) and not 
examined further.  
This work is for the most part, descriptive in nature.  It is often claimed therefore that it has little 
relevance to moral philosophy, and any suggestion of significance is usually warded off by repeating 
the catchphrase derived from Hume that ‘one cannot derive an ought from an is’. This catch phrase 
has its origins in the following passage from Hume’s A treatise of human nature: 
In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always 
remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of 
reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning 
human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual 
copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not 
connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, 
however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some 
new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and explain'd; 
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and at the same time that a reason shou'd be given, for what seems altogether 
inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are 
entirely different from it.1 
A commonly accepted reading of this passage is that no evaluative or normative conclusion can be 
inferred from any set of purely descriptive or factual premises. This general view was termed ‘Hume’s 
Law’ by R. M Hare2 and has been used as one of the most common responses to claims that scientific 
research into morality can have any significance for moral philosophy. I take this consideration to be 
a poor reason to abstain from examining empirical work into morality for its philosophical merits or 
insights for two reasons.  
Firstly, whether this interpretation is correct is contentious, and much philosophical effort has gone 
in to both attempting to decipher precisely what point Hume was trying to convey and further, 
whether some form of Hume’s Law is actually true and if it is, in what manner it is true. In an attempt 
to move forward and not belabour philosophical discussions that have already been overworked, I 
take the following conservative position on the is/ought debate3:  what Hume is establishing is a point 
about deductive arguments; that if a moral ‘ought’ occurs in the conclusion of some deductive 
argument, but not anywhere in the premises of the argument, the argument is invalid.4  This point 
about logical deduction does not imply that ‘normative conclusions cannot be inferred from factual or 
descriptive premises’, only that deductive arguments containing oughts in their conclusions must have 
an ought in one of the premises for the deduction be valid.  
Secondly and more importantly, it is not true that moral philosophy is interested in only those things 
that fall cleanly on the normative or ‘ought’ side of the divide between ‘is’ and ‘ought’. There are many 
 
1 David Hume, A treatise of human nature, Book 3, sec. 1, part 1, p. 334. 
2 R. M. Hare, ‘Universalisability’, p. 303. 
3 It is worth noting that the is/ought “gap” is sometimes mislabeled as the ‘naturalistic fallacy’, but this is a 
misnomer as the term ‘naturalistic fallacy’ was coined by G. E. Moore in his Principia ethica for a prima facie 
similar, but nevertheless different, point about the semantics of moral terms; the ‘naturalistic fallacy’ refers to 
the idea that it is mistake to attempt to define moral terms such as ‘good’ in terms of natural properties such as 
‘desirable’.  
4 This is roughly the position taken by Charles Pigden. See ‘Snare’s puzzle/Hume’s purpose: Non-cognitivism and 
what Hume was really up to with no-ought-from-is’. 
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subtle distinctions involved in evaluating which moral judgments should be made, whether such 
judgments are true, or correct, or justified, or ‘appropriate’ in some other sense. These subsequent 
questions are questions about the nature of moral debate – questions that are usually considered to 
fall under the umbrella of metaethics. These questions nevertheless form an integral part of the 
endeavour of moral philosophy.  
Metaethics is sometimes defined as simply ‘the study of the nature of morality’, but this can be 
misleading, as this definition makes it sound as though it is the kind of thing science can directly 
investigate – that metaethics might be a solely descriptive domain. But the questions metaethics 
traditionally deals with are not obviously amenable to being dealt with in an empirical manner. When 
philosophers inquire about the nature of morality, they are asking questions such as the following: 
• When we make moral judgments, are we stating facts? If so, what kind of facts are they? Or, 
are we instead expressing our attitudes or desires?  
• Can moral judgments be true or false? If not, can they be more or less ‘correct’ or 
‘appropriate’? How are they justified? Are they ever justified? 
• How do we come to know that they are true or correct or justified? Can we have moral 
knowledge? What kind of epistemology is appropriate in the moral domain? 
• Is there such a thing as objectivity in ethics? Or is ethics fundamentally subjective or relative 
to some agent or group of agents? Can we say what the objective/subjective distinction 
amounts to in ethics? 
• Is there such a thing as moral progress? What does it consist in, and how do we know when it 
has been made? 
So it is clear that the idea that there is an unassailable gap between normative and the descriptive 
disciplines and therefore empirical research into morality is not relevant to moral philosophy is too 
simplistic to be used as a reply to reject such considerations outright.5 There is no principle that can 
be applied in general to the question of whether any given item of empirical research into morality 
 
5 For a further discussion of why we should reject philosophy’s historic default position of claiming irrelevance 
for such considerations, Oliver Curry’s ‘Who’s afraid of the naturalistic fallacy?’ is a comprehensive discussion. 
Curry argues that few philosophers have been willing to pursue the ‘naturalistic approach’ due to a range of 
things that have been called the ‘naturalistic fallacy’ including Hume’s Law and Moore’s naturalistic fallacy. Curry 
discusses several related concerns that have been given this name and demonstrates none of them pose 




will be of normative moral significance or of significance for metaethics or any other area of 
philosophical ethics. Nevertheless, we must proceed cautiously, as drawing conclusions from biology 
and the empirical sciences for ethics is not easy; as Philip Kitcher has described it “the relation 
between biology and ethics has been an alluring swamp in which any number of scholars have 
floundered.”6 
Often in interdisciplinary contexts, usage of terminology differs between disciplines. Useful 
engagement between disciplines requires understanding what each discipline is talking about, so 
before moving on to chapter 1, I will provide an account of the ways in which ‘morality’ is being used 
so that it is clear what the phenomenon to be explained is and to disambiguate where possible how 
certain researchers from differing disciplines are using the term. The characterizations that I give will 
be general, and non-committal on some points: indeed, the term ‘morality’ without context probably 
does not have a determinate enough meaning to be able to give a non-controversial list of necessary 
and sufficient conditions that all would agree with. Nevertheless, I hope to provide a general account 
that most (including philosophers) could agree is a representative description. This description of 
morality will hopefully be neutral on most normative and meta-ethical questions, as the intention here 
is to give a clear picture of what the phenomenon appears to be rather than an analysis that shows 
what is ‘really going on’ or settles any justificatory questions. As there are many different uses of the 
term ‘morality’ it is useful to start by having a clear picture of what these uses are and which meanings 
are intended in certain contexts.   
‘Morality’ is a word not frequently used outside of moral philosophy, and when it is, it is often used 
differently to its usage within philosophical circles. Dictionary definitions typically list two senses in 
which the word is used: a normative and descriptive sense. When used descriptively, ‘morality’ usually 
refers to a code of conduct or principles concerning the assessment of behavior put forward by a group 
or society or to assess one’s own behavior. This descriptive usage is what is generally intended when 
 
6 Philip Kitcher, ‘Biology and ethics’, p. 163. 
5 
 
biologists, anthropologists, psychologists, sociobiologists and so on, talk about the ‘evolution of 
morality’. However, strictly speaking morality is the output of a moral psychology, and it is this 
particular psychology that is what evolved rather than ‘morality’ itself.   
The normative usage of ‘morality’ is that which philosophers often concern themselves with. When a 
moral philosopher asks ‘is act X moral?’ (or questions about this question) they are asking is X in 
accordance with some idealized code of conduct that would be put forward by all rational beings (or 
if not rational, whatever method of assessment they argue is the correct one). Thus moral philosophy 
concerns itself with not only the question ‘is X moral?’ but also ‘is the code of conduct which we are 
asking if X is in accordance with the correct one?’ (or sound or true or some other kind of similar 
assessment or agreement with it).  
‘Moral judgments’ are the assessments or evaluations that individuals make about whether something 
is in accordance with the code of conduct or shared rules of how to live. They appear to be a kind of 
mental event – an assessment of a past, present, or future situation, usually resulting in some kind of 
linguistic utterance or conclusion thought to oneself.  They take as their subject matter the conduct 
of people in interpersonal relations.  A moral judgment can be about one’s own interactions with 
others, or between about the conduct and interaction of third-parties.  They are most likely to be 
about (but certainly not limited to): negative appraisals of acts of harming others, assessments of 
reciprocity and fairness, requirements concerning behaviour in a matter befitting one’s status in a 
social hierarchy, and rules about ‘bodily matters’ – things such as food, sex, hygiene, appropriate 
practices concerning bodily waste and so on. 7   More generally, morality is often (especially in 
philosophy) taken to be about the sum of all these considerations: that is, how one ought to live or 
what one should do all things rationally considered. Moral judgments also often involve a component 
of desert.  That is they involve coming to positive or negative conclusions that people deserve a 
particular treatment: a punishment or reward as a result of their conduct. The notion of being 
 
7 List adapted from Richard Joyce, The evolution of morality, p. 65. 
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deserving of a reward or punishment can be both external (that is judging that others are deserving 
of something) or internal to the individual making a moral judgment, in the form of a moral conscience. 
The precise kind of utterance that verbalizations of moral judgments are, is a contentious issue in 
moral philosophy. One point upon which views typically diverge is whether moral judgments assert 
beliefs about facts (things that can be true or false) or express attitudes (such as disapproval, disgust, 
acceptance of some standard and so on). These two viewpoints fall roughly under the terms 
‘cognitivism’ (that moral statements have cognitive content: they are beliefs) and ‘non-cognitivism’ 
(the denial of cognitivism). In describing this aspect of moral judgments, I mean only to provide an 
account of the features that moral judgments appear to have; active philosophical research on the 
issue is ongoing with well entrenched positions.  Firstly, there looks to be much that is correct about 
the cognitive picture of moral judgments.  Moral statements usually take the form of a subject-
predicate sentence such as “Stealing is wrong” or “Hitler is evil”.  Such sentences contain a predicate 
applying what seems to be a property (wrongness) to the subject (stealing). In non-moral discourse it 
is generally accepted that sentences of this form, such as “the fridge is white” assert beliefs. So, prima 
facie the grammatical form of moral judgments points towards their being assertions of beliefs.  A 
second point in favour of the cognitivist is that we do not simply put forward moral judgments, we 
also dispute them.  Arguing that something is right or wrong is a common occurrence, and such 
discourse makes the most sense if what people are arguing about are facts, things that can actually be 
true or false. Thus, a good first approximation is that moral judgments appear to express beliefs. 
In many contexts in which moral judgments are put forward however, they can also appear to have a 
non-cognitive element: they express some kind of attitude. This feature of judgments can be brought 
out clearly with the following simple argument.8  Consider the following sentence: 
(1) “Racial discrimination is wrong”  
 
8 This form of argument is developed in greater depth in Richard Joyce, see ibid., pp. 53-57. 
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 Like the examples in the previous paragraph, if one heard this phrase uttered, it would perhaps most 
naturally be taken to be expressing a belief. However, if someone uttered the following: 
(2) “Racial discrimination is wrong, but I do not disapprove of it” 
It is likely that we will be perplexed as to what they mean. Such a sentence appears to contain some 
kind of contradiction, even if it is not apparent where precisely it lies. Upon hearing this sentence, our 
initial reaction might be to try to ascertain what was abnormal about the context. Was the speaker 
joking? Was it said in a sarcastic tone? Do they think that everyone else thinks that racial 
discrimination is wrong, but they themselves dissent from this view? Are they simply confused, or 
trying to confuse others?  The point of this is that when we try to interpret what (2) means, we look 
for reasons why it might not be a genuinely made moral judgment.  Thus, if in (2), “but I do not 
disapprove of it” is enough to undermine the seriousness of what precedes it (“Racial discrimination 
is wrong”), then the most straightforward explanation is that the “Racial discrimination is wrong” part 
of (2), functions (at least in part) to express disapproval in addition to appearing to assert a fact.  
While this result is a departure from the usual exclusive endorsement of only one of cognitivism or 
non-cognitivism, there does not seem to be anything problematic with the thought that some 
linguistic utterances can express more than one mental state at a time. For example calling someone 
a ‘bible basher’ indicates that you have a belief that they are a Christian who tends to evangelize, but 
this is not all that you express by using the term: it is usually also an expression of disdain for the 
aggressive tactics of proselytizing used and an aversion to the message in general (the person who 
was called a bible basher is most unlikely to describe themselves in this way!). 
A final feature of moral judgments is that they appear to have a certain kind of force, a special 
importance, to them. By this it is meant that in some sense moral judgments are made with the 
intention of being inescapable and that they purport to have a kind of authority that provides genuine 
deliberative weight. The inescapability of moral judgments amounts to the fact that they are intended 
to apply whether the subject of them agrees or disagrees with the judgment. It is important to note 
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that whether these considerations are taken any notice of is another issue: the claim is not that moral 
judgments are necessarily motivating, only that they are made with the intention of not being able to 
be ignored as considerations. In this respect, moral judgments often seem to be like categorical 
imperatives – an imperative that’s legitimacy does not depend on some goal aimed at by its target. A 
hypothetical imperative is the opposite – one which does depend on the agent in question’s goals. If 
for example I say “Have some cake”, there is generally a tacit conditional of “unless you’re not hungry” 
or something similar implied: the imperative here is ‘escapable’ in some sense. By offering cake, I 
generally do not want to advance an imperative that should be followed regardless of your wants or 
desires. Thus, “Have some cake” is hypothetical in a way that “Do not murder people” is not: there 
are no conditions such as “unless you enjoy murdering people” that one could have that would 
invalidate the imperative.  That moral judgments have the form of categorical imperatives is a 
relatively uncontroversial claim as long as it is remembered that this is only a description of a feature 
that moral judgments appear to have. That they just do appear to be stated as imperatives that are 
inescapable should not be confused with the claim that the moral judgments actually are inescapable 
or that their categorical form provides a fundamental basis or justification for morality.  
In addition to inescapability, moral judgments gain their practical weight from the authority that they 
purport to have. Moral authority is another controversial topic in ethics, but it does seem to be true 
that moral judgments are intended to carry a certain kind of weight or importance that is greater than 
other kinds of judgments such as judgments of transgressions of conventions or prudential 
requirements. What the source of such authority is does not appear to be obvious or epistemically 
accessible to moral judgers, but it is a robust and consistent feature that moral judgments appear to 
have; studies show that children as young as 3 attribute a special kind of authority to moral 
judgments.9   
 
9 In one study, children are asked whether breaking a convention – a boy wearing a dress to school – is “ok”, and 
most respond negatively, but if asked “would it be alright if the teacher were to say it’s ok?” then most respond 
that it would be. For a moral judgment such as whether punching another student is ok, respondents said that 
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To summarize, moral judgments to appear to be:  
• Mental evaluations of situations concerning interpersonal relations. These evaluations are 
often subsequently expressed in linguistic utterances. 
• Their subject matter is mainly issues of harm, fairness, justice, social status, and appropriate 
practices concerning ‘bodily matters’. 
• They often imply a concept of desert: deserving rewards or punishments. 
• Statements of judgments (the linguistic utterances) have features that make them appear to 
express both beliefs and attitudes. 
• Moral judgments purport to have a special kind of inescapability and authority. 
 
1.1 Thesis Structure 
The structure of this thesis is summed up as follows: 
1. Disciplines outside of moral philosophy have been interested in the phenomena of morality 
and have been producing research concerning morality’s nature, function, operation, and 
place in the world.  
2. The interactions of moral philosophers and these researchers from outside philosophy 
generally has been of two kinds in the past: either much of this research has been routinely 
ignored or deemed irrelevant because of Hume’s Law or other related considerations, or 
philosophical arguments and conclusions have been advanced (often by those doing the 
empirical research themselves) as being revolutionary for moral philosophy, but have arrived 
at their conclusions with scarce or inadequate philosophical analysis done and consequently 
have been ignored by mainstream moral philosophy.  
 
it was never ok, even if the teacher were to say it was. See Judith G. Smetana and Judith L. Braeges, ‘The 
development of toddlers’ moral and conventional judgments.’ 
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3. There is no currently existing principle for deciding in general how in a particular case to deal 
with such things. 
4. So, the best we can do is look at a range of different attempts to say something important or 
philosophically interesting based on empirical research into morality, and see: 
a. What if anything there is to these claims about the relevance of empirical research 
into morality, and in the cases where the arguments are successful, what the 
philosophical implications are, and 
b. In examining these case studies, what we can learn about how to assess the impact 
of empirical research into morality: what lessons, organizing principles, strategies, 
pitfalls, rules, and tests that can be applied to instances of philosophical arguments 
utilizing empirical approaches to morality.  
5. The result of this is a framework for assessing empirical approaches to moral philosophy and 
a better understanding of whether such approaches to moral philosophy are likely to be 
successful or fruitful.  
The intended audience of the framework developed in point 5 above, are nonphilosophers working 
on interdisciplinary research involving philosophy or having philosophical conclusions. In their paper 
‘Interdisciplinary collaboration in philosophy’, Andrew Higgins and Alexis Dyschkant have argued that 
philosophers should take a more collaborative approach towards other academic disciplines. This 
integrationist position advocates supplementing philosophy’s methodology with the methods and 
tools of the sciences and other disciplines.10  Higgins and Dyschkant argue that philosophers actively 
should communicate and collaborate with nonphilosophers on research and that such cooperation 
would lead to significant benefits for philosophers and progress of philosophy.   
 
10 Andrew Higgens, Alexis Dyschkant, ‘Interdisciplinary collaboration in philosophy’. See also Andrea Polonioli, 
‘New Issues for New Methods: Ethical and Editorial Challenges for an Experimental Philosophy’. 
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However, not all collaboration of this kind has been successful due to philosophers’ lack of experience 
and understanding of the methodology of other disciplines. They note that “too many 
experimentalists have failed to produce philosophically significant work, either because they have 
insufficiently integrated themselves into the research communities they aim to emulate or because 
they have not fully taken advantage of the distinctive methods of philosophy.”11 
To address this deficit, they argue that philosophers should work with nonphilosophers in those 
complementary disciplines. They also provide some guidelines for philosophers working in this 
interdisciplinary space in an attempt to avoid common missteps and violations of the methodological 
norms of those other disciplines. The framework in this thesis is produced in a similar spirit and its 
intended audience is the other side of such interdisciplinary collaborations. It aims to provide guidance 
for nonphilosophers collaborating with philosophers to make forays into philosophical debates or for 
those not currently collaborating with philosophers who have become excited by the potential 
implications for philosophy of their empirical findings. 
In the first part of the thesis, consisting of chapters 2, 3, and 4, I examine one area of empirical and 
theoretical research which it has been argued has significant implications for philosophical ethics: the 
evolutionary origins of morality.  In chapter 2 I introduce the recent research describing the 
evolutionary genealogy of morality to show that such an evolutionary story has much plausibility.  
In chapter 3 I turn to discuss the potential implications this growing understanding of the evolution of 
morality has for philosophical ethics. I look briefly at the attempts by the biologist E. O. Wilson to draw 
ethical conclusions from the evolutionary origins of human nature and sociality. When first published, 
Wilson’s work on human morality and his claims about ethics were highly controversial.  He argues 
that evolutionary biology can shed light on a number of issues: on the metaphysics of morality, on 
what he calls the ‘problem of altruism’, on biological constraints on what we ought to do, and on the 
‘naturalness’ of various human behaviours and consequently their ethical status among other issues. 
 
11 Andrew Higgens, Alexis Dyschkant, ‘Interdisciplinary collaboration in philosophy’, p. 373.  
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Wilson’s arguments are suggestive of a number of different ways in which an understanding of our 
biological origins may provide novel insights into ethics. While suggestive, I conclude Wilson’s 
arguments are either unsuccessful or underdeveloped, and can be used to highlight a number of 
common difficulties or complications in drawing ethical conclusions from evolutionary facts. His work 
shows that useful philosophical conclusions do not simply fall out of the facts about morality’s 
evolutionary genealogy and require argument and engagement with the philosophical literature to 
make progress.  
Secondly, and in more detail, I examine the work of Richard Joyce and Sharon Street who provide 
more sophisticated and in-depth attempts at drawing implications for philosophical ethics from the 
evolution of morality. Joyce argues that because we have evolved to have certain moral beliefs due to 
the evolutionary advantage they gave, moral truth may not have played any part in the genealogy of 
morality and consequently our moral beliefs are in danger of having their justification undermined. In 
contrast to Wilson, Joyce locates his argument in the wider meta-ethical context and addresses the 
philosophical difficulties involved in arguing for his position, and his evolutionary argument raises 
novel considerations for meta-ethical debates about moral scepticism.  
In a related area to Joyce’s argument, Sharon Street puts forward a Dilemma for the Moral Realist that 
aims to challenge them to choose between dropping their commitment to a scientifically defeasible 
account of the evolution of morality and rejecting their theoretical commitment to moral realism. 
According to Street’s argument, if the Moral Realist wishes to avoid the latter choice, they must argue 
that somehow the independent moral truth that Realists are committed to was involved in the 
evolutionary genealogy of morality. Arguably, no realists have adequately met this challenge, and 
indeed it is hard to see how they would go about doing so. If the Moral Realist wishes to reject that 
independent moral truth played a role in the evolution of morality, then they must either accept anti-
realism or claim that a coincidence of fantastic proportions has occurred and our evolved moral 
psychology just happens by chance to be identical to the independent moral reality.   
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In Chapter 4 I examine the outcome of these attempts to put forward philosophical arguments based 
on the evolution of morality and assess what we can learn from these attempts. I argue that ultimately 
Wilson’s attempts are unsuccessful, but that his work is instructive in a number of ways and highlights 
a number of pitfalls in such attempts.  Richard Joyce’s arguments are more successful and provide a 
good model of how to integrate empirical and ethical research. While Joyce’s conclusions are 
somewhat controversial, and he establishes less than he initially sets out to, he nevertheless 
establishes important and noteworthy results. Sharon Street’s argument is more successful in 
establishing what she sets out to achieve, namely showing that evaluative realism that has a 
commitment to mind-independence is untenable. This is a somewhat limited conclusion, but is 
nonetheless important and provides a new and sound argument against some forms of moral realism. 
It pushes the meta-ethical debates in the direction of a more moderate picture of the metaphysics of 
morality and this is an important contribution. When taken together, Street and Joyce’s arguments 
provide a picture of morality in which the metaphysics of morality is limited to certain options.  
I examine where each of Wilson, Joyce, and Street were successful, where they went wrong, and what 
we can learn from their attempts. From looking at the manner of successes and failures of these 
attempts and the lessons we can learn from their missteps, I begin constructing a framework which 
can be useful in assessing arguments of this empirical or evolutionary sort. 
In Chapter 5 I turn to examine the implications of research in psychology for ethics. I give an overview 
of recent work done on moral psychology that is thought to be of relevance to moral philosophy, 
including models of how moral judgment are made by Joshua Greene, Marc Hauser, Jonathan Haidt, 
and Shaun Nichols. I present a combined tentative model of this work, and discuss the philosophical 
work of Nichols who argues for certain theses about moral rationalism and emotivism. 
In Chapter 6 I discuss how empirical considerations about how moral judgments are made may or may 
not have implications for philosophical ethics. There are however limits to the usefulness of discussing 
in the abstract how important the implications of moral psychology for ethics are, and thus following 
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these general remarks I examine two different attempts to draw ethical conclusions from research 
done in moral psychology and in chapter 7, social psychology. 
The first that I look at is from the work of Shaun Nichols, who claims that psychological findings 
undermine ‘moral rationalism’—the idea that moral judgments are closely connected in some way to 
rationality. Nichols thinks that findings concerning psychopaths, people who appear to be 
unmotivated by moral considerations but have intact rational capacities, show that various rationalist 
theses are false. He argues that psychopaths provide a counter-example to empirical rationalism; the 
idea that moral judgments are produced by rational faculties. I evaluate this argument and conclude 
that while the form of rationalism he argues for is in principle a hypothesis that could be tractable to 
empirical methods, there are a number of problems with using the evidence Nichols cites. Nichols also 
argues that conceptual rationalism, the idea that it is part of our concept of a morality that moral 
requirements are rational requirements, is shown to be mistaken by data about people’s concept of a 
psychopath. I argue that this attempt is also unsuccessful due to a number of difficulties involved in 
assessing the content of concepts. 
Secondly, I examine an argument put forward by John Doris and Stephen Stich, who claim that findings 
in social psychology undermine the assumptions of virtue ethics. They argue that various ‘situationist’ 
findings show that people do not have robust dispositions to act virtuously in the sense that virtue 
ethics assumes people have. Thus, their conclusion is that psychological data shows virtue ethics to 
be an untenable theory. I argue that their arguments are unsuccessful for two reasons. Firstly, their 
interpretation of the findings of ‘situationist’ psychology is too extreme, and they generalise too far 
from these results. Secondly there are doubts about whether the conception of virtue they target is 
the same conception as that used by virtue ethicists.  
In chapter 7 I repeat the analysis done in chapter 4 but for the arguments presented in chapters 5 and 
6. I examine what we can learn from attempts to argue for philosophical conclusions based on 
empirical research into morality by Shaun Nichols, Adina Roskies, John Doris and Stephen Stich.  I look 
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at the successes and failures of the presented arguments, and analyse what we can learn from these 
attempts about what a good and bad argument for ethics from empirical research looks like. I draw 
from this analysis the second half of the framework. 
In chapter 8 I present my conclusions about the success of the case studies in drawing conclusions for 
moral philosophy from empirical research and I present the framework to assist in assessing and 





Chapter 2 Evolutionary origins of morality  
2.1 The evolution of morality 
The idea that evolution has may have pernicious implications for morality dates back to the time when 
the theory of evolution was itself developed. There have been many attempts at using evolution to 
undermine the authority of morality or to reveal that “morality is a collective illusion foisted upon us 
by our genes.”12  Often the mainstream philosophical response to these arguments is to dismiss them 
as naïve or misled. Nevertheless, despite the recognition that many of these arguments have been 
poor, there are philosophers and researchers that are intimately familiar with the details of the 
evolutionary origins of morality who think that an understanding of its origins must still somehow 
inform us of useful information about morality’s nature and metaphysics. Indeed, the more familiar 
one becomes with the evolutionary genealogy of morality the harder it becomes to see how it cannot 
have some impact on the kind of thing we think morality is. If moral philosophy is concerned with 
understanding morality, then asking key analysis questions of ‘why’ at different levels of explanation; 
including the evolutionary or ‘ultimate’13 levels, cannot help but be informative. Philosophy often 
progresses when scientific advances make some philosophical questions redundant or through so 
called ‘disciplinary speciation’ where new disciplines emerge from work in philosophy or another 
discipline such as physics, psychology, linguistics, and economics and so on. As David Chalmers notes, 
“these fields have sprung forth as tools have been developed to address questions more precisely and 
more decisively…when we develop methods for conclusively answering philosophical questions, those 
methods come to constitute a new field and the questions are no longer deemed philosophical.”14 
Therefore in this section I briefly attempt to make as plausible as possible the case for evolution 
playing a central role in the origins of morality.  
 
12 Michael Ruse, Taking Darwin seriously, 1986, p. 253.  
13 To borrow Nikolaas Tinbergen’s terminology for evolutionary explanations in biology, originally from ‘On aims 
and methods of ethology’. 




2.2 The evolution of cooperation 
I begin by presenting a brief overview of the processes that gave rise to cooperation and sociality in 
organisms, capacities that are widely held to be the pre-cursors to our moral faculties. I then discuss 
how various processes may have resulted in the transition from cooperation and group living to more 
full-fledged systems of norm-based living and morality. While much of the theory of the emergence 
of cooperation and sociality in organisms is well accepted, the more cognitive and culturally infused 
elements of the evolution of morality are more conjectural and tentative. Nevertheless, there is a 
growing sense that something along such lines must be correct: evolutionary processes must have 
played a large role in shaping the psychological capacities humans use to judge morally and live as 
social creatures.15 
Any evolutionary explanation is one that explains the existence of a trait by a process of variation and 
selection. This process consists of small heritable variations in structure having an effect on the 
phenotype of an organism, which in turn influences its reproductive success or ‘fitness’.  Those 
variations in genotype which result in phenotypes that improve an organism’s fitness become more 
common in successive generations.  Adaptations are the cumulative outcome of many iterations of 
this process: they are the features of organisms that have an identifiable structure, function, use, or 
form16 (this includes both adaptations of the ‘engineering’ type and so called ‘selection-byproduct’ 
adaptations17). Evolutionary pressures that persist through many generations make certain variations 
 
15 As William Fitzpatrick notes in ‘Morality and evolutionary biology’ this has been a growing theme in both 
popular and academic writing, echoing themes in E. O. Wilson’s Sociobiology (although certainly Wilson is not 
the first to make such claims).     
16 This is somewhat ambiguous: there is continuing debate as to whether the term ‘adaptation’ should be 
reserved for features that have an identifiable adaptive function or purpose that has been selected for 
(sometimes termed engineering type adaptations), or whether it should be used more broadly to refer to any 
feature or trait that is the result of evolution (called a selection-product type adaptation). For further discussion 
see Elizabeth Lloyd, ‘Units and levels of selection: an anatomy of the units of selection debates’. 
17 Note this distinction and similar ways in which adaptation and selection can diverge or be present separate to 
each other is also discussed below in section 2.3.3 ‘From sociality to morality – epistemic difficulties’.   
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in the same ‘direction’ consistently fitness enhancing.  The many iterations of this process of 
reproduction and selection ‘accumulate’ and eventually result in identifiable traits. 
The thought of adaptations generally brings to mind images of structural or physiological features of 
organisms such as beaks of a certain shape or size, organs such as gills, specific colours or markings 
and so on.  There is however no reason why adaptations are limited to such physiological features: 
many adaptations are behaviours or mental capacities or structures that mediate adaptive behaviour. 
Morality is the product of traits of this last kind; it is a social phenomenon that is the output of a 
number of interacting and interrelated human faculties, each of which in part, has evolutionary 
origins. To begin answering questions therefore about morality’s phylogeny, we need to examine its 
particular parts, and look at how these elements might have first emerged and only then how they 
may have developed into more complex phenomena. Accordingly, I shall begin by looking at the 
simplest forms of helping behaviour that emerged.   
Helping behaviour simply means behaviour that one organism produces that has beneficial effects for 
the fitness of another organism.  There are no other requirements: the behaviour does not have to be 
consciously performed, it does not have to be performed with the intent to be helpful, and there is no 
requirement that it be ‘altruistic’ in the everyday sense of the word.18 By looking at the most basic 
systems of regulation of social behaviour, we can start to theorize how more complex systems of 
cooperative social behaviour emerge. That such basic processes and systems that are part of our 
phylogeny should still have an influence on our present moral faculties should not be surprising.  
Evolution works by modification of what is already present; new structures or systems come about 
through modification of previous ones.  In the case of morality, we should expect the same to happen: 
more complex forms of mental faculties that allow for social living are modifications and extensions 
of prior, simpler forms of mental faculties for social living. The continuity of evolutionary processes 
 
18 The term ‘altruistic’ is often used with one meaning in biology and another in other disciplines, which can 
result in confusion when the contexts intersect. In biology ‘altruistic behaviour’ usually refers to behaviour that 
is fitness sacrificing for the helping individual and fitness enhancing for the recipient of the helping behaviour.  
In philosophy and everyday usage, it refers roughly to behaviour performed with an unselfish concern for others.  
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means that their history matters. In the following sections I focus on four processes or paths19 that are 
generally identified as having played a part in the evolution of cooperation and helping behaviours in 
animals.  These are: kin selection, mutualism, direct reciprocity, and indirect forms of reciprocity. 
 
2.2.1 Inclusive fitness 
Inclusive fitness, also sometimes known as ‘kin selection’, is perhaps the most prevalent form of 
helping within species of animals that live socially. The basic idea of kin selection is that an organism 
can increase the frequency of its genes in a population by helping its kin. An organism shares some 
proportion of its genes with its kin, so one way to improve the reproductive success of its own genes 
is to improve the reproductive chances of its kin by helping them. The helping behaviours incur some 
fitness cost to the organism, but as long as this cost is outweighed by the fitness benefits to the 
helping organism’s kin then the net result is evolutionarily advantageous. This relationship was 
formalized by William Hamilton in his 1964 article20 and has become known as Hamilton’s rule. This 
rule simply states that helping behaviour can occur between kin when the following inequality is 
satisfied:  
RB – C > 0 
Where R is the genetic relatedness of the helper to the recipient, B is the reproductive benefit gained 
by the recipient, and C is the cost to the individual that is helping. The outcome of this rule is that we 
should expect that the frequency and ‘value’ of the helping behaviours will be proportional to the 
relatedness of two individuals.  Thus, in sexually reproducing species such as our own (with one 
chromosome of each pair from each parent), the genetic relatedness of siblings is approximately 0.5, 
parents to offspring is also 0.5, grand-children are 0.25, and cousins 0.125 and we should expect that 
altruistic behaviour should be more frequent and more substantial between those individuals with 
 
19 Lee Dugatkin’s term for these processes in his ‘The evolution of cooperation: Four paths to the evolution and 
maintenance of cooperative behaviour’.  
20 W. D. Hamilton, ‘The genetical evolution of social behaviour’. 
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higher coefficients of relatedness.  This prediction is borne out in the fact that fitness sacrificing 
helping behaviour in such species is most prevalent between parents to offspring and between siblings 
and close kin, with the closest genetic relationships engendering the most significant helping 
behaviour.21 
Kin selection provides a well understood and well confirmed theory of why many helping behaviours 
directed at kin are present in a diverse range of species. In what way might this contribute to the 
explanation of morality (remembering that here we are only interested in the first steps towards, or 
elements of morality, which can help account for its emergence)?  Firstly, familial relations form a 
significant part of the moral domain. Certainly, a large part of our moral behaviour involves relations 
with non-kin, yet at least some of our moral obligations are to family and some of these are unique to 
family.  
There are however, other more concrete ways in which kin selection contributes to the ‘building 
blocks’ of morality, including towards non-kin, through the proximate mechanisms it helped construct.  
The proximate mechanisms of kin selection are the particular systems that allow organisms to 
recognize kin and regulate helping towards them.  Firstly, the system that recognizes kin may not end 
up ‘targeting’ only kin.  For example, many birds ‘imprint’ on and thus take to be their parent, the first 
suitable moving object they see.  The range of suitable moving objects turns out to be quite wide, and 
there are many documented cases of birds imprinting on humans, other animals, and even moving 
inanimate objects.  While some kind of imprinting may or may not be part of the process of kin-
recognition in humans, it serves to illustrate that mechanisms for targeting kin can be far from perfect 
in novel circumstances while being sufficiently effective in their usual environments.  In humans, there 
appears to be a strong propensity to treat those raised with us from a very young age as siblings.  This 
mechanism (like imprinting) may have been highly effective at picking out genetically related siblings 
 
21 Ibid., also see Austin Hughes, Evolution and human kinship, for a full treatment of kin selection in human and 
non-human animals.  
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in our evolutionary past where populations were structured in small family groups. There is evidence 
that such a propensity exists in the form of what is known as the Westermarck effect.  This is when 
individuals who are raised together from an early age become desensitized to sexual attraction to one 
another. It has been hypothesized that this is the result of an incest avoidance mechanism and thus 
requires kin recognition.  Evidence for this phenomenon can be seen in Israeli Kibbutzim (with 
extremely low rates of intermarriage between children raised communally) and in arranged marriages 
in China (where young girls who are to marry a young male member of a family are adopted and 
treated as daughters, with the common outcome of failed marriages due to the absence of ‘romantic’ 
interest).  So, if kin targeting systems are based on a heuristic, such as ‘treat as kin those you are raised 
with from an early age’, then it is possible that behaviour that is the result of an adaptation for helping 
kin may end up being targeted at non-kin in novel environments.  As Richard Joyce writes, because 
“humans now live in societies in which we interact with far more conspecifics than natural selection 
ever dreamed of (including ‘virtual interactions’ supplied by TV, newspapers, and so forth), then one 
would expect to observe ceteris paribus, a great deal of helping behaviour towards non-kin, despite 
the fact that kin selection is the only explanatory process in play.”22 
The third way in which kin selection may have contributed to morality is through the construction of 
motivationally powerful proximal mechanisms that regulate helping behaviour.  Since natural 
selection operates on variation of what is already present, it is unsurprising to find old structures that 
originally developed due to one kind of selective pressure being recruited for other purposes or uses.  
One non-moral example of such a change of uses for a proximal mechanism is oxytocin, a hormone in 
mammals that originally regulated maternal nurturing behavior towards offspring, but was later 
modified to also play a role in regulating pair-bonding behaviour.23 So, while the proximal mechanisms 
for helping behaviour may have developed to promote cooperation with kin, there is reason to think 
 
22 Richard Joyce, The evolution of morality, p. 23. 
23 Example from ibid., p. 22. See also, Allman, J. Evolving brains, p. 97 and 199. 
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that these mechanisms could have been put to use in subsequent mechanisms for regulating helping 
behaviour towards non-kin.   
 
2.2.2 Mutualism 
By-product mutualism (hereafter simply mutualism) is perhaps the most straightforward process that 
gives rise to helping behaviours. This is the easiest form of cooperation to explain evolutionarily 
because it describes a situation where fitness is enhanced for both participants immediately, and the 
fitness benefits outweigh the cost of participating for both organisms at the same time. An illustration 
of this kind of cooperation is cooperative hunting. By hunting together, a pair of individuals may be 
able to capture prey that they would be unable to capture alone. In mutualism there is little 
opportunity to ‘defect’ or ‘free-ride’ in an attempt to attain the benefits of the cooperation without 
paying the costs: all participants must contribute for the benefits to be available at all and the benefits 
of cheating are less than the reward available by cooperating.  Another important feature of 
mutualism is that it does not require a stable or ongoing relationship between participants: because 
participants benefit immediately, it is in their interests to cooperate in such circumstances (where 
interests means what is fitness enhancing) regardless of whether they participate in future mutualistic 
behaviour or never interact again. 
While the process of mutualism may be conceptually simple to understand as clearly favouring 
cooperation, it does not follow that the type of behavioural strategies or the proximal mechanisms 
underlying such strategies are themselves correspondingly simple. Mutualism requires coordinated 
action on the part of participating organisms, and in cognitively capable species, is likely to produce 
psychologies that are on the lookout for the possibility of cooperative exchanges.  Further, the 
proximal mechanisms used for mutualism may be modifications of proximal mechanisms for helping 
kin (a possible first step towards helping directed ‘purposely’ at non-kin), and may themselves have 
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been modified by other processes for further use, such as in kinds of reciprocity or helping behaviour 
selected for by group selection (more on this in §2.2.4 and §2.3).   
 
2.2.3 Cooperation 
The idea of direct reciprocity is that sometimes it can be in the interests of an organism to behave in 
ways that advance another organism’s fitness, if doing so will result in the other organism returning 
the favour at some point in the future. This can be for a number of reasons: the value of the help can 
exceed the cost incurred by the helper (meaning that overall the costs to each participant are 
outweighed by the benefits), alternatively the benefits may be impossible to attain without such a 
‘turn taking’ practice occurring, or it may be that each organism’s contribution is of a specialized kind 
which provides benefits that would be unattainable without the cooperation.  Such a system has 
enormous potential for enhancing fitness, but it is also one that is difficult to establish and maintain.  
The difficulty is that reciprocity is vulnerable to exploitation by free-riders: organisms that accept help 
from others (they get the benefits) without themselves helping in return (they do not pay the costs).   
This difficulty is often illustrated using the prisoner’s dilemma, a model from game theory.  The original 
thought experiment goes something like the following.  Imagine you and an accomplice have been 
arrested and are charged with committing a crime (whether either of you actually did commit a crime 
is of no consequence).  You are separated from your accomplice, and given the following options: 
• If you confess against your accomplice, and your accomplice remains silent, you will go free 
and your accomplice will be sentenced to 10 years in prison. 
• If you confess against your accomplice, and your accomplice confesses against you, you will 
both be sentenced to 5 years in prison. 




• If you remain silent, and your accomplice confesses against you, you will be sentenced to 10 
years in prison, and your accomplice will go free.24  
These options can be summarized in a matrix to make the situation’s structure clearer: 
                                                 Accomplice (A) 
 
You (Y) 
 Confess Remain Silent 
Confess 
Y = 5 years 
A = 5 years 
Y = 0 years 
A = 10 years 
Remain Silent 
Y = 10 years 
A = 0 years 
Y = 2 years 
A = 2 years 
Figure 1: Prisoner’s dilemma  
In a one-off prisoner’s dilemma, since you do not know what your accomplice will do, the best option 
is to confess. We can see this by considering the payoffs of your options when your accomplice 
confesses and remains silent. If he confesses, you have two options. You could confess and you will 
get 5 years, or you could remain silent and get 10 years. So, if he confesses you should also confess.  
If he remains silent, again you have two options.  You could confess, in which case you will go free, or 
you could remain silent, in which case you will get 2 years. So, if he remains silent, you should still 
confess.  So, for either option that your accomplice chooses, your prison term will be minimized by 
confessing. 
The structure of the prisoner’s dilemma can be summarized by ordering the payoffs from most 
individually desirable to least.25 
T > R > P > S 
 
24 Description based on that given in James Rachels, The Elements of Moral Philosophy, p. 148. 
25 Description of ordinal payoffs from Steven Kuhn, ‘Prisoner dilemma’. 
25 
 
Here T stands for ‘Temptation’, the payoff a participant receives when they confess and their 
accomplice remains silent. R is the ‘Reward’ that both players receive if they both remain silent. P is 
the ‘Punishment’ a participant receives when they confess and so does their accomplice, and S is the 
‘Sucker’s’ payoff that a participant receives if they are the only one to remain silent.  Any such situation 
that has the above payoff ordering can be considered to be a prisoner’s dilemma. Such situations can 
be used to model potential cooperative situations in biology if we assume that natural selection will 
produce organisms that employ strategies to maximise their fitness in much the same way as one of 
game theory’s ‘rational agents’ will make choices that maximise their own interests. If this is the case, 
then we can expect that organisms that face a situation where fitness can be maximised by free-riding 
or defecting will do so.  This is why, as Kim Sterelny concludes, “for most animal species, the 
temptation to defect subverts cooperation.”26   
How then, if cheating is always the best option in a prisoner’s dilemma, can cooperation result from 
such situations?  The answer is that such opportunities for cooperation arise not once, but repeatedly. 
Thus, if an individual with an appropriate strategy can interact on enough occasions with another 
individual with a similar cooperative strategy, higher long term payoffs are available than in a single 
instance of a prisoners dilemma. This is because the two options that will be available consistently in 
an iterated prisoners dilemma are R (both cooperating) and P (both defecting). Any organism that 
settles for S – the suckers payoff (cooperating while their partner defects) is not likely to last very long; 
being defected on consistently is not a viable strategy.  Thus, since R > P, strategies that employ 
reciprocal cooperation will result in more evolutionary advantageous outcomes than strategies of 
reciprocal defection.  Those organisms that consistently receive reward payoffs will be fitter than 
those that receive the punishment outcome.  
There is a large body of work on strategies that achieve this outcome as evolutionary solutions to the 
prisoner’s dilemma.  The standard starting point for discussion of strategies comes from Robert 
 
26 Kim Sterelny, Thought in a hostile world: The evolution of human cognition, p. 124. 
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Axelrod’s computer simulations of various strategies competing in iterated prisoner’s dilemma 
tournaments.27  In Axelrod’s experiments the strategy of ‘tit-for-tat’ was the most successful in a range 
of populations made up of various strategies.  Tit-for-tat is a simple algorithm that starts by 
cooperating and each round follows what its opponent does in the previous round.  This strategy reaps 
the benefits of cooperation (it will cooperate while its partner does – the R payoff), does not allow 
itself to be exploited (it defects as soon as its partner attempts to do so: resulting in T, and avoiding 
the sucker’s payoff S), and it is forgiving (if a defecting partner starts cooperating again, it will also do 
so).  The outcome of this large (and still expanding) body of work on algorithmic strategies for 
cooperation is that there are a number of effective solutions to the iterated prisoner’s dilemma that 
consistently favour mutual cooperation over mutual defection.  The optimal strategy in any particular 
‘tournament-like’ situation depends on a number of things including what strategies the other 
individuals in the population use, whether there is any ‘noise’ introduced into interactions, or any 
other assumptions that are added to the model to make it more representative of ‘real’ situations.   
The adaptive advantage of cooperation is immense but despite the success of theoretical models, 
direct reciprocity does not appear to be a widespread process in nature (excluding perhaps some of 
the higher primates).  Marc Hauser provides a relatively comprehensive overview of the empirical 
evidence for direct reciprocity28 including studies of vampire bats, blue jays, capuchin monkeys, and 
cotton-top tamarins, guppies during predator inspection, cooperative territorial defense in lions, 
grooming among impala and a number of nonhuman primates, coalitions among male baboons and 
among dolphins for access to females, and food-sharing among chimpanzees. He concludes that either 
animals do not reciprocate and apparent cases can be explained by other processes (such as 
mutualism or misdirected kin selection), or if there is reciprocity, then it is uncommon, unstable, or 
only generated under artificial conditions. While reciprocal behaviour might be an adaptive strategy, 
 
27 Robert Axelrod, William D. Hamilton, ‘The evolution of cooperation’. 




the conditions necessary for it to get off the ground are generally not met.  In the very limited cases 
where helping behaviours such as grooming are exchanged, the reciprocation involves only one single 
commodity, in a limited and particular context, and the time between helping behaviour and 
reciprocation is usually very short. 29  So, it seems that direct reciprocity cannot account for the 
generation of much helping behaviour. While recent empirical work points towards many of the 
purported examples of reciprocity being cases of the other processes discussed in this chapter, as we 
shall see in the next section, the theoretical models of reciprocity are still important.  While most 
animals only display at the most, specific kinds of reciprocity with very short time spans between 
reciprocation, reciprocity among humans is the opposite.  It displays a high level of generality and 
abstractness; one thing may be traded for another of a different kind, and reciprocal relationships are 
maintained that have long periods of time between acts of reciprocation.  
To summarize, reciprocity, if it contributes to the explanation of morality, does so in one of two ways. 
Firstly, it may have had a role early on, in producing mechanisms to motivate organisms to make basic 
exchanges of items such as food or behaviours such as grooming – although the evidence for such 
propensities is limited. Secondly, these motivational structures may be available later on for 
modification by subsequent processes, which working alongside other cognitive capacities, produce 
much more abstract and general forms of reciprocal exchange.  The next section focuses on this 
possibility.    
 
2.2.4 Indirect reciprocity 
Indirect reciprocity, as its name suggests, introduces an intermediate step into reciprocal interactions.  
The intermediate step is the exchange of a form of currency for social interaction: reputation. In a 
prisoner’s dilemma, the direct reciprocity solution depends on responding appropriately to the 
previous interaction. If one player cooperates in one round, it shows they are willing to cooperate in 
 
29 Ibid., p. 391.  
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the next and as long their cooperation is met with cooperation from the other player a reciprocal 
relationship can be maintained.  There are reasons to think however, that the prisoner’s dilemma is 
too simplistic to be an adequate model for this kind of interaction in many of the more cognitively 
developed animals and in humans. The main reasons for this are as follows. Firstly, individuals do not 
live in an epistemic vacuum; often they will have the opportunity to observe how others interact 
before they themselves interact with them.  They can therefore gain information about what kind of 
strategy others are using, and what to expect in interactions with that individual. Secondly, individuals 
within a population of possible reciprocating partners are not (despite the model’s name) prisoners: 
they are not locked into an endless cycle of mutual defections with one partner that will not 
cooperate. Individuals may cease unproductive interaction with defectors, often while incurring very 
few costs at all to themselves. This alters the payoff structure considerably: defecting may result in 
the individual who was cheated withdrawing all possible future interactions with that particular non-
cooperator.  Thirdly, with reputation, the capacity to punish non-cooperators is much higher.  Not only 
can you withdraw the future opportunity to interact, you can punish even more severely by 
discouraging other individuals from interacting with the defector.  
Once helping behaviours can be traded, reciprocal relationships can give rise to specialisation which 
makes reciprocity an even stronger strategy.  Reciprocity and specialisation can work in conjunction 
to ‘push’ each other to greater levels. Such reciprocal behaviour is a non-zero-sum game – if some 
behaviour costs each organism very little, but helps another significantly, then the benefits to 
participants can greatly exceed the costs paid by each.  The cognitive requirements for this kind of 
indirect reciprocity however are not insignificant. Individuals need to be able to recognize each other, 
remember what was traded, and be able to estimate the benefits and costs of such a trade.  They need 
to be able to tell when help is given intentionally, or if it was simply a by-product of some other action 
or even an accident.  Making use of reputations for deciding whether or not to interact with an 
individual involves being aware of the standing of others, and being able to effectively read and 
transmit signals about others’ statuses. One of the key features that make cooperation through 
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indirect reciprocity more tenable is the possibility of cheap enforcement through the reputation. 
Enforcement significantly alters the structure of the payoffs from that of a traditional prisoner’s 








 Defect Cooperate 
Defect 
A = 2 
B = 2 
A = 0 
B = 10 
Cooperate 
A = 10 
B = 0  
A = 5 
B = 5 
Figure 2: Prisoner’s dilemma payoffs without punishment 
To a structure where the payoff for defection is made undesirable due to punishment, similar to this: 
 
 




 Defect Cooperate 
Defect 
A = -2 
B = -2 
A = 0 
B = -2 
Cooperate 
A = -2 
B = 0  
A = 5 
B = 5 
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Figure 3: Prisoner’s dilemma payoffs with punishment 
Clearly in a situation such as this where any defection is punished, the best option is to cooperate. 
Here the prisoner’s dilemma payoff ordering, T>R>P>S, becomes R>S>P>T.  Thus, punishment of 
defection, if it can be established, is an effective way to suppress the temptation to free-ride in 
cooperative situations. Reputations based on how one interacts with other individuals, and social 
pressure to conform to cooperative behaviours is one possible way that punishment can be 
implemented without high costs to those individuals participating in the punishment (this also diffuses 
somewhat the problem of ‘second-order’ defection – free-riding in cooperative situations of 
enforcement).  So, the prisoner’s dilemma is a useful tool in modelling potential cooperative situations 
of a less mechanical or algorithmic kind.  Due to its cognitive requirements, indirect reciprocity is 
unlikely to be present in less cognitively advanced organisms, but in conjunction with the processes in 
the next sections, it is plausible that it played a significant role in the evolution of more advanced kinds 
of cooperation. 
 
2.3 Evolved normative guidance? 
The previous sections discuss the most important processes involved in the development of helping 
behaviours in the animal world, and how increasing cognitive complexity and plasticity in response to 
potential cooperative situations could result in more advanced kinds of cooperation.  For the most 
part, biology provides an empirically backed, coherent, and explanatory account of the beginnings and 
adaptive advantage of cooperation and social behaviour in animals. Clearly however, this is just part 
of the origin of human morality; there is still a large gap in both magnitude and kind between human 
social interaction and the social interactions of the rest of the animal world. There is an increasing 
amount of theoretical work being done on the processes that were involved in getting from 
cooperative and social forms of living to the ultra-sociality and advanced normative guidance of 
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humans.30  It has been theorized that there are a number of processes or elements that were involved 
in this transition. Morality and normative guidance require language, so one of the key elements that 
developed was the emergence of language capabilities in the human lineage. Another likely key 
element was the evolution of uniquely improved forms of social learning which resulted in humans 
having a pervasive and highly variable culture. It has been hypothesized that this allowed group 
selection based on cultural variation to take off. In the next sections I discuss first the evolution of 
language and its contribution to morality and then culture and group selection and their possible 
contributions.  
 
2.3.1 Morality and the evolution of language 
In higher animals and primates, the social problems solved by the processes of kin selection, 
reciprocity, mutualism and so on, seem to be analogous to the ‘subject matter’ of moral judgments, 
and there are good reasons to think that parts of homologous motivational structures are in place in 
such animals.31  Some of the most obvious features that are missing from these kinds of cooperation 
are the cognitive, conceptual, and linguistic elements, and also the authority, and apparent normative 
force that human morality involves. Cooperation in higher animals and primates appears to be 
mediated mostly by pro-social urges, but as the discussion of direct reciprocity indicated, the potency 
of these pro-social feelings is limited: they are vulnerable to breakdown in situations where social 
defection would benefit an individual. Philip Kitcher provides a good illustration of this, summarizing 
a case from Frans De Waal’s Chimpanzee Politics where cooperation is undermined by social defection 
for self-interested goals: 
 
30 See William Fitzpatrick ‘Morality and evolutionary biology’, specifically section 2.3 ‘Explaining the origins of 
morality: From psychological altruism to the evolution of normative guidance’. 
31 Frans de Waal provides an argument for this in the form of a principle of evolutionary parsimony.  He argues 
that the best explanation of the apparent emotions we see in social interactions in primates is that they really 
are there: we should not posit new ad hoc motivational structures when we already have good candidates for 
the job. See Frans de Waal, Primates and philosophers: How morality evolved, pp. 61-62.  
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Researchers spent the daylight hours observing the behaviour of a colony of 
chimpanzees in Arnhem, Holland. They duly recorded patterns of association, 
alliances that enabled animals to obtain outcomes they wanted.   For some years, 
two males had supported one another in this way until the two, in concert, 
dethroned the male who had previously been dominant.  At that point, one of the 
males forsook his old coalition-partner (friend?), pursuing a strategy apparently 
aimed at monopolizing the females of the colony. This action precipitated a series 
of intense conflicts, with swiftly changing alliances and profound social instability.  
In the end, the male who forsook his old alliance was savagely attacked by the 
former dominant male and the forsaken friend, and the attack proved fatal.32 
This scenario is not atypical for non-human primate societies: primate social life involves participation 
in coalitions and cooperation of various kinds, and these relations are frequently disrupted by 
defection. As Kitcher puts it there is a “delicate interplay of opposing forces – the altruistic dispositions 
drawing animals to act together and the selfish disruptions threatening to decompose the social 
group.”33  This disruption results regularly in a breakdown of social cohesion requiring time-consuming 
repair: usually in the form of mutual grooming. Grooming takes up a considerable amount of time, far 
more than is necessary or useful for the removal of parasites in primates such as chimpanzees or 
bonobos.  One implication of this is that the amount of time spent cooperating is limited by the 
amount of time available for social repair: fighting individuals do not make good cooperators.  Another 
implication is that social group size is limited.  Since grooming is a one-to-one activity, the number of 
individuals that can groom each other is heavily restricted.   
At most non-human primates have about 20% of their ‘time-budget’ to spend on grooming.34 At some 
point however our ancestors circumvented this limitation.  One way we can tell that this happened is 
 
32 Philip Kitcher, ‘Biology and ethics’, p. 171. 
33 Ibid., p. 171. 
34 Dunbar, R. I. M., ‘Coevolution of neocortical size, group size and language in humans’. This is an empirical 
finding; when required to spend more time on grooming, primate groups will cease to function and will disperse. 
Dunbar explains: “Given that primate groups are held together by social grooming, time budget constraints on 
group size become an important consideration. Even if a species has the cognitive capacity to manage all the 
relationships involved in large groups, there may be circumstances under which the animals simply do not have 
the time available to devote to servicing those relationships through social grooming. Relationships that are not 
serviced in this way will cease to function effectively; as a result, the group will tend to disperse and the 




by looking at brain sizes (more specifically the ratio of neo-cortex volume to the total volume of the 
brain). In surviving species of primate there is a strong correlation between this neo-cortex ratio and 
group size: the larger the neo-cortex (proportionally) the larger the group size. As group size increases, 
the time required for maintenance of social relationships increases.  Based on the correlation between 
group sizes and neo-cortex ratios, estimates of the duration various hominid ancestors would have 
had to spend on grooming every other member of the group have been made.  For Australopithecines, 
estimates place group size at roughly 67, requiring 18% of their time-budgets for grooming; Homo 
Habilis in groups of about 82, requiring 23% of their time; Homo erectus at 111 in a group and 31% of 
their time; and Homo Neanderthalensis at 143 and a large 41% of their time.35 So from the early Homo 
(habilis and rudolfensis) onwards, the time required for grooming was more than what was likely to 
be available.36  
The outcome of these considerations is that somewhere along the line, hominids must have hit upon 
a new and much more efficient substitute for social exchange: language.  If large group size was 
sufficiently adaptively advantageous37 then there would be increasing pressure for more efficient 
forms of exchanging information about relationships and conduct of group members.  Language is a 
powerful tool for social interaction for a number of reasons.  The reputation component of indirect 
reciprocity immediately becomes more accessible if one can talk with others about the 
trustworthiness of prospective interactants. Compared to individually trying to observe how every 
other individual acts, conversations about others’ conduct are an information goldmine.  The amount 
of information gathered and social ‘networking’ that can be accomplished in 20% of one’s time far 
outweighs methods requiring direct interaction between each individual.  Additionally language is an 
important instrument for allowing reputation to be used for punishment and commendation. 
Information can be directly conveyed as to what kinds of treatment people deserve based on what 
 
35 Leslie C. Aiello, R. I. M. Dunbar, ‘Neocortex size, group size, and the evolution of language’, pp. 188-189. 
36 Ibid. 
37 There are a number of hypotheses as to why this might be so, the most obvious being larger numbers were 
advantageous in intergroup conflict. See Richard Alexander, The biology of moral systems, pp. 79-81. 
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actions they have made. Also, reciprocal exchanges that involve anything beyond the most basic kinds 
of ‘trades’ create pressure for more efficient forms of information transfer. Leda Cosmides and John 
Tooby illustrate this nicely in the following:  
If I want to exchange an axe for something, how do I indicate what I want?  Let’s 
say that I point to the pear you are holding in your hand.  What am I referring to 
by pointing at the pear? Do I want that particular pear? Any pear at all? Five 
bushels of pears? A fruit of some kind, not necessarily a pear? To be led to the site 
where you found such good pears?38  
Thus, language use would be a highly valuable tool in making reciprocal exchanges and may have been 
necessary for any trades beyond a certain level of complexity. 
So, the hypothesis is that language functioned as a more efficient substitute for peacemaking and 
social bond maintenance activities such as grooming, and additionally it enabled a huge increase in 
the exchange of information, especially about the social conduct of group members. A large part of 
the adaptive value of such communication is that people with poor reputations can be avoided, 
shunned, or punished, and those with good reputations interacted with and commended to others as 
good co-operators. The kind of information conveyed in conversations, was for the most part, not 
simply descriptions of behaviour: the purpose of the communication was to criticize and commend 
other’s behaviour. As Richard Joyce amusingly writes “Effective (juicy) gossip involves more than mere 
descriptions of who did what to whom; it embodies praising and condemnatory language – perhaps 
along the lines of ‘Ogg never repaid Gak for that axe: the scoundrel!’ (to choose a rather quaint 
translation) or ‘Klug always repays a favor: He’s a great guy!’”39 So, right from the outset, it is plausible 
that language used in social contexts may have conveyed both information (not repaying an axe, or 
being someone who reliably repays favours) and also evaluative content (he’s a scoundrel, a great 
guy).  
 
38  Leda Cosmides, John Tooby, ‘Evolutionary psychology and the generation of culture, part II: Case study: A 
computational theory of social exchange”, p. 64. 
39 Richard Joyce, The evolution of morality, p. 91. 
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The evolution of language was clearly an important element in enabling the possibility of normative 
guidance – a capacity to establish rules and have those rules impact on the wishes, plans and 
intentions of all the members of a group in a way that permitted high levels of cooperation and 
collective action.40 Without language, morality as it exists in humans would not be possible: morality 
and normative guidance require evaluative concepts, and further, these must be communicable.41 For 
example, to formulate the idea that Ogg is a scoundrel requires a kind of conceptual complexity that 
is only available to language users and the communication of such information is only feasible for 
language users (imagine trying to communicate that you saw someone take more than their fair share 
of food without being able to use any of our linguistic capacities). Once established, normative 
guidance enabled the group size limits to be transcended and induced more stability into what was 
previously a somewhat fragile and turbulent early hominid social climate.  This transition allowed the 
change from pre-moral primates and hominids that simply accepted or did not accept particular 
behaviours and reacted in either hostile or friendly ways, to organisms that had an awareness of 
whether particular behaviours broke certain norms, and that particular behaviours will not only 
provoke hostile or friendly reactions from other group members, but also merit or deserve particular 
reactions.  
Language is an extremely important and integral element of morality and social living in humans. 
Language made it possible to easily express, memorize, and exchange information, evaluations, and 
concepts. It allowed huge increases in productivity and the number of problems solvable 
cooperatively. While the evolution of language was a necessary component for the evolution of 
morality, the evidence regarding when language evolved is relatively inconclusive even relative to 
other processes such as the development of culture. The fossil evidence is ambiguous and scarce, with 
some claiming that there are identifiable brain structures associated with language present in 
hominids from two million years ago, while others argue that the soft anatomy of the vocal tract 
 
40 Philip Kitcher, Biology and ethics, p. 172.  
41 For a discussion of this, see Richard Joyce, The Evolution of morality, pp 80-85. 
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indicates that even very recent hominids, perhaps only 50,000 years ago still may have only had 
extremely limited speech.42 Additionally, it is not easy to find other empirical evidence that is relevant 
to finding out how or when the transition from non-linguistic to linguistic communities took place.  For 
these reasons, while the evolution of language seems to be highly relevant for explaining how morality 
developed, accounts of its role are still highly theoretical and somewhat speculative. 
 
2.3.2 Group selection and culture 
Multilevel selection has been the subject of considerable debate in biology in the last 40 years, during 
which there has been little consensus as to its status. There is however something of a trend towards 
its acceptance, especially in relation to its role in explaining the evolution of new levels of hierarchical 
organisation in the biological world. Examples of these transitions where lower-level entities 
aggregate to create new higher-level entities include the transitions from individual genetic molecules 
to chromosomes, prokaryotes to eukaryotes, single-celled organisms to multi-celled ones, and in 
group selection (the transition that this section focuses on) from individual organisms to cooperative 
groups of many such organisms.43  A striking feature of these transitions is that while they involve 
selection operating at both levels simultaneously, they ultimately result in a high degree of functional 
integration (i.e. cooperation) and suppression of competition between the lower-level entities.44   
While group selection is somewhat contentious, some like Kim Sterelny have argued that it played a 
pivotal role in the extraordinary levels of cooperation found in humans.45 The thought here is that 
group selection became important once a certain level of social capability was present, and once it did 
take off, it allowed for even more comprehensive and pervasive kinds of cooperation to develop. 
Sterelny puts forward three conditions that must be met if group selection is to be a powerful 
 
42 Peter Richerson, Robert Boyd, Not by genes alone, p. 144. 
43 Examples from Samir Okasha, Recent work on the levels of selection problem, p. 350. 
44 Ibid., p. 350. 
45 See Kim Sterelny, Thought in a hostile world: The evolution of human cognition, pp. 123-145. 
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evolutionary process.46 Firstly, there must be variation in the groups’ levels of cooperativeness (i.e. 
something that allows them to be differentially successful). Secondly, cooperative individuals must 
have a tendency to form groups with other cooperative individuals. And thirdly, the fitness advantage 
bestowed by being members of cooperative groups must outweigh the fitness advantage of selfish 
individuals over cooperative individuals in mixed groups. There are generally two ways this third 
condition can be met: either the fitness benefits to those that free-ride over those that do not are 
relatively small compared to the fitness advantages at the group level, or there are barriers which stop 
free-riding or make it a costly choice.  
There are a number of reasons to think that humans and our predecessors satisfy these conditions.  
Social learning and primitive forms of culture can provide large variation in the fitness levels of groups. 
Indeed the variation between different groups is one of the notable features of humans: neighbouring 
groups of modern humans can have radically different cultures including different languages, dress, 
social structures, technological advancements, religious beliefs, foods, and customs. Having a 
tendency to form groups and cooperate with other individuals who are part of the social group is a 
well-established tendency in human primate ancestors.  Finally, human cognitive abilities can also 
achieve both the flattening of fitness advantages of free-riders, and impose barriers to free-riding 
taking place: the monitoring of cheaters and imposing of sanctions on them can significantly alter the 
cost to benefit ratio so as to make free-riding not worthwhile.47   These kinds of punishment or 
enforcement behaviours need not be of the costly or dangerous kind either, as Richard Joyce reminds 
us “if the punishment is the withdrawal of social esteem, which can be distributed or denied like a 
magical substance, or exclusion from ongoing beneficial exchanges, then punishment can often be 
meted out at no cost.”48 
 
46 Ibid., pp. 125-126. 
47 The details of cooperation for enforcement are complicated – enforcement itself is a cooperation problem 
and therefore immediately raises the possibility of so called second order defection problems.  Kim Sterelny 
offers a good introduction to these difficulties and the processes that may have overcome such difficulties. See 
Thought in a hostile world, p. 126. 
48 Richard Joyce, The evolution of morality, p. 41. 
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Thus, the advent of our species’ unique capacities for culture is thought to have had substantial 
implications for the development of the uniquely social forms of living in humans.  Culture here simply 
means any “information capable of affecting individuals’ behaviour that they acquire from other 
members of their species through teaching, imitation, and other forms of social transmission.”49 Social 
learning and imitation, resulting in distinctive cultures, tends to increase the variation between 
groups, while simultaneously reducing the variation within groups.50 Significant variation between 
groups and homogeneity of individuals within groups, can allow for powerful selection at the level of 
the group to take place. Peter Richerson and Richard Boyd argue that the human capacity for social 
learning and cumulative culture, via a kind of population-structured selection based on cultural 
groups, gave rise to a new kind of social world – an environment that drove the selection of novel 
social instincts in the human lineage.  For example, if group selection as a result of the varying cultural 
practices in groups creates an environment where cooperation is rewarded and non-cooperation is 
heavily discouraged and punished, then the climate in which gene selection is to take place has 
changed dramatically: genetic selection in such conditions will be likely to result in psychologies 
strongly disposed towards cooperative social behaviour. This interaction between the various 
processes and the resulting pressure towards pro-social behaviours operating on organisms with 
already functional mechanisms for motivating social interactions resulted in the cooperation explosion 
that is unique to humans. This kind of theory of simultaneous and interacting cultural and genetic 
inheritance is sometimes called a “dual inheritance theory.”51  
Richerson and Boyd argue that this kind of co-evolution of culture and human psychology has a deep 
evolutionary history, and as a result we have deeply entrenched “tribal” instincts to go along with the 
 
49 Definition from Peter Richerson, Richard Boyd, Not by genes alone, p. 5.  
50 Kim Sterelny, Thought in a hostile world, p. 127.    
51 Sterelny describes ‘dual inheritance’ as follows: “Children resemble their parents because of the flow of genes 
from parents to children. But children also resemble their parents because there is an extensive and accurate 
flow of information from parent to child”, Kim Sterelny, ‘Review: Genes, memes and human history’, p. 250. 
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pro-social instincts that evolved earlier in our phylogeny.52 By “tribal” instincts they mean a suite of 
new social instincts suited to life in groups, 
…including a psychology which “expects” life to be structured by moral norms and 
is designed to learn and internalize such norms; new emotions, such as shame and 
guilt, which increase the chance the norms are followed; and a psychology which 
“expects” the social world to be divided into symbolically marked groups.53 
So, the role of group selection is generally thought to have been influential later on than the processes 
leading to cooperation discussed in previous sections. It required cognitive capacities that were most 
likely the result of these earlier processes and depended upon the variation between groups (and 
uniformity within groups) which was due to cultural evolution. This altered environment produced 
strong selective pressures for a “tribal” social psychology. Richerson and Boyd think that without 
including cultural causes, the explanation for human’s unique sociality is incomplete.  
The theory they present is plausible, and highlights the possibility that culture and social learning had 
a much more direct influence on genetic evolution than has previously been attributed to it.  While 
the anthropological data they provide for cultural evolution as a process taking place in both historical 
and contemporary times is compelling, the support for the further claim that culture changed the 
selective environment in ways that resulted in ‘tribal’ social instincts evolving, is lacking. Data on 
hunter gatherers from contemporary or recent historical sources is unable to provide support for the 
operation of the hypothesized processes in prehistoric times. As Stephen Shennan has commented, it 
still remains “unclear whether we can apply Richerson and Boyd’s models in a reasonably empirically 
constrained way to explain the deep human history that archaeologists try to study.”54 Additionally, 
Richerson and Boyd readily admit that “paleoanthropologists have no idea when human language 
evolved”55 which is undoubtedly important to the development of social systems based on norms and 
 
52 Peter Richerson, Richard Boyd, Not by genes alone, p. 196. 
53 Ibid., p. 214.  
54  Stephen Shennan, ‘Not by genes alone: How culture transformed human evolution, by Peter J. Richerson and 
Robert Boyd’, p. 297. 
55 Peter Richerson, Robert Boyd, Not by genes alone, p. 144. 
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more generally culture of any complex kind.  Richerson and Boyd recognize that their account of 
human ultra-sociality is still highly theoretical, and many of the details are yet to be filled in, or are 
likely to change.56 Despite this, they think that any modifications or improvements on their theory will 
retain many of elements that give it its unique form: being an evolutionary explanation that 
synthesizes the genetic and cultural causes to explain the special kinds of advanced sociality found in 
humans.  
 
2.3.3 From sociality to morality – epistemic difficulties 
The plausibility of evolutionary theories of sociality developing into something more like normative 
guidance and morality can be readily established. However, the plausibility of such accounts does not 
imply we know the actual details of this transition with any certainty or can verify the truth of those 
accounts. Empirical constraints are both difficult to identify and access, given the historical nature of 
the transition and intangibility of the phenomena in question. Accordingly, it is important to 
understand the limits to the certainty that we can place on evolutionary explanations of morality and 
more generally what we can know of how human cognition evolved.  
Richard Lewontin has forcefully argued that the details of the best accounts of some areas of our 
evolutionary history are necessarily speculative and that adequate confirmation of them may never 
be found.57  This is not to deny cognition did emerge during our evolution, as Lewontin agrees that 
“…it must be, that human cognition, like every other characteristic of the human species, has arisen 
during the continuous course of human evolution.” 58  Nevertheless, providing solid epistemic 
foundations for evolutionary explanations of human cognition is an exercise fraught with difficulty 
that may mean we cannot verify the details or even truth of the explanations.  
 
56 Ibid., p. 235.  
57 Richard Lewontin, ‘The evolution of cognition: Questions we will never answer’. 




2.3.4 Adaptationism  
Stephen J. Gould and Lewontin in ‘The spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian paradigm’ highlight 
what they perceive as a range of systematic errors within what they call the ‘adaptationist paradigm’. 
By adaptationist paradigm they mean an observed tendency of evolutionary theorising to treat 
adaptation by natural selection as a near omnipotent force; that every existing trait can be explained 
by and is the result of natural selection. If any constraints are taken into consideration, they are briefly 
acknowledged but then dismissed or simply ignored thereafter.59 Lewontin and Gould argue the result 
of this approach is that evolutionary explanations of phenomena are accepted too uncritically and 
with insufficient justification or support for the certainty that they are advanced with.   
Lewontin and Gould identify a number of what they believe to be common errors in the evolutionary 
reasoning of the adaptationist programme and identify a number of alternatives to explanation by 
adaptation and natural selection that they believe are sometimes in operation but are ignored. The 
faults in evolutionary reasoning they identify include: 
• The failure to distinguish current usage of a trait from the potential origin of that trait (“male 
tyrannosaurs may have used their diminutive front legs to titillate female partners, but this 
will not explain why they got so small.”60) 
• The failure to be critical of evolutionary explanations when they are implausible or poorly 
reasoned. The fact that an evolutionary explanation can be imagined does not mean it is a 
good or reasonable one.  
• The lack of attempts to evidentially constrain or provide support for adaptive stories as 
explanations of traits other beyond the plausibility of the story being told. 
 
59 Stephen J Gould, Richard Lewontin, ‘The spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian paradigm: A critique of 
the adaptationist programme’, p. 585. 
60 Ibid., p. 581. 
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They also fault the adaptationist programme for not being willing to consider the variety of alternative 
explanations to a trait being an adaptation selected for by natural selection. Alternatives include61: 
• That the trait may not have been an adaptation at all and not be due to selective pressures- it 
may have some other causal history.  
• That the trait may be a by-product of another trait that itself is an adaptation due to natural 
selection. This is where the reference to the “Spandrels of San Marco” comes from in Gould 
& Lewontin’s article: spandrels are an architectural by-product of arched roofs; they are space 
between the shoulders of adjoining arches and are necessary if arches are present despite not 
being the intended or designed feature themselves.  
• It is possible that one of selection or adaptation is present but not the other. A trait maybe an 
adaptation without the explanation of its selection being the real reason it was selected for, 
or the selective pressures identified may be correct, but the trait itself is not in fact a result of 
those selective pressures.  
Many of these cautionary points are certainly relevant in the case of the evolution of human cognition 
and behaviour. Indeed, perhaps more so than in many contexts, alternative explanations and causes 
are likely to be present in the history of human development and there needs to be sufficient evidence 
to discriminate between those explanations. 
 
2.3.5 Questions we will never answer? 
Lewontin goes further in his article ‘The Evolution of Cognition: Questions We Will Never Answer’62 in 
discussing the difficulties of sufficiently grounding evolutionary explanations of cognition. Lewontin 
 
61 Ibid., pp. 590-593.  
62 Lewontin, ‘The evolution of cognition: questions we will never answer’, p. 108. 
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argues that there are three things that must be known to have a defensible explanation of how a trait 
has evolved via natural selection63. The three items are: 
a. We must know how a trait varies (The ‘Principle of variation’) 
b. We must know how the trait is heritable (The ‘Principle of heredity’) 
c. We must know how the trait will increase an organism’s fitness when it possesses the trait. 
(The ‘Principle of natural selection’) 
All three of these principles are necessary parts of an explanation of adaptation by natural selection. 
Without variation, there is nothing to select. If variation is not heritable, then the trait cannot persist 
or affect the next generation. And if there is no differential reproduction and survival there can be no 
change in the frequency of the trait in successive generations. 
In the case of the evolution of human moral or normative capacities these requirements or principles 
translate into the following: 
a'. That there is variation in the cognitive capacity for normative guidance – it must be 
demonstrable that some individuals have cognitive capacities for normative guidance that are 
not shared by other individuals or groups.  
b'. That a cognitive capacity for normative guidance that has appeared in some individuals is a 
heritable trait that will be transmitted to subsequent generations of those individuals who 
possess it. 
c'. That those individuals who have the cognitive capacity for normative guidance will leave more 
offspring than those lacking it.  
It would be fatal to the explanation to be missing any one of these elements of the evolutionary 
process, but Lewontin argues that we are in fact missing evidence for all of a', b', and c'.  
 
63 Ibid., p. 109. 
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For a' (the requirement that we must know how a trait varies) the period in which it appears much 
important cognitive development was supposed to have occurred did not involve visible 
morphological changes – there are no changes in morphology for the physical fossil record in the most 
important last 100 000 years, and very little other physical evidence is available to go on. The scarce 
cultural artefacts and cave drawings might count as one useful signpost of “a cognitive activity of a 
very advanced nature”64 but these early forms of evidence are difficult to infer anything reliable from; 
and single signposts many generations apart are certainly not enough on an individual or group level 
to provide sufficient evidence to “know how a trait varies” in a way useful for assessing evolutionary 
change.  
Secondly for b' (the requirement that we must know how the trait is heritable) we have very little 
visibility of evidence showing what or how differential cognitive capacities for normative guidance 
were passed from one generation to the next and certainly not at a level of detail that would allow us 
to assess or follow the phylogeny. While suggestive, using comparisons between our closest 
evolutionary relatives as evidence is also problematic if we do not know whether particular traits are 
homological (inherited from a common ancestor) or analogical (where traits that are similar evolve 
because of the similar environmental challenges and selective pressures, but there is no common 
ancestor). The paradigmatic example of this is linguistic ability in humans and our nearest evolutionary 
relationships. There appear to be some elements of language that we can teach to chimpanzees and 
other close primates, but this itself is not evidence that these particular abilities share an evolutionary 
origin (that they are in fact homologous). It may be that the capacity for such learning evolved in 
parallel due to similar pressures after we split from a common ancestor – they may simply be 
analogous capacities. The upshot of this is that what little we might deduce from the differences 
between ourselves and our nearest ancestors are not sufficient to meet the requirement of b'. 
 
64 Ibid., p. 115. 
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Finally, for c' (the requirement that we must know how the trait will increase an organism’s fitness) 
there is no evidence available to us showing that individuals with the cognitive capacity for normative 
guidance had a reproductive advantage within the relevant time period. While it might seem easy for 
us to imagine how cognitive capacities would result in an adaptive advantage, this alone is not helpful. 
Firstly our imagination of what might be evolutionarily advantageous may be misleading; as Lewontin 
rightly reminds us “the view of our individualistic, competitive, and entrepreneurial society that the 
smart and articulate win power may not apply to our primitive ancestors.”65  But even if we did have 
an accurate picture of the kinds of cognitive capacities for normative guidance and how they might 
have made those who possess them more evolutionarily successful (which the accounts in the 
previous sections suggest we do) we do not have the evidence to confirm this picture or support one 
potential story over others. There is no obvious way of verifying what made particular individuals or 
groups who possessed differing cognitive capacities more successful than other individuals and groups 
who lacked them.  
Lewontin’s critique of evolutionary explanations of human cognition is a significant challenge for 
evolutionary accounts of human morality. It suggests that the existing evidence we have will not be 
sufficient to provide verification for the kinds of theoretical accounts presented in this chapter. Noam 
Chomsky has also warned against assuming that all questions we can formulate about ourselves will 
be knowable or verifiable. In ‘The mysteries of nature: How deeply hidden?’, Chomsky aims to remind 
modern thinkers 66  that there are limits to what we can know.  He specifically mentions the 
evolutionary origins of cognition as one of these potential ‘mysteries’ for human understanding.67  He 
aims re-popularise the idea that “there is no reason to believe that humans can solve every problem 
 
65 Ibid., p. 129.  
66 Chomsky contends that earlier thinkers including Descartes, Galileo, Newton, Locke, and Hume among others 
were more cognisant of the limits of human conceivability and what might be known. See Noam Chomsky, ‘The 
mysteries of nature: How deeply hidden?’, pp. 174-175.  
67 Ibid., p. 199.  
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they pose or even that they can formulate the right questions; they may simply lack the conceptual 
tools.”68 
However, in the same discussion Chomsky also warns against the dangers of hastily assigning anything 
to the category of “unknowable”.69  He argues that problems we identify as ‘hard’ (including the 
problem of consciousness often referred to in philosophy as “the hard problem”70) are not necessarily 
more uniquely difficult or unsolvable than other problems we have been able to resolve. The lack of 
conceivability of a solution at any point in time should not be used as a guide to what is knowable or 
will be knowable in the future.  
There is more than one way in which this warning is applicable. In some cases, a claim of the 
impossibility of knowing something can be shown to be straight-forwardly incorrect when claims are 
disproven some years later. This can occur when the phenomena in question becomes understood via 
new methodology or related discoveries open new theoretical and evidential avenues of inquiry for 
the original question. An example of this is Auguste Comte’s claim in 1835 that we would never know 
anything about the composition of stars.71 Comte stated, concerning stars, that “we would never know 
how to study by any means their chemical composition, or their mineralogical structure”.72  The 
theories and tools that would allow these measurements had not been conceived of at this point, but 
by the mid-20th century, after a number of key advancements in various branches of physics and 
spectroscopy, it was possible to determine the composition, temperature, and structure of stars.  
Alternatively, it may be that concepts and theories that an ‘unknowable question’ depends on are 
themselves revised or shown to be incorrect which opens up the way for the unknowable concept to 
be re-examined as a different question. The theory of chemical bonds (or more accurately a lack of a 
 
68 Ibid., p. 185. 
69 Ibid., p. 171. 
70 Ibid., p. 177. 
71 See J. Hearnshaw, ‘Auguste Comte's blunder: An account of the first century of stellar spectroscopy and how 
it took one hundred years to prove that Comte was wrong!’.  
72 Ibid., p. 90. 
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theory) and the inability to reduce chemistry to known physical phenomena well into the 20th century 
is Chomsky’s example of this. There was a rich field of Chemistry with many experimental and 
theoretical successes, but no understanding of how it related to or cohered with the rest of physical 
science- no reduction of chemical to physical theory was viewed as possible.  Understanding of the 
relation turned out to be impossible because the understanding of physics was deficient. The 
unification between chemistry and physics had to wait until physics had undergone radical changes- 
only with an updated molecular mechanics based on quantum theories of matter was the reduction 
possible.73   
Thus, Chomsky makes two points relevant to the present discussion. Firstly, as per Lewontin, there 
are things that we may not ever have sufficient evidence for, including explanations of the evolution 
of human cognition. Second, while there are things we may not know, and things that we may not 
have evidence for presently, it is difficult to know if this will always be the state of affairs. It is 
dangerous to assert something is entirely unknowable in the future as the history of science is littered 
with examples where this has proven to be false.  
 
2.3.6 “How possibly” explanations 
Returning to evolutionary accounts of morality, we know that while the theories presented may 
appear plausible, there is limited evidence to support preferring any given evolutionary story 
presented over alternative hypotheses. The period of interest in human pre-history, from the first use 
of tools by Hominins approx. 2.6Ma in the early Palaeolithic down to the early Neolithic approx. 10,000 
years ago, offers only archaeological evidence. 74  We can build on this with comparisons of 
anthropological knowledge of human groups who still live as hunter-gathers in group sizes similar to 
those the fossil record shows. Additionally, comparisons with other primates, our nearest evolutionary 
 
73 Noam Chomsky, ‘The mysteries of nature: How deeply hidden?’, p. 187. 
74 See Nicholas Toth, Kathy Schick, ‘Overview of Palaeolithic archaeology, p. 1943.  
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relatives provide insight into the social problems likely faced by groups of similar sizes prior to the 
Lower Palaeolithic. But these traces and inferences do not provide any certainty and are not sufficient 
to constrain the evolutionary hypotheses about the development of capacities involved in our moral 
psychologies.   
Given this epistemic situation, Philip Kitcher has suggested that evolutionary explanations that 
address the development of morality should be conceived of as ‘how possibly’ explanations.75 By ‘how 
possibly’ explanations he means ones that allow us to explore ‘how  a sequence of events could have 
happened’ given the constraints of a particular theory, while being conscious that the explanation is 
ultimately underdetermined (that is, the evidence is not sufficient to establish the explanation as the 
only one that could fit with the limited evidence we have). This allows explanations to at least establish 
plausibility, and allows for hypothetical exploration of the consequences were the proposed theory 
true.  Of course, it would be better if we were able to know definitively the actual history of our social 
and normative capacities, but “…given the temporal remoteness of the events and the limitations of 
our evidence, modesty is required. In the context of rebutting the skeptical challenge, modesty— 
settling for “how possibly”— is enough.”76 
There are few points to note about this strategy. Firstly, that this approach is not unique within 
evolutionary theory to the case of human cognition. There are many areas where evidence is too 
historically remote or sparse to sufficiently constrain hypotheses, but explanations are still proffered 
as a best available effort. 77  
Second, while there is not space in the present thesis, it would be an interesting exercise to explore 
and delineate what the other alternatives to the evolutionary account are, and evaluate the fit of 
 
75 Philip Kitcher, The Ethical Project, pp. 9-13.  
76 Ibid., p. 12. 
77 The example Kitcher cites (Ibid., p. 12) is the evolution of the cell – it may be questioned whether we have 
sufficient epistemic access to be confident that evolution by natural selection was the process involved or if it 
was, what the details of that explanation are. See also Gijsbert van den Brink, Jeroen de Ridder & René van 
Woudenberg, ‘The epistemic status of evolutionary theory’ for more general discussion of where adaptation by 
natural selection is underdetermined.   
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these options against what evidence is available, and examine whether they provide the same 
explanatory or predictive power as the evolutionary account.  Building on this exploration, it may be 
that some of the arguments that attempt to draw conclusions for philosophical ethics from the 
evolutionary accounts could also apply to non-evolutionary alternatives if they are similar in enough 
aspects. In some cases, it will simply be sufficient for there to be an account that is ‘naturalistic’ in that 
it rules out any elements requiring divine intervention or supernatural influence. In others that 
particular behaviours or phenomena had the functions they did due to evolution will be relevant. 
Ultimately, in evaluating whether knowing the exact details of an evolutionary explanation is 
important and whether a “how possibly” explanation is sufficient will have to be evaluated on a case 
by case basis. As will be included in the analysis in Chapter 4, the level of detail required of the 
evolutionary explanation is a consideration that needs to be taken into account as part of assessing 
any evolutionary account of human sociality and its influence on philosophical ethics.  
Given the above, I proceed with the following as a self-consciously “how possible” account. An overall 
sequence of the hypothetical development of morality might be as follows. Our distant ancestors, the 
earliest hominids were social animals who lived in groups based mostly on kinship. Later hominids, 
also our ancestors, evolved language as a response to an increased need to communicate in social 
situations, and perhaps also developed the pre-cursors to moral emotions and the capacity to make 
and communicate evaluative judgments. This allowed them to live in cooperative societies that were 
governed by socially shared rules.  As Kitcher puts it, they invented a “proto-morality, perhaps little 
more than some judgments about who belonged with whom and a few crude injunctions about loyalty 
and revenge”.78  Once this was in place, it allowed other processes, perhaps group selection and 
indirect reciprocity, to combine with cultural evolution based on variations in culture between groups, 
resulting in a range of different kinds of systems of rules or norms. These systems were transmitted 
both genetically (in the form of dispositions to learn language, have certain pro-social emotions, 
 
78 Philip Kitcher, Biology and ethics, p. 173.  
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preparedness to pick-up evaluative concepts, and so on) and culturally, through oral tradition and 
inculcation of group wide norms or rules from one generation to the next. In this radically different 
environment, genetic selection might continue to select for traits that favoured highly social and 
altruistic tendencies. Cultural evolution, with the differential success of a variety of cultures or 
“experiments in living” being more successful than others, resulted after many thousands of years in 
distinct cultural lineages.79  These cultural lineages, once they reach the limits of our known historical 
record, become recognizable as including systems of morality.  
The history of the later stages of cultural evolution is continuous with the oldest extant oral and 
written records of religious, moral, and legal systems that we have access to today. Examples of these 
include: “Early Mesopotamian law codes, versions of myths (the Gilgamesh epic is a prominent 
example), and the Egyptian Book of the Dead”80 which all contain recognizable moral rules and ideas. 
While the early evidence of morality is often fragmentary and highly specific to particular situations, 
the primary function of the rules they contain is to resolve situations of potential conflict. They often 
concern specific social situations, such as “the causing of miscarriages to the daughters of others, the 
failure to use an orchard one has rented, [and] the joint maintenance of irrigation systems.”81 This 
high level of specificity is probably due to the incomplete nature of our record of them, but also due 
to the fact that they are intended as additions to a widely known, system of social rules that was 
already a well-established and entrenched part of the cultural inheritance.   
In this chapter I have discussed the proposed evolution of morality, via various processes, beginning 
with the most basic such as kin selection, mutualism, and reciprocity, all of which result in various 
kinds of biological altruism.82 Living in social groups allowed the possibility of further processes such 
as indirect reciprocity, and group selection to result in more extensive kinds of altruism that were 





82 Altruism in the biological sense of fitness enhancing for others, fitness reducing for the individual helper.  
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emotions, and evaluative concepts, allowed for group norms to guide behaviour more extensively. 
Many of the details of this story may be altered in the future as more work is done and theories are 
modified and developed, and further evidence if it can be identified is taken into account.  
Undoubtedly there is much more to be said on the issue, but the previous sections should at least 
make plausible that morality could be in part an evolved capacity, and make pertinent the question of 





Chapter 3 Implications of the evolution of morality for ethics 
In this chapter I look at theorists who have attempted to show that a growing understanding of the 
origins and background of morality has significant consequences for moral philosophy. First, I look 
briefly at the attempts by the biologist E. O. Wilson to draw ethical conclusions from the evolutionary 
origins of human nature and sociality. The term ‘Sociobiology’ was coined by Wilson to refer to the 
study of the biological determinants of social behaviour, based on the theory that such behaviour is 
often genetically transmitted and subject to evolutionary processes. Wilson’s Sociobiology: The New 
Synthesis attempted to provide a “systematic study of the biological basis of all social behaviour”83 
and was an impressive synthesis of evolutionary theory and ethology. The majority of Sociobiology 
covered non-human animal behaviour, and only in the last chapter did Wilson turn to discuss the 
evolutionary explanations of human behaviour. When first published, the comments on human 
morality and his claims about ethics were highly controversial and open to various kinds of criticisms 
due to being too fast or incomplete. Wilson followed up in an attempt to clarify many of these ideas 
with his book On Human Nature which attempts to clarify how such sociobiological ideas might apply 
to human society. In On Human Nature, Wilson discusses a wide range of human social phenomena 
including Religion, War and Aggression, Altruism, Sexuality, Diversity, and the potential merging of 
social and biological sciences. 
It is worth noting that while the term sociobiology is generally not used in discussions about the 
evolution of human behaviour or sociological phenomena, this is mostly due to it being replaced by 
‘evolutionary psychology’. The difference between the two is simply that sociobiology was focused on 
evolutionary explanations of sociality in animals (including humans) whereas evolutionary psychology 
is focused on only human evolution and the resulting mental adaptations that mediate human 
behaviour.  
 
83 E. O. Wilson, Sociobiology: The new synthesis, p. 4. 
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Wilson argues that evolutionary biology can shed light on a number of issues: on the metaphysics of 
morality, on what he calls the ‘problem of altruism’, on biological constraints on what we ought to do, 
and on the ‘naturalness’ of various human behaviours and consequently their ethical status among 
other issues. Wilson’s arguments are suggestive of a number of different ways in which an 
understanding of our biological origins may provide novel insights into ethics. While suggestive, I 
conclude Wilson’s arguments are either unsuccessful or underdeveloped, and can be used to highlight 
a number of common difficulties or complications in drawing ethical conclusions from evolutionary 
facts. His work shows that useful philosophical conclusions do not simply fall out of the facts about 
morality’s evolutionary genealogy and require argument and engagement with the philosophical 
literature to make progress.  
Secondly, and in more detail, I examine the work of Richard Joyce and Sharon Street who provide 
sophisticated and in-depth attempts at drawing implications for philosophical ethics from the 
evolution of morality. Joyce argues that because we have evolved to have certain moral beliefs due to 
the evolutionary advantage they gave, moral truth may not have played any part in the genealogy of 
morality and consequently our moral beliefs are in danger of having their justification undermined. In 
contrast to Wilson, Joyce locates his argument in the wider meta-ethical context and addresses the 
philosophical difficulties involved in arguing for his position, and his evolutionary argument raises 
novel considerations for meta-ethical debates about moral scepticism.  
In a related topic to Joyce’s argument, Sharon Street puts forward a Dilemma for the Moral Realist 
that aims to challenge them to choose between dropping their commitment to a scientifically 
defeasible account of the evolution of morality and rejecting their theoretical commitment to moral 
realism. According to Street’s argument, if the Moral Realist wishes to avoid the latter choice, they 
must argue that somehow the independent moral truth that Realists are committed to was involved 
in the evolutionary genealogy of morality. No realist has yet met that challenge, and indeed it is hard 
to see how they would go about doing so. If the Moral Realist wishes to reject that independent moral 
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truth played a role in the evolution of morality, then they must either accept anti-realism or claim that 
a coincidence of fantastic proportions has occurred and our evolved moral psychology just happens 
by chance to be identical to the independent moral reality.   
 
3.1 E. O. Wilson and sociobiology 
 
The biologist, who is concerned with questions of physiology and evolutionary 
history, realizes that self-knowledge is constrained and shaped by the emotional 
control centers in the hypothalamus and the limbic system of the brain. These 
centers flood our consciousness with all the emotions – hate, love, guilt, fear, and 
others – that are consulted by ethical philosophers who wish to intuit the 
standards of good and evil. What we are then compelled to ask, made the 
hypothalamus and limbic system? They evolved by natural selection. That simple 
biological statement must be pursued to explain ethics and ethical philosophers, if 
not epistemology and epistemologists, at all depths.84  
 
Due to the strong reaction of many to his work, E. O. Wilson was perhaps one of the most infamous 
of modern researchers to recognize and comment on the importance of our evolutionary origins for 
human behaviour. He contended that our increasing knowledge of the origin and evolutionary biology 
of social behaviour meant that “Scientists and humanists should consider together the possibility that 
the time has come for ethics to be removed temporarily from the hands of the philosophers and 
biologicized.”85  
In his writing on this issue there are roughly four distinct claims he makes that indicate the direction 
this ‘biologicization’ should take.86 Firstly, biologicizing ethics means recognizing that moral judgments 
are the products of biological causes that are, as Wilson puts it, “shaped by the emotional control 
 
84 E. O. Wilson, Sociobiology: The new synthesis, p. 3. 
85 E. O. Wilson, Sociobiology: The new synthesis, p. 562.   




centers in the hypothalamus and limbic system of the brain”.87 The consequence of recognizing this 
fact is that the metaphysics of morality will be demystified: judgments of morality are no longer to be 
considered “occult truths known through moral intuition.” 88  Thus Wilson thinks that applying 
Sociobiology and evolutionary theory to ethics will shed light on the ontological and metaphysical 
problems of ethics.  
The second problem Wilson thinks evolutionary theory solves is what he calls the ‘problem of 
altruism’.  He argues that evolution can explain why humans are altruistic; why it is that we sometimes 
act in ways that benefit others at a cost to ourselves. Evolutionary theory can explain why humans are 
such highly social creatures, why we make moral judgments and why doing so would have been 
adaptive.89 
Wilson’s third claim is that in some sense we must “adjust our ethical judgments to fit the realities”90 
that a sociobiological analysis reveals about ourselves. The idea here is that if a sociobiological analysis 
shows that we are genetically predisposed to be helpful or considerate to only friends and family say, 
and not at all altruistic to distant strangers, then because these tendencies or behaviours are genetic 
predispositions, there is little point in attempting to alter them: our biology constrains what we ought 
to do by constraining what is possible for us to do.  
Finally, the fourth direction that Wilson suggests the biologicization of ethics should take is that 
biology can inform us of whether something is a naturally occurring phenomenon and this information 
can be used in evaluating its status. For example, Wilson’s discussions of sexuality and homosexuality 
at times appear to endorse claims of the following kind: because these are naturally occurring 
practices, they should be considered acceptable or unobjectionable, and we would therefore be 
 
87 E. O. Wilson, Sociobiology: The new synthesis, p. 3.  
88 James Rachels, Created from animals: The moral implications of Darwinism, p. 77. 
89 E.O. Wilson, On human nature, pp. 149-167. 
90 Ibid., pp. 141-148. 
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wrong in attempting to alter these patterns of behaviour.91 In the following sections, I discuss each of 
these four claims in turn. 
 
3.1.1 The metaphysics of morality 
By recognizing the biological basis of morality, Wilson thinks that progress in metaethics concerning 
the metaphysics of morality can be made.92 This does not appear to be an unreasonable claim; an 
empirical approach seems like it would enable us to identify the kinds of entities that are involved in 
morality and assess which of those are scientifically more or less dubious and to study them in more 
detail to ascertain their nature and ontology. Wilson however does not provide much direction for 
this advancement of the understanding of the metaphysics of morality beyond broad claims about 
progress being possible once the biological nature of morality is realised. Further, to say anything non-
trivial about moral metaphysics, it requires somewhat more explanation from Wilson as to how 
“removing ethics from the hands of philosophers” may be the best approach. Presumably doing so 
will not result in useful engagement with current and past philosophical literature and because of this 
miss many of the known philosophical difficulties or complexities involved. 
For example, what kind of metaphysical insights might be revealed by looking at morality through a 
sociobiological or evolutionary lens? Perhaps it will show that evolution has produced various mental 
faculties in human minds (biological brains), and that the functioning of these faculties produces 
outputs that constitute the psychological and social phenomenon we call morality. If this were the 
insight that sociobiology will provide, then it would appear to be somewhat misleading to view this as 
a new kind of insight, as this is more or less the same kind of goal many moral philosophers have been 
aiming at for most of the twentieth century: providing an adequately naturalised account of the 
phenomena of moral philosophy. 
 
91 Ibid., pp 143-148. 
92 Ibid., pp. 196-199. 
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The program of Naturalism in this sense (although of course the term is used in a number of different 
ways in philosophy), can be divided roughly into two parts: ontological and methodological.  The 
ontological component consists in asserting that reality is constituted of only of those kinds of things 
that are studied by the natural sciences, and that ‘supernatural’ entities do not exist (ghosts, spirits, 
or gods and the like). So, attempting to show that morality fits into a scientifically respectable ontology 
and has an explanation (evolution) that does not posit unacceptable entities or causes, fits perfectly 
within this already existing philosophical program of naturalism. The methodological component of 
naturalism is concerned with a commitment to the scientific method as our best tool for discovering 
what reality is like.  Again, like the ontological component, philosophers that are sympathetic to 
naturalism are likely to share this goal: the phenomena in question will be best investigated 
(descriptively) through the appropriate scientific disciplines – the social sciences, psychology, 
neuroscience, sociobiology, anthropology and so on.  
Thus, if the purpose of is simply to show that morality fits within a reality that contains nothing 
‘supernatural’, then this is a program that many philosophers have long been committed to, and 
Wilson would need to provide more direction as to how sociobiologists would be better equipped to 
pursue that program than those already engaged in the endeavour. Indeed, any such task will require 
engagement with already existing literature on the metaphysics of morality and other areas of 
metaethics already devoted to dealing with how morality fits into the world. Simply recognizing the 
naturalness of the genealogy of our moral tendencies does not provide answers to the interesting 
questions about the metaphysics of morality.  
Wilson’s thought that progress may be made in philosophy by recognising the biological bases of 
morality is not without precedent. It is commonly thought that some progress in philosophy is made 
through the emergence of scientific disciplines that make use of newly developed approaches and 
methodologies to address questions that were previously the domain of philosophy. As the questions 
become systematically and conclusively answered, they move out of the purview of philosophy into 
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their own new fields of study. For example, ‘natural philosophy’ originally subsumed all kinds of 
systematic study of nature. During the scientific revolution, as new standards of evidence, 
experimentation, and methodology were developed and applied to particular problems, the study of 
natural philosophy as a discipline disappeared and was replaced by the familiar disciplines of biology, 
physics, astronomy, chemistry and so forth.93  While such terms were already in use, they came to be 
more narrowly and rigidly defined to the refer to the application of scientific methods to these areas 
of inquiry.  
Under this paradigm, once a methodology which conclusively answers questions within some domain 
of philosophical investigation is developed, the problem ceases to be a philosophical one. There are, 
however, limits to this process, and it appears highly unlikely that all of philosophy is amenable to 
such disciplinary speciation. David Chalmers has proposed a number of distinctive features that 
philosophical questions have that explain why some questions may remain as divisive questions that 
are part of philosophy rather than developing into new fields of science.94 
The first feature that marks questions as philosophical is that they simply may not have objective 
answers. Where there is no objective truth, there cannot be a methodology that can consistently 
converges on that truth. A science where there is no underlying shared subject is an untenable 
endeavour. This explanation is only a partial one however, as not all areas of philosophy are 
susceptible to anti-realist theories.  
Another feature of philosophical questions Chalmers suggests is what he terms ‘verbal disputes’, 
where proponents of opposing views use the same terms in different ways. While participants might 
be making sound arguments, they fail to engage properly with each other, and therefore gain little 
traction in persuading one another. Another possibility is that philosophy deals with domains that are 
remote from data that might answer the questions being asked. However, ‘philosophical data’ is not 
 
93 David Cahan, Natural philosophy to the sciences: writing the history of nineteenth-century science, p. 4.   
94 Chalmers, David, ‘Why isn’t there more progress in Philosophy?’, pp. 20-21.  
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a commonly used term in philosophy and it is not clear what kinds of considerations would count as 
such. This worry about the remoteness of data could simply be another way of stating that empirical 
considerations do not appear to be relevant or sufficient by themselves to answer many of the 
questions which philosophy addresses. At best it is an unusual styling of philosophical methodology, 
and hints perhaps at the inappropriateness of speaking of ‘data’ in reference to the kinds of questions 
philosophy deals in.    
Sociological explanations almost certainly play some role in ensuring philosophy’s questions remain 
divisive. This may be because disagreement provides higher rewards in philosophy compared to the 
sciences, or that philosophical positions are simply more powerfully influenced by surroundings and 
the intellectual environment in which they develop than scientific positions. A striking example of the 
latter is G. A. Cohen's reflections on how, in a very real sense, he came to accept and defend the 
analytic/synthetic distinction due to attending Oxford, while recognising that, had he attended 
Harvard, he would likely have rejected the distinction, independent of the actual reasons for or against 
it. 95  Chalmers suggests that the other proposed features of the philosophical domain also give 
sociological factors more traction, thus making them more powerful in combination.  Closely related 
to sociological explanations are psychological factors; there might be something unique about our 
minds and their self-reflexive relation to philosophical questions that makes us less able to converge 
on agreement in the way sciences might require. 
All of the above considerations could be applicable to metaphysics of morality, and so provide reason 
to be wary of Wilson’s claim. This is not to say that the direction of his thought is without merit. As I 
 
95 Cohen writes "...people of my generation who studied philosophy at Harvard rather than at Oxford for the 
most part reject the analytic/synthetic distinction. And I can’t believe that this is an accident. That is, I can’t 
believe that Harvard just happened to be a place where both its leading thinker rejected that distinction and its 
graduate students, for independent reasons—merely, for example, in the independent light of reason itself—
also came to reject it. And vice versa, of course, for Oxford. I believe, rather, that in each case students were 
especially impressed by the reasons respectively for and against believing in the distinction, because in each 
case the reasons came with all the added persuasiveness of personal presentation, personal relationship, and 
so forth. So, in some sense of “because,” and in some sense of “Oxford,” I think I can say that I believe in the 
analytic/synthetic distinction because I studied at Oxford. And that is disturbing. For the fact that I studied at 
Oxford is no reason for thinking that the distinction is sound.” In G. A. Cohen, ‘Paradoxes of conviction’, p. 18.  
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discuss in the following chapters, there are philosophers who think that evolution and biology have 
implications for metaethics, but to reach any conclusions such implications will likely require 
philosophical work. The direct application of scientific methods to metaethical questions will likely 
flounder due to the features highlighted by Chalmers. Only through looking at the actual metaphysical 
and metaethical debates involved, and through close engagement with precisely what the purported 
problems of metaphysical strangeness or super-naturalness are in ethics, is it likely that any progress 
will be made. And certainly, Wilson does not provide reason to think that this work would be best 
accomplished by having ethics “removed temporarily from the hands of the philosophers and 
biologicized.”96  I look at two such attempts to integrate metaethics with research from psychology 
and evolutionary biology in §3.2 and §3.3, but regarding Wilson’s claims, very little simply ‘falls out’ 
of the recognition that morality or a tendency to moralize has a biological basis.  
 
3.1.2 The problem of altruism 
Wilson’s second claim about biologicizing ethics is that evolutionary theory solves the ‘problem of 
altruism’. The various processes discussed in the first chapter, including kin selection, reciprocal 
altruism, group selection, and mutualism, all show how behaviour that is individually costly to an 
organism could still be adaptive and therefore evolve. Further, sensible accounts have been given of 
extending such processes and adding others to them such as cultural evolution and cumulative cultural 
inheritance, to explain the emergence of morality in humans, and thus altruistic action in humans. 
Wilson’s target with this claim about solving the ‘problem of altruism’ is the thought that altruistic 
behaviour would “work against individual survival – the altruist increases the chances of others’ 
surviving, by helping them, while at the same time decreasing the chances of his own survival, by 
giving something up. Therefore, we would expect natural selection to eliminate any tendency towards 
altruism.”  However, the difficulty with Wilson’s claim is that to a large degree, this “problem of 
 
96 E. O. Wilson, Sociobiology: The new synthesis, p. 562.   
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altruism” was only a problem of biology, not moral philosophy, and the difficulty of explaining altruistic 
behaviour prior to the discovery of such processes was a problem of biological theory.  
There has in philosophy been much written on whether we are fundamentally egoists or altruists in 
the non-biological sense, that is, whether one is always motivated by one’s own interests as opposed 
to acting in others’ interests at a cost to one’s own (and where interests is not defined as the interests 
of one’s genes’ interests). Practically every system of morality involves recommending actions that 
help others, often when such actions incur costs to the individual. However, there is one historical 
view of human nature that claims that we are incapable of following such imperatives, and that it is 
simply human nature to be selfish. This theory, typically called “psychological egoism” (or sometimes 
shortened simply to “egoism”) holds that each individual looks out for only themselves, and thus they 
are unlikely to act altruistically: they will only help others when doing so is in their interests. Thus 
psychological egoism might be considered a “problem of altruism” in ethics. There are however a 
number of definitive responses to this view, and these responses were produced without the help of 
evolutionary theory.  
In brief, a typical response is as follows. It is easy to reinterpret people’s motives as being purely 
egoistic, for example by claiming that the reason we help people is so that we do not feel guilty, or 
because we think others will think more highly of us if they see us or hear about us doing so. While it 
is possible to reinterpret the motives that people have in this way, doing so does not really show that 
this is why people are truly motivated. One major reason is that such reinterpretation of motivations 
is very difficult to verify or falsify: any motive given for action will be translated into a self-interested 
one, meaning that no motive could be given for an action that would falsify the theory. Further, even 
if it were possible to establish that people were motivated because of these self-interested reasons, 
acting out of self-interest is not mutually exclusive with genuinely having the interests of others at 
heart – it is possible that pursuing one’s own interests involves furthering the interests of others. 
Indeed many cases of everyday behaviour that involves helping others are just like this: for example 
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when people help their children or friends in any number of ways – they may be acting because it is 
what they want to do (what they consider ‘in their interest’), but this fact does not show they do not 
genuinely wish to advance the interests of their children or friends that they are helping. Further, if 
some given action turned out not to advance (say) their children’s interest, it is likely that they would 
not wish to act in this way at all.  
So, a confusion that lends the appearance of plausibility to psychological egoism is the conflation of 
self-interested desires with selfish ones. Doing something out of self-interest does not necessarily 
preclude that action from being altruistic (in the general, everyday sense): self-interested actions 
differ in an important respect from selfish actions. Selfish actions actively disregard others’ interests, 
whereas an action that is motivated by self-interest does not necessarily make any impact upon others 
(brushing one’s teeth for example is done with one’s own long-term interests in mind, but it need not 
be to the detriment of others!) Thus, once we focus on only actions that are selfish, it is much less 
plausible that this class of actions makes up the sole motivation for people’s behaviour. So, there are 
clear reasons for rejecting psychological egoism, which do not depend upon biological explanations. 
It is clear then that sociobiological insights are not the only way that this debate may be settled, as 
many philosophers have come to satisfactory and widely accepted conclusions that we do sometimes 
act in the interests of others at costs to ourselves.  Therefore, given that Wilson’s target appears in 
the first place to be one of biology (the problem of biological altruism), and that analogous problems 
in ethics have fairly widely agreed upon solutions that do not depend on sociobiological insights for 
their resolution, it would appear that Wilson’s second proposal is somewhat unnecessary: ethics, at 





3.1.3 Biological constraints on what we ought to do 
Wilson’s third proposal is the idea that paying close attention to our evolutionary origins may inform 
us of the limits of what is possible for humans: that doing so will show that our biology limits the range 
of forms that human nature may take. Morality recommends things that we should do, but there is 
little point to it if we are unable to put into practice what it recommends. Thus Wilson’s idea is that 
evolution constrains the range of possible actions recommendable by morality, and sociobiology can 
improve our understanding of ethics by telling us what these constraints on what is possible are, due 
to our evolved human nature. There is a sense in which Wilson’s second point about the problem of 
altruism (in the preceding discussion) could just be one example of this: if humans turned out to be 
fundamentally selfish, and incapable of altruism, then morality’s dictates would be of little use. It could 
not be the case that we ought to be altruistic, if our evolved nature constrained our desires to only 
those that were selfish.  So, the basic idea here is that “a sound morality must be based on a realistic 
conception of what is possible for human beings.”97  
Wilson suggests the following case as an example of a constraint on what is morally possible for 
humans due to our biology:  
Now there is reason to entertain the view that the culture of each society travels 
along one or the other of a set of evolutionary trajectories whose full array is 
constrained by the genetic rules of human nature. While broadly scattered from 
an anthropocentric point of view, this array still represents only a tiny subset of all 
the trajectories that would be possible in the absence of genetic constraints. As 
our knowledge of human nature grows, and we start to elect a system of values on 
a more objective basis, and our minds at last align with our hearts, the set of 
trajectories will narrow still more.  We already know, to take two extreme and 
opposite examples, that the worlds of William Graham Sumner, the absolute Social 
Darwinist, and Mikhail Bakunin, the anarchist, are biologically impossible.98 
 
97 Ibid., p. 70. 
98 E. O. Wilson, On human nature, p. 208.  
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Thus, Wilson thinks that at least these two ideals of social reform are outside the gamut of what is 
possible for humans, due to our particular human nature. What should we make of this claim? 
Certainly, it seems as though sociobiology might be suggestive of the kinds of social arrangements 
that creatures such as ourselves would find rewarding.  Social creatures with motivational systems 
that find rewarding friendship, cooperation, reciprocity, justice, desert, and all the benefits that these 
bring in terms of allowing people and societies to cooperate and flourish, are likely to find systems 
such as anarchy, where some of these goods are unavailable, or Social Darwinism99, where injustice 
and apparently arbitrary imperatives about the above are made, to be difficult, and perhaps 
unrewarding. But there is nothing that sociobiology has shown that makes any of these a biological 
impossibility.  
While in political philosophy the term ‘anarchy’ refers to a rather broad range of political views, its 
essence is that no ‘coercive institutions’ are justified and that coercive institutions should be replaced 
by social and economic organizations based on voluntary contractual agreement. This hardly sounds 
like a biological impossibility; indeed, surely similar arrangements of living have been from time to 
time part of our history. And Social Darwinism, while it is based on a flawed interpretation of biological 
evolution, and produces its moral imperatives in a highly dubious way100, does not appear to involve 
anything that is particularly taxing on what we know about human nature. If it were put into practice 
as a political movement, it would involve coercion of the weak in society by the powerful, but this is 
something that is hardly novel to human nature. Thus it is questionable how much work can be done 
by Sociobiology in Wilson’s claims about Anarchy and Social Darwinism. While biology may be 
somewhat suggestive of how well any given social reform will fit with human nature, it is hardly 
decisive, and often only in hindsight is the ‘fit’ able to be seen. Thus, it would seem at least in these 
 
99 Social Darwinism was the idea, popular in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, that humans are, or should 
be, subject to natural selection based on their social standing and circumstances and various other arbitrary 
features that were deemed “good” or “bad”. According to this theory the poor and disadvantaged were 
considered weak, and the rich and able were considered strong, and therefore should be given preferential 
treatment. Social Darwinism was used to justify political conservatism, imperialism, and racism and to 
discourage intervention and reform. 
100 The errors that Social Darwinism makes are the same as those discussed in the §3.1.4.  
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broad, general cases of particular social ideas that it is hard to draw out any definite or practical 
implications. Richard Rorty sums up how we might respond to this claim about sociobiology: if we 
imagine that the Sociobiologists inform us that some proposed moral code or social reform is 
impossible for us to adopt;  
We have, they tell us, run up against hard-wired limits: our neural layout permits us to 
formulate and commend the proposed change, but makes it impossible for us to adopt it. 
Surely our reaction to such an intervention would be, “You might be right, but let’s try 
adopting it and see what happens; maybe our brains are a bit more flexible than you think.” 
It is hard to imagine our taking the biologists’ word as final on such matters, for that would 
amount to giving them a veto over utopian moral initiatives.101 
 
3.1.4 Naturalness and morality 
The fourth claim of Wilson’s is a claim about deriving the moral status of something from facts about 
its evolutionary origins - the fact that it evolved ‘naturally’ is used as a guide for claiming it is 
acceptable or normal in some sense. For example, Wilson claims that what he takes to be the 
‘biological purpose’ of sex in humans – pair bonding – appears to “argue for a more liberal sexual 
morality”.102  Wilson thinks that the historical western view of sex (which he attributes to Christian 
and Jewish ideas, with the examples he uses coming from the Catholic Church) holds that the “primary 
role of sexual behaviour is the insemination of wives by husbands”103, that any form of birth control 
outside of abstinence should be prohibited, and that all “‘genital’ acts outside the framework of 
marriage”104 are abnormal, including masturbation which is an “intrinsically and seriously disordered 
act”105. Wilson thinks these ideas are misled, because the Church has a mistaken view of human 
nature: 
The Church takes its authority from natural-law theory, which is based on the idea that 
immutable mandates are placed by God in human nature.  This theory is in error.  The laws 
 
101 Richard Rorty, ‘Born to be good’. 
102 E O Wilson, On human nature, pp. 141. 
103 ibid., p. 141. 
104 ibid., p. 141.  
105 ibid., p. 141. 
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it addresses are biological, were written by natural selection, require little if any 
enforcement by religious or secular authorities, and have been erroneously interpreted by 
theologians writing in ignorance of biology.  All that we can surmise of humankind’s genetic 
history argues for a more liberal sexual morality, in which sexual practices are to be 
regarded first as bonding devices and second as means for procreation.106 
Thus, Wilson appears to endorse the claim that because pair bonding is at least as much an adaptive 
primary function of sex in humans as reproduction, that it “argues for a more liberal sexual morality” 
– that it should be permissible to have sex for reasons other than reproduction.  
However, it does not follow that something is good or right from a claim about something being 
natural or adapted. This form of argument, sometimes called an “appeal to nature” has a number of 
problems. Firstly, it is easy to show that if we allow this form of argument, there will be countless 
counterexamples: it is trivial to find things that are natural but are considered bad or things that are 
unnatural but considered good. For example, naturally occurring poisons and poisonous plants are 
often considered bad, but are natural, and vaccinations that produce immunity to diseases are 
unnatural, but are considered good. Evolved behaviour in all organisms includes the full range of what 
we consider morally good and bad behaviour, and thus it would be impossible to draw useful 
conclusions about good and bad just from the status of something as being an adaptation or not.   
Secondly, a more general error that ‘appeals to nature’ commit is that they jump from one descriptive 
fact, to a normative claim with no supporting (normative) premises in the argument.    
At times Wilson appears to be aware that his argument is on shaky ground. For example, he provides 
a more careful discussion after coming to the conclusion that homosexuality could be a “naturally” 
occurring behaviour: 
The juxtaposition of biology and ethics in the case of homosexuality requires 
sensitivity and care.  It would be inappropriate to consider homosexuals as a 
separate genetic caste, however beneficent their historic and contemporary roles 
might prove to be. It would be even more illogical, and unfortunate, to make past 
genetic adaptedness a necessary criterion for current acceptance.  But it would be 
 
106 E O Wilson, On human nature, pp. 141-142. 
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tragic to continue to discriminate against homosexuals on the basis of religious 
dogma supported by the unlikely assumption they are biologically unnatural.107 
But of course, even this misses the point: the issue is not whether the practice in question is 
“biologically unnatural” or not – for whether it natural or not is not determinative or even indicative 
of whether something is generally considered right or wrong in philosophy (at least without significant 
further argument).  
Thus, Wilson’s claim that we should consider the “possibility that the time has come for ethics to be 
removed temporarily from the hands of the philosophers and biologicized” appears to be unfounded 
given the lack of substance of the four proposed routes of ‘biologicization’ that he presents. Biologists 
are unlikely to have special insight into the consequences for the metaphysics of morality based solely 
on more detailed understanding of the biology of sociality. Wilson’s ‘problem of altruism’ turned out 
to be a problem of biology, not ethics, and the analogous problem in ethics – the idea of psychological 
egoism – is a problem to which there are already a number of apparently successful philosophical 
responses. While Wilson’s idea that we must “adjust our ethical judgments to fit the realities” of 
human nature has merit in principle, sweeping claims about various political theories are too 
unspecific to be of much use. Claims about psychological or human impossibility will need to be very 
specific and will require philosophical work to establish, and the simple fact that some human 
behaviour or trait is evolved does little to show that it is impossible or even difficult to change. And 
finally, claims about the naturalness or unnaturalness of various behaviours or traits, do not tell us 
about whether they are morally good or bad: natural things can be bad, unnatural things can be good.  
Thus Wilson’s remarks appear to be overly optimistic about the ease of which biology and evolution 
science can be simply applied to revolutionise moral philosophy. This is not to say that it is impossible 
however or destined to be fruitless. Attempts such as Wilson’s however, do point to the fact that it 
will require careful engagement with the philosophical debates if progress is to be made. To say 
 
107 E O Wilson, On human nature, p. 147.  
68 
 
something useful about ethics or metaethics, one must engage with the already existing ethical and 
metaethical debates. In the next section I look at one such attempt to do so by Richard Joyce, who 
argues that evolution has implications for the epistemic status of our moral beliefs.  
 
3.2 Richard Joyce’s evolutionary debunking argument 
In recent years Richard Joyce has developed an evolutionary debunking argument. 108   Joyce’s 
argument has been revised over the years, but it has remained a debunking argument in that that it 
has taken evolution to be showing certain pre-suppositions or commonly accepted assumptions about 
morality to be false. Based on considerations about the evolutionary origins of morality, at various 
points, Joyce has argued that different conclusions or consequences follow from his argument, 
including error theory, moral scepticism, and scepticism of the justification of moral beliefs. It is 
instructive to see how his argument has developed, as it is a good example of an argument that has 
set out to see what follows from the evolutionary origins of morality, while not neglecting to engage 
with the meta-ethical literature and taking into account considerations the literature raises. The end 
result is a mature position that is neither philosophically naïve nor under-developed and is surprisingly 
robust given its potentially controversial outcomes.  
His final position is that at the least, our moral beliefs’ justification is undermined by our 
understanding of the evolutionary origins of morality (it may be that we can re-instate such 
justification, but not without providing an argument independent from genealogical considerations). 
His conclusion is an epistemological one; the argument aims to show the justification for moral beliefs 
is lacking or that it never existed all along. It is worth noting that this conclusion is weaker than the 
conclusions of some other arguments that have been termed “evolutionary debunking arguments”109 
 
108 Richard Joyce, The myth of morality, The evolution of morality. 
109 For examples, see Guy Kahane, ‘Evolutionary debunking arguments’. 
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and the resulting meta-ethical position does not by itself, constitute an error theory, as its conclusion 
is still consistent with there being true moral beliefs.  
The starting point of Joyce’s argument is the observation that the best accounts we have of the 
evolution of our moral psychology seem to show that its evolutionary function is to facilitate social 
cohesion and group living. By evolutionary function it is meant the reason that our moral psychology 
was selected for; why it made those particular individuals or groups 110  who possessed it more 
reproductively and therefore evolutionarily, successful. If this is the function of our Moral Psychology, 
then the reason it evolved does not necessarily rely on the moral beliefs it produces being true. The 
metric for success in the evolutionary environment was that the beliefs were useful rather than true, 
which raises the question of where moral truth fits in this genealogical story, and if it does so at all.  
 
3.2.1 Belief Pills 
Joyce often introduces his argument via the following thought experiment. He asks us to imagine there 
are such things as ‘belief pills’ which cause us to start believing something when we take them but to 
have no memory of this belief formation process. Say that you believe that Napoleon lost the battle 
of Waterloo. Sometime later you learn that the reason you have this belief is that someone tricked 
you into ingesting a belief pill that made you believe that he lost at Waterloo. To aid the arguments in 
this chapter I will use basic flow charts of the following kind111 - the simple belief pill case is as follows: 
 
110 Depending on which account of the levels of selection at work in the evolution of morality one subscribes to.  
111 The nature of the entities and relations in the diagrams will not be specified – they are not necessarily causal, 
identity, entailment, implication or any other kind of formal relation. Their purpose is simply to allow the reader 








Figure 4: Belief pills 
Given the new knowledge about the origins of your belief about Napoleon losing at Waterloo, you 
have a choice of what attitude to take towards this belief. You could carry on believing that Napoleon 
lost at Waterloo, but doing so seems remiss: you know that the truth of the belief has no connection 
to why you believe it, so why should you continue to think that it is true? You could adopt the belief 
that it is false that Napoleon lost at Waterloo, but this too seems to be an inappropriate response; 
your new knowledge about the belief pill provides no more reason for you to believe it to be false 
than it does for you to believe it to be true. In this position of uncertainty, it would seem best, at least 
initially, to suspend judgement about the truth or falsity of Napoleon losing at Waterloo and hold that 
your previous belief is no longer epistemically justified.  
A similar line of reasoning can be applied to the case of the evolutionary genealogy of morality, where 
the process of the evolution of our disposition to make moral judgments is like the belief inducing pills 
and our moral beliefs the belief about Napoleon losing at Waterloo. In applying this analogy, there is 
one modification that is immediately necessary for the analogy to go through. The hypothetical belief 
pills, as their name suggests, produce beliefs. Evolution however, does not simply produce innate 
beliefs in humans about what is right or wrong (for example, I can have a belief that I morally ought 
to pay my taxes, but it is unlikely that the forces of natural selection at play could have ‘known’ about 
government revenue and redistribution of income). The connection between the evolutionary 
genealogy to the particular moral beliefs has an intermediary step.  Instead of directly producing 
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beliefs, the result of the evolutionary genealogy is a psychology that judges the interactions and events 
of social life in terms of moral concepts and forms beliefs that these moral concepts figure in.112  
The belief pill analogy can be modified to account for this intermediary step, such that instead of 
producing particular beliefs (that Napoleon lost at Waterloo), the pills cause the taker to form beliefs 
involving a particular concept; that is beliefs involving the concepts of battle, Napoleon, Waterloo and 
so on in some sensible combination. Without taking the pill you would not form beliefs about 
Napoleon at all. The exact content of the belief is irrelevant to the fact that were you to discover that 
someone had tricked you into taking a Napoleon-type belief pill, your justification for holding the 
belief about Napoleon would be undermined.  
Thus modified, with evolution as the substitute for belief pills, causing humans to form beliefs 
involving particular concepts; beliefs involving rightness and wrongness, justice, fairness, and so on. 
The best accounts of the evolution of morality we have indicate our moral psychology developed 
because it was useful rather than any other reason (for example because it successfully identified true 
beliefs). Without our particular evolutionary genealogy, we would not form beliefs involving these 
moral concepts at all.  Joyce thinks that once we have uncovered these facts about evolution and 
morality, we should seriously question whether our moral beliefs are appropriately justified and 
should be sceptical of believing those moral beliefs are true.  Regardless of the truth-values that we 
think our moral beliefs have, our justification for holding these beliefs should be undermined upon 
discovering the evolutionary origins of the concepts that figure in and constitute them.  
 
112 There are a number of different ways this could be developed. Joyce discusses these in more detail in 
‘Evolution and ethics’. One of these is that the human brain comes hardwired with moral concepts but the 
developmental environment determines what things the concepts are applied too. Thus, in one environment 
individuals may develop to judge that slavery is deeply morally wrong, whereas in another it may be viewed as 
entirely acceptable. Another view is that the concepts the moral faculty deals in come with biases towards 
certain kinds of content. Cross-cultural surveys show that the moral concepts are relatively universally deployed 
in domains that deal with actions producing harm, regulations concerning fairness and exchanges, values 
pertaining to social hierarchy, and so on. Thus, moral systems involving these domains will be more easily learnt 
and perhaps there are some prewired abstract principles and innate parameters which when combined with a 
particular developmental environment result in a fully functional moral faculty. Examples of this kind of 
conception are elaborated in Marc Hauser, Moral minds, and John Mikhail, Elements of moral cognition: Rawls' 
linguistic analogy and the cognitive science of moral and legal judgment. 
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The diagram below shows the structure of this proposed model of the influence of evolution on moral 
beliefs:  
Evolutionary 






Evolutionary  ultimate  cause of moral judgment
Moral Judgment




Figure 5: Evolutionary genealogy of moral belief 
 
 
While it is possible that the moral beliefs are true, the above picture gives moral truth no role in the 
causation of moral beliefs either at the proximal or ultimate levels.113 Thus this picture gives us no 
reason to believe that our moral beliefs are likely (or unlikely) to be true and instead it shows the 
reason we hold these beliefs at all is one that is unrelated to their truth, and thus we should re-
 
113 This refers to Nikolaas Tinbergen’s levels of explanation of animal behaviour which draws the distinction 
between Proximate explanations which explain how organisms work by describing their structures, mechanisms, 
and ontology versus Ultimate explanations which explains why organisms are the way they are by describing 




consider their status as epistemically justified, unless we can discover some other source of 
justification. 
 
3.2.2 Truth tracking 
The obvious response for those who wish to save the epistemically justified status of our moral beliefs 
is to claim that moral truth did in fact have a role in the evolutionary development of our moral 
psychology in some manner. In the context of evolutionary debunking arguments, the term truth 
tracking is often used to refer to the doxastic relation between our evolved moral psychology, and the 
moral facts which the moral beliefs are purportedly about. Our moral psychology is said to track the 
truth when the beliefs it produces are connected in an appropriate manner with the truth of moral 
facts.   By appropriate manner, without going in to the details of any particular epistemic theory, it is 
simply meant that to find out that this relation does not hold is to discover that the belief is not 
appropriately justified or backed up by the way things are.   
Thus, a truth tracking account of the evolution of morality would require that the moral psychology 
that was selected for had some way of recognising or “latching on” to the moral truth that the content 
of the moral belief was about. Evolution would be selecting creatures that could accurately pick up on 
what the moral truth in a given situation was. The following picture shows how a simple version of a 
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Figure 6: A truth tracking account of morality 
However, is this picture of the evolution of morality a defensible one? Could evolution have evolved 
to latch-on to and track independent moral facts? Joyce notes that it may be objected that the 
Napoleon thought experiment is rigged from the start to undermine the beliefs in question: if beliefs 
are formed in a manner that does not relate to the truth or falsity of the proposition, then of course 
knowledge of this fact undermines their justification. Perhaps morality is not like this, and evolution 
has a tendency to produce a disposition to form true beliefs about morality.  
3.2.2.1 A truth-dependant evolutionary genealogy 
To make sense of this, Joyce draws a distinction between two kinds of evolutionary explanation for 
why people have the beliefs that they do. The first kind are explanations that depend upon the truth 
of the beliefs they’re explaining for them be successful explanations of why such beliefs bestowed 
evolutionary advantages. The example he gives of this is the human faculty for doing simple 
arithmetic. He claims that there is (or could be) a straightforward evolutionary explanation for why 
humans would have an inbuilt faculty that allows them to perform basic calculations. Does, in the case 
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of arithmetic, an evolutionary genealogy risk undermining our beliefs about simple propositions of 
arithmetic? Joyce does not think so:  
…let’s interpret this as implying that our belief that 1 + 1 = 2 is innate. This, it seems 
pretty safe to declare, is an eternal and necessary truth, and thus by “hard-wiring” 
such a belief into our brains natural selection takes no risks—it is not as if the 
environment could suddenly change such that 1 + 1 would equal 3. So does the 
fact that we have such a genealogical explanation of our simple mathematical 
beliefs serve to demonstrate that we are unjustified in holding these beliefs? 
Surely not, for we have no grasp of how this belief might have been selected for, 
how it might have enhanced reproductive fitness, independent of its truth. False 
mathematical beliefs just aren’t going to be very useful. Suppose you are being 
chased by three lions, you observe two quit the chase, and you conclude that it is 
now safe to slow down. The truth of “1 + 1 = 2” is a background assumption to any 
reasonable hypothesis of how this belief might have come to be innate.114 
So, in this case, according to Joyce, the evolutionary genealogy is not an undermining one, as the 
availability of fitness benefits depend upon the beliefs in question being true. Justin Clarke-Doane 
however, has argued that Joyce’s interpretation of the example is incorrect115, despite the view being 
widely accepted by many, including Roger Crisp, Allan Gibbard, Stephen Pinker, Walter Sinnott-
Armstrong, and Ernest Sosa. 116   Clarke-Doane argues that this example is mistaken because it 
construes what are first order logical truths as mathematical truths. Clarke-Doane asks us to imagine 
two hypothetical ancestors, P and Q, both of who observe a pair of lions entering some bushes nearby 
to hide. The difference between the two is that P believes there are two lions entering the bushes to 
hide and that 1+1=2, whereas Q while also believing there were two lions entering the bushes to hide 
believes that 1+1=0. He argues that ancestors like P would have had an evolutionary advantage over 
those like Q, not because of their beliefs about arithmetic, but because the logical truths 
corresponding to those arithmetical statements obtained. That is: 
 
114 Richard Joyce, The evolution of morality., p. 182.  
115 Ibid.  
116 Clarke-Doane references Roger Crisp, Reasons and the good, Allan Gibbard, Thinking how to live, Steven 
Pinker, The Blank Slate, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Moral Skepticisms, and Ernest Sosa, ‘Reliability and the A 
Priori’, see Justin Clarke-Doane, ‘Morality and mathematics: the evolutionary challenge’, p. 327. 
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If our ancestors who believed that 1+1=2 had an advantage over our ancestors 
who believed that 1+1=0, the reason that they did is that corresponding (first-
order) logical truths obtained. In particular, ancestor P, who believed that 1+1=2, 
had an advantage over ancestor Q, who believed that 1+1=0, in the above scenario 
[where P believes there were two instances of lions entering the bushes to hide, 
and that 1+1=2 vs Q who also saw the lions entering the bushes but believes that 
1+1=0], intuitively because if there is exactly one lion behind bush A, and there is 
exactly one lion behind bush B, and no lion behind bush A is a lion behind bush B, 
then there are exactly two lions behind bush A or B. In other words, ancestor P did 
not have an advantage over ancestor Q because its belief that 1+1=2 was true. 
Ancestor P had an advantage over ancestor Q because its belief appropriately 
aligned with (first-order) logical truths about its surroundings.117 
Clark-Doane’s contention, is that beliefs such as ‘there are exactly two lions chasing you, and you 
observe two lions quit the chase, so you conclude that it is now safe to slow down’ are not 
constructions that refer to arithmetic and hence mathematical truths. Instead they are first order 
logical beliefs.118 He also points out that whether a statement counts as a first-order logical truth as 
opposed to a mathematical one is not simply a terminological issue, and while many claim that 
mathematics reduces to logic, the claim is not that it reduces to first order logical claims, but to 
second-order logic or set theory.119 
Clarke-Doane is likely correct about this point, but for Joyce’s argument, the fact that the chased-by-
lions vignette is about first order logical beliefs instead of mathematical beliefs is not detrimental. 
While the point may be of interest to philosophers of mathematics, acceptance of Joyce’s claim that 
some beliefs may have that may have an evolutionary origin that does depend upon the truth of those 
beliefs all that is required for his argument. Indeed Clarke-Doane is willing to accept that such beliefs 
exist as long as we do not talk of them as mathematical beliefs.120 Clarke-Doane also finds a number 
 
117 Ibid., pp. 330-331.  
118 Roughly formalised the belief would be that “there is an x and a y such that x is a lion chasing you that has 
quit the chase and y is a lion chasing you that his quit the chase and, x ≠ y, and for all z, if z is a lion chasing you, 
then z = x or z = y”. 
119 Ibid., p. 330, see footnote 41.  
120 Ibid., pp. 331-333. Clarke-Doane accepts many mathematical hypotheses correspond to nonmathematical 
truths about the world that could figure in evolutionary genealogies that depend upon the truth of the beliefs. 
He writes “the basic idea that for any mathematical hypothesis that we were selected to believe, H, there is a 
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of issues elsewhere in Joyce’s argument, and evolutionary debunking arguments in general, which are 
discussed along with the arguments of William Fitzpatrick and Benjamin Fraser in further detail in §3.5. 
  
3.2.2.2 Truth-independent evolutionary genealogy  
The second kind of evolutionary explanation is one that explains why the beliefs we have a disposition 
to form, were fitness enhancing, regardless of whether these beliefs were true. Joyce thinks that the 
moral case differs from the arithmetic (or, accepting Clarke-Doane’s contention, the first order logical) 
case in just this way: we can make sense of our ancestors’ disposition to form beliefs about rightness 
and wrongness independently of the existence of anything that these terms refer too. The practical 
success that having such beliefs could have bestowed could be sufficient to ensure they were fitness 
enhancing regardless of whether they were true or false. Moral systems, in the very first stages of the 
evolution of morality could have been no more than primitive rules or emotions or conventions aimed 
at ensuring social cohesion and collective action. And at further stages, there is no obvious reason why 
this criterion of success (social cohesion) would need to be any different. Thus, beliefs that accurately 
represented facts were not necessary for the fitness benefits of greater social cohesion and 
cooperation to be available. Although truth is often a good route to practical success (for example 
when counting the number of lions chasing you), it is possible that having false beliefs and acting on 
them could also have been adaptive in certain contexts. As Joyce notes, “Whether we assume that the 
concepts of right and wrong succeed in denoting properties in the world, or whether we think that 
they suffer from a referential failure that puts them on a par with the concepts witch and ghost, the 
plausibility of the hypothesis concerning how moral judgment evolved remains unaffected.”121 
 
 
nonmathematical truth corresponding to H that captures the intuitive reason that belief in H was advantageous 
is plausible. By nonmathematical truth I mean a truth that does not imply a substantive mathematical 
sentence…that is, roughly, a truth that does not imply the existence of a relevantly mind-and-language 
independent realm of mathematical objects.” p. 332.  
121 Richard Joyce, The evolution of morality, p. 183.  
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3.2.3 Moral naturalism 
The first kind of evolutionary explanation described above shows that moral truth has a potential role 
it could play, but it does not explain why it was evolutionarily advantageous to track the moral truth 
or any of the details of how it might work.  Why would the moral faculty have this seemingly ad hoc 
(from a scientific viewpoint) ‘identify and track moral truths’ function? Without a reason for 
introducing moral facts into the picture (other than to reply to the skeptic) there is much left 
unexplained about such a truth tracking account of the evolution of morality. 
The most common way of resolving this problem is to endorse some variety of moral naturalism: 
claiming that moral truth was part of the evolutionary explanations all along. The things that our 
evolved moral psychology tracked were things that enhanced social cohesion and group living, and 
these just were, in some sense, the moral facts. 
Moral naturalism is this view that moral facts are identical to, constituted by, or supervene on some 
natural facts. So, moral facts are simply facts about humans, their environment, and their “patterns 
of reaction to it”122 and therefore are the kinds of things that can play a causal role in explanations. 
This view, if it can be defended, provides a potential truth tracking account of the evolution of moral 
judgment. The diagram showing how this position fits with the evolutionary account is as follows:  
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Figure 7: Evolutionary genealogy of moral naturalism  
 
3.2.4 Harman’s challenge 
Joyce takes the evolution of morality as an explanation of why we have a disposition to form moral 
beliefs, and this explanation does not depend upon moral beliefs being true. Further, he claims that 
without this evolutionary genealogy and our particular social history, we would not have such moral 
concepts as obligation, virtue, wrongness, desert, fairness and so on at all. Therefore, if there is no 
explanation for why we would have these concepts independent of the evolutionary explanation, then 
it seems that we have reason to doubt that moral beliefs would be independently true or that the 
concepts that figure in them ever refer to anything. Recognition of this means that unless the moral-
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realist can make good on their picture of moral naturalism, a skeptical conclusion looms. Joyce thinks 
this makes what he call’s ‘Harman’s Challenge’ particularly pressing.123  Gilbert Harman’s challenge is 
that if we can explain why we make a moral judgment without reference to moral facts, and we cannot 
show how in some sense moral facts figure in, reduce to, or supervene on the original explanation, 
then we should cease to think that the judgment has anything to do with these facts. 
Harman uses the following example to illustrate this challenge:  
You round a corner and see a group of young hoodlums pour gasoline on a cat and 
ignite it, you do not need to conclude that what they are doing is wrong; you do 
not need to figure anything out; you can see that it is wrong.124  
Suppose that we attempt to explain this event of judging the cat-burning in terms of the natural 
sciences. We can give an account in the terms of physics and chemistry say, in which the terms “cat”, 
“burning”, and “wrong” do not figure at all. But does the fact that these terms do not appear in the 
explanation mean they have no part to play in explaining this case of cat burning? For the terms 
“burning” and “cat” it seems the answer is no: burning cats can be reduced to descriptions of physics 
and chemistry, which shows that the burning cat was in some sense ‘present’ in the causal explanation 
of the situation. Does the same hold for the term “wrong”? Can we provide a reduction of the term 
“wrong” to naturalistic facts? Harman’s challenge is that if we can explain why we come to judge this 
to be wrong, why it seems that this episode of cat burning is wrong, without having any idea of how 
the “facts of wrongness” reduces to or supervenes upon this explanation, then the actual existence of 
wrongness is not needed to explain anything about the situation, and we need not think it plays any 
part in this episode of cat-burning. Thus, Joyce thinks he has an explanation for why people would 
hold any moral beliefs or use any moral concepts, and argues that unless there is an account of moral 
facts which shows how they reduce to or figure in moral explanations, then we should conclude that 
we are in error holding moral beliefs: there are no moral facts. If morality is to be vindicated, it must 
 
123 ibid., p.184, Gilbert Harman introduces his ‘challenge’ in ‘The nature of morality’, pp. 3-10. 
124 ibid., p. 4. 
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be because some kind of moral naturalism (the idea that moral facts reduce to or supervene upon 
natural facts) is true. Otherwise moral facts should be excised from the picture with a “swift slash from 
Ockham’s Razor, since we have a complete explanation of moral judgment with no need to posit any 
extra ontology in the form of moral facts.”125  
Joyce argues that unless Harman’s challenge can be met, our commitment to morality should be 
undermined, and we should consider that moral discourse constitutes some kind of mistake: we 
should be ‘error theorists’ about morality. An error theory is a theory about a domain of discourse 
that one believes to have been shown to make false claims.126 Typically in meta-ethics, the term ‘error 
theory’ is reserved for positions which involve active disbelief – situations where we are sure that the 
subject matter is false. While Joyce at this earlier point did describe his position as a kind of error 
theory, his view is not quite as strong as typical positions that use the term and thus, he no longer 
uses this designation. He argued that the evolutionary explanation of our moral beliefs forces us to 
consider Harman’s challenge, and if we cannot meet it, then he thinks a position of agnosticism 
towards morality is justified. Ultimately, he concludes that the prospects for a satisfactory account of 
such a moral naturalism that would meet Harman’s challenge are not good, and thus endorses the 
claim that moral facts do not refer to anything: moral discourse is a kind of error.  In the next sections 
I examine Joyce’s grounds for concluding that moral naturalism is untenable. 
 
3.2.5 Arguments against moral naturalism 
The strategy Joyce adopts to argue against moral naturalism is a kind of reductio ad absurdum 
whereby if it can be shown that commitments entailed by moral naturalism are not possible, then 
 
125 ibid., p.188.  
126 What is meant by ‘error theory’ is often conveyed by way of example – typical illustrations include 
discourse about supernatural entities such as ghosts or witches, or theories about scientific entities or facts 
that have been proven to be misled, such as the fact that phlogiston resides in combustible materials or that 
the earth is flat. We hold an error theory about these cases because we think that they are predicated on 
errors: there are no such things as witches, ghosts, or phlogiston, and the world has been shown to be 
spherical, not flat. 
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some or all of those commitments must be rejected. Joyce identifies a central feature of moral thought 
and discourse – a “non-negotiable” commitment that cannot be possibly naturalized: “it is very hard 
to see how naturalistic facts could possibly provide the inescapable authority we apparently expect 
and require of moral facts.” 127  He calls this particular feature of morality ‘practical clout’ – the 
combination of moral inescapability and moral authority. He thinks any satisfactory analysis of the 
concept of morality and how it is used will show that practical clout is a necessary feature. Joyce’s 
argument expands upon those of John Mackie in Mackie’s Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong.  Joyce 
agrees with Mackie, that in making a moral judgment someone is saying something that “is not purely 
descriptive, certainly not inert, but something that involves a call for action or for the refraining from 
action, and one that is absolute, not contingent upon any desire or preference or policy or choice, his 
own or anyone else’s.”128  What Joyce terms “practical clout” appears to be similar to what Mackie 
calls “authoritative prescriptivity”, “objective prescriptivity” or even simply the “to-be-pursuedness” 
or “to-be-doneness” that is somehow built into moral claims. 129  Practical clout’s inescapability 
amounts to the fact that one cannot avoid a moral prescription simply by having or not having 
particular desires. For example, one cannot “evade the proscription ‘Don’t kill innocent people’ by 
citing some special desires that makes it ok for one to do so (‘But I really enjoy it!’) or shrug off moral 
concerns by claiming a lack of interest in such values.” 130  Thus according to Joyce, moral 
considerations are supposed to bind people irrespective of what their desires or interests are.  It is 
important to note that whether these considerations are taken any notice of by the moral agent is a 
separate issue. Joyce is not arguing for a kind of ‘motivation internalism’ whereby a moral judgment 
is not counted as sincere unless it is recognized as providing motivation for acting in accord with the 
judgment. As he writes, this strange feature of moral judgments (practical clout) “resides not in 
 
127 ibid., p. 191. 
128 John Mackie, Ethics: Inventing right and wrong, p. 33. 
129 For example, Joyce tries to show that practical clout is important to people, by quoting Mackie talking 
about “objective prescriptivity” and how it is important to people. Joyce agrees that “this assumption [of 
objective prescriptivity] has been incorporated in the basic, conventional meanings of moral terms” – where 
this quote is from Mackie talking about the status of objective prescriptivity (ibid, p. 35).  
130 Richard Joyce, The evolution of morality, p. 192. 
83 
 
intrinsic motivation-engagement but rather intrinsic action-guidingness.” 131  However despite not 
adopting such an internalist view, Joyce does think moral considerations still have a particularly strong 
form of authority, one that cannot simply be ignored. Joyce thinks that if some considerations are to 
be counted as moral, they must provide reasons for action that cannot be ignored in one’s 
deliberations about what to do – although the ultimate result might not be deciding on the outcome 
that the moral considerations favour.  
For Joyce the authority of morality can be contrasted usefully with that of etiquette: while etiquette 
provides reasons that are inescapable (people who do not care about etiquette can still be said to 
transgress against its demands), the reasons it provides do not have “Genuine binding force over a 
person.”132 For example, a person who “speak[s] with his mouth full in order to stop a friend from 
eating a wasp” is transgressing a norm of etiquette, but the reasons etiquette gives in this case are 
not authoritative – the fact that speaking in such a situation with one’s mouth full might be considered 
rude is not a consideration that holds any deliberative weight in such circumstances. As Joyce writes, 
when compared to normativity of the kind etiquette provides “it is often thought that morality 
requires something stronger and more authoritative.”133 
Joyce’s argument about practical clout has strong similarities with John Mackie’s “Argument from 
queerness.” 134  Mackie divides his well-known argument from queerness into two parts: a 
metaphysical part – that “if there were objective values, then they would be entities or qualities or 
relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe” 135 ; and an 
epistemological part – that “if we were aware of them, it would have to be by some special faculty of 
moral perception or intuition, utterly different from our ordinary ways of knowing anything else”136. 
Joyce’s argument against moral naturalism focuses only on the metaphysical considerations raised by 
 
131 ibid., p.173. 
132 ibid., p. 192.  
133 Ibid., p. 193.  
134 J. L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing right and wrong, pp. 38-42. 
135 ibid., p. 38. 
136 ibid., p. 38. 
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Mackie, which seems to be a reasonable simplification given that the epistemological argument is 
dependent on the metaphysical one in the sense that one only needs to posit an ‘utterly different’ 
way of knowing due to the fact that the “entities or qualities or relations” are themselves “of a very 
strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe.”137  Mackie thinks that if moral 
properties existed they would have to be of the form of categorical imperatives (that is there a sense 
in which they apply to all inescapably)138 and be “objectively valid”139 and that such a combination is 
“metaphysically queer”. 140  Similarly, Joyce’s term practical clout appears to identify the same 
features: inescapability (for Mackie that moral judgments have the ‘form’ of categorical imperatives) 
and moral authority (that moral judgments have “objective validity” and are “intrinsically action-
guiding”).  Mackie thinks this objective validity means that the truth of moral facts could not depend 
in any way on people’s desires or ends: they would need to be true regardless of whatever ends, 
interests, or desires people had and they would need to be intrinsically “action-guiding” for all. Mackie 
suggests that Plato’s Form of the good would be an example of what such metaphysically queer 
entities might be like: “The Form of the Good is such that knowledge of it provides the knower with 
both a direction and an overriding motive; something’s being good both tells the person who knows 
this to pursue it and makes him pursue it.”141 Such “entities, qualities, or relations” simply could not 
exist as they are too metaphysically peculiar: they would have to guide action by some unspecified 
and apparently mystical mechanism. Both Joyce and Mackie’s arguments hold that morality has 
features that simply cannot exist as they are too metaphysically “queer”, and do not fit within a 
naturalistic picture of reality.  
So, Joyce’s complaint about moral naturalism is as follows. Moral facts, if they are to exist, need to 
provide us with reasons completely irrespective of our individual ends, and these reasons must be 
 
137 ibid., p. 38. 
138 J. L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing right and wrong, pp. 27-30. 
139 ibid., pp. 30-35. 
140 Ibid. 
141 ibid., p. 40.  
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authoritative – they cannot be ignored in practical deliberations about what to do – the reasons that 
awareness of moral facts give us must be strong reasons. It appears that these desiderata – practical 
clout or in Mackie’s case objective validity – are utterly different from anything that we know how to 
explain naturalistically, and they must require in some sense for the “universe to take sides”. If the 
moral facts are true independently of people’s desires, concerns, or ends, then something else 
somewhere in the universe must demand that something be done or not done, pursued or not 
pursued. Mackie and Joyce’s arguments do seem to be persuasive on this light: there does not seem 
to be any way we can imagine such a “queer property” as practical clout or any kind of objective 
prescriptivity reducing to or supervening on the natural world we know.  
 
3.2.6 Moral Naturalism and practical clout 
There are two ways one might respond to Joyce’s argument against moral naturalism that reject his 
view of practical clout – the inescapable practical authority that Joyce argues is a necessarily a feature 
of moral judgments. The first kind of reply is simply to claim that practical clout can be accommodated 
by a suitable moral naturalism, and to demonstrate how this might be so. The second kind of response 
is simply to deny that practical clout is a feature of morality. I shall begin with the first kind of response: 
with showing that practical clout can be suitably naturalized. Joyce assumes that attempting to locate 
practical clout will mean identifying a particular kind of reason that people have when there is a moral 
requirement to do or refrain from doing something. This is the route that many supporters of moral 
naturalism take to be most promising and it is hard to see how else practical clout can be naturalized 
if not in the form of reasons, as talk of reasons is our best conception of how the notion of “to-be-




3.2.6.1 Moral naturalism with practical clout 
There is one kind of reason that is typically considered but rejected: those that are sometimes called 
“institutional reasons” following Mackie’s discussion.142 Suppose that I am playing chess, and I wish to 
move one of my Rooks diagonally. It appears acceptable to say, that even though I desire to do so, I 
have a reason not to move my Rook diagonally. The fact that I have a reason follows from the fact that 
I agreed to play chess (and thus tacitly perhaps, assent to playing by the rules). So, in this case I have 
a reason to act (or refrain from acting) that does not depend on my desires. Because of this, Mackie 
does not deny that there are “desire-transcendent” reasons. He does however reject that such reasons 
can be “objectively valid”: such reasons are only legitimate because of the presence of an institution 
that one must endorse for the reason to apply. While this kind of reason is independent of my 
immediate wants, it is not entirely independent of all my desires or purposes: I only have a reason not 
to move my Rook diagonally if I accept the rules of chess. So, the reason only applies hypothetically. 
If I no longer wish to partake in the chess game, then I would no longer have a reason to play by the 
rules. These so called “institutional reasons” apply wherever there is any kind of established institution 
or social practice. Other examples that Mackie suggests are etiquette and the institution of 
promising.143 Because these kinds of reasons are escapable in some sense, they are unable to provide 
the kind of practical clout necessary to be the kind of reasons morality gives us. If institutional reasons 
are ultimately dependent upon the ends and desires of the person, then moral reasons cannot be a 
kind of institutional reason. Because the required naturalization must account for reasons that are 
inescapable, they cannot be sensitive to peoples’ wishes to partake or not partake in a particular 
institution. 
 
142 ibid., pp. 64-73. 
143 Although it is not clear that one can simply “opt out” of the institution of promising, Mackie thinks that 
there is a sense in which promising is optional or hypothetical: “I can surely refrain from endorsing the 
promising institution; I can decline to speak within it. No doubt this would be eccentric, unconventional, it 




Where else then might we find practical clout? One way is to locate the property of goodness as being 
identical to or supervening upon some other property, such as the tendency to produce happiness, or 
the tendency to promote welfare.144 Certainly, it seems plausible that considerations of happiness or 
welfare might provide us with reasons for action (hence the intuitive appeal of utilitarian theories – it 
often just seems that suffering should be avoided, happiness promoted where possible, and so on). 
But will awareness of these properties provide reasons that are inescapable and authoritative? It 
seems hard to deny that welfare and happiness and the like are things that generally matter to us, but 
does the fact that an action will produce happiness or welfare (or whichever property we choose) 
always produce reasons in us that have deliberative weight?  Or, is the fact of the matter simply just 
that while we generally do think that such things give us reasons, there are cases where we can be 
aware that such a property as tendency to promote welfare obtains, but that this fails to make a 
difference to our reasoning? It seems that despite the attractiveness this proposal has, it is does not 
go very far towards showing how such properties themselves are inescapable and authoritative. There 
is no obvious way to show that there is a necessary connection between the property of tending to 
promote welfare (or whichever property we choose) and our reasons. This strategy therefore simply 
pushes the problem back a step, as we still need to answer the question: why think that the property 
of promoting happiness or welfare will have practical clout? As it stands, there is no argument other 
than the proposal’s initial plausibility to show that such reasons are inescapable (that one can be 
aware of such a property, but that this has no impact on one’s deliberation) and thus this is not a good 
solution to the problem of naturalizing practical clout.  
Another way of approaching the naturalization of morality that is often thought to be more promising 
is to identify moral requirements as requirements of rationality: we are morally required to do just 
what we have sufficient or real reason to do. What we have real reason or sufficient reason to do is 
just what we would do if we ‘reasoned correctly’ in some sense.  Here the strategy is to attempt to 
 
144 It is worth noting such a strategy is not limited to properties historically identified by utilitarians – those 
concerning happiness, welfare, pleasure and so on.  
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provide a “substantive and naturalizable account of ‘correct practical reasoning’ (or ‘practical 
rationality’) according to which any person, irrespective of her starting desires would through such 
reasoning converge on certain practical conclusions that are broadly in line with what we would expect 
of moral requirements.”145 The aim therefore is to find an account of reasoning whereby if someone 
has a genuine moral reason for acting in some way, call it φ-ing, then it is not possible for them to 
sensibly say something like “I acknowledge that were I to reason correctly I would want to φ, but what 
is it to me?”146 According to Joyce, the “dominant attempt in modern philosophy” to provide such an 
account of reasoning is what is often called the ‘self-conception strategy’. Joyce quotes David Copp 
who describes this strategy as follows:  
On the self-conception strategy, there is a way of conceiving of oneself such that 
a rational person who is thinking clearly must conceive of herself this way, but if 
she does not treat moral reasons as authoritative, she cannot coherently conceive 
of herself in this way.  It might be said, for example, that a person who does not 
treat moral reasons as authoritative cannot see herself as autonomous; or that she 
cannot see herself or value herself as a rationally reflective agent, acting for 
reasons; or that she is committed to practical solipsism; or that she cannot 
coherently expect other people to respond to the reasons she addresses to them; 
or the like.147 
It may be asked however, what is so bad about being unable to see oneself as autonomous or as 
rationally reflective and so on? Why should viewing oneself in these particular ways be of such 
paramount importance (and thus why does it entail reasons for action that are practically speaking, 
inescapable)? As Joyce writes “such things certainly have a nasty ring about them, but what does that 
ring really amount to?”148  Joyce takes Christine Korsgaard to provide an answer: to ignore such 
reasons is to violate the “conceptions of ourselves that are most important to us… it is to lose your 
integrity, and so your identity,… it is to no longer be able to think of yourself under the description 
 
145 Richard Joyce, The evolution of morality, p. 195. 
146 Ibid., p. 195.  
147 David Copp, ‘Moral naturalism and three grades of normativity’, p. 35. 
148 Richard Joyce, The evolution of morality, p. 197.   
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under which you value yourself and find your life to be worth living… it is to be for all practical purposes 
dead or worse than dead”149 
What then should we make of this argument? The charges Korsgaard makes certainly sound like they 
should be something we should care about. However, one immediate problem is that “these strong 
claims are supposed to reveal what is wrong about any moral transgression: failing to return a 
borrowed book, being rude to an undeserving waitress, pinching a morning newspaper from a hotel 
corridor.”150 But the fact that someone may occasionally do such things, and yet, on the whole, lead a 
happy, reflective, and satisfying life, should lead us to question whether this really is a good 
explanation of why we must care about such moral considerations. Thus, one potential weakness 
appears to be that the self-conception strategy cannot adequately account for the full range of moral 
transgressions. Presumably however the self-conception theorist is likely to respond that such minor 
moral transgressions do not perhaps cause you to be “dead or worse than dead” and that in these 
cases such rhetoric might not be warranted, but that they do create a kind of incoherence or some 
kind of feeling of loss of integrity, or that one is acting against one’s character in some small way when 
one makes minor transgressions. Indeed, it makes sense that in such cases the strength or weight of 
the reasons in question are likely to be more minor to accompany the more minor transgressions. 
Joyce’s complaint about the self-conception argument not accounting for very minor transgressions 
therefore is not a conclusive reply.  
However, there is a deeper problem with the self-conception strategy.  The problem is that the self-
conception strategy simply assumes rationally deciding to ignore such reasons from time to time (and 
thus acting against one’s self-conception) will result in wholesale rejection of continuing to be able to 
conceive of oneself in such a way. But why should we simply accept that the issue is settled by the 
self-conception theorist’s claim that we must cease to view ourselves in this way if we only 
 
149 Christine. Korsgaard, The sources of normativity, p. 102.  
150 Richard Joyce, The evolution of morality, p. 197. 
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occasionally act in ways contrary to it? Simply claiming this is not enough; the authoritative 
normativity of moral claims cannot be ultimately dependent on the self-conception theorist’s 
assertions that we ‘must’.  David Copp illustrates this point nicely using the story of the ring of Gyges 
from Plato’s Republic: 
Gyges values the power and love he will achieve if he carries out his plot151, and 
this means that, if he is fully rational and thinking clearly, and if Korsgaard’s theory 
is correct, he must value his reflective agency. Moreover, if Korsgaard’s analysis is 
correct, and if Gyges understands morality, he must then understand that carrying 
out his plot would conflict with his valuing his reflective agency. Yet he also values 
power and love, and he understands that carrying out his plot would help him 
achieve a life of power and love. So he might ask, “Why should I not carry out my 
plot? Why should I be moral?” For all that Korsgaard has shown, it seems to me, 
his asking these questions would not indicate either that he is not fully rational or 
that he does not understand morality. Nor need it indicate that he does not value 
his reflective agency.152   
Just because Gyges values one way of seeing himself, it does not follow that he cannot also value the 
things he can attain by carrying out his plot. A person who values their own identity as an autonomous 
reason-responsive individual can still rationally wonder whether they should act against moral 
reasons, and sometimes decide to do so if there are other reasons that seem to have more weight. 
Ultimately, the claims of the self-conception theorist come down to the assertion that “moral reasons 
cannot be ignored, because if you do, something bad will happen to you or the way you think about 
yourself”. But put in this way, such a claim hardly seems to be an adequate account of the 
inescapability and authority of morality that Joyce is trying to locate, especially when it is rationally 
debatable as to whether the “something bad will happen to you” in question can be cashed out in any 
substantial way that one cannot decide to ignore. The self-conception theorist would no doubt 
question this response: if we were really rational and clearheaded we would see that it is impossible 
 
151 Gyge’s ‘immoral’ plot is as follows: “Having made his discovery [of a ring that could make him invisible] he 
managed to get himself included in the party that was to report to the king, and when he arrived he seduced 
the queen, and with her help attacked and murdered the king and seized the throne.” Plato, The Republic, Part 
I, Book IV.  
152 David Copp, Moral naturalism and three grades of normativity, p. 37. 
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to ignore such reasons. But, the fact that many philosophers, who we would consider rational by any 
other standard fail to see this, and that there is little more that can be said to convince them (that is 
non-circular) means we can legitimately question this naturalization of the authority and 
inescapability of morality. This however is just one attempt to show that the authority of morality can 
be naturalized, and thus its failure would not show that the project is doomed.  
In response to the failures to provide an adequate account, a supporter of moral naturalism with 
practical clout is likely to raise at this point what is called the ‘partners in innocence’ strategy (or 
alternatively ‘companions in guilt’ strategy – which term one opts for usually depends on the side of 
the debate one’s support falls). The tactic here is to point to other kinds of normativity that have a 
feature that is analogous to practical clout – other kinds of ‘ought-ness’ of a particularly inescapable 
and authoritative kind – and to observe that there are not similar kinds of sceptical doubts about 
naturalising these kinds of normativity in other domains. Typical examples include logical normativity 
(facts about to-be-deduced-ness) or epistemological normativity (facts about to-be-believed-ness.) 
That is, few doubt whether there are facts about what one ought to deduce given a certain set of 
premises or about what one ought to believe given certain other beliefs.153  These ‘benign’ cases force 
those who identify something wrong with practical clout to come up with a reasoned distinction 
between the moral case and the epistemological or logical cases of normativity, and if they cannot, 
this provides reason for accepting that the moral case is perhaps also unproblematic. Of course, at 
this point, it is open to the critic of naturalising practical clout to claim that these other kinds of 
normativity are also unacceptable and cannot be naturalised, but doing so is usually considered a 
counter-intuitive option.  
What can be concluded from the ‘partners in innocence’ or ‘companions in guilt’ argument? Firstly, 
the argument does not actually deal with the difficulties of naturalising the various kinds of 
normativity – instead it points to different kinds of normativity in an attempt to shift the burden of 
 
153 Richard Joyce, ‘Moral anti-realism’.  
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proof from those providing a naturalistic account of morality to those who criticise such accounts. 
Providing an account of how these other non-moral kinds of normativity can be naturalistically 
accounted for, how they reduce to or supervene upon natural facts, is unlikely to be straightforward: 
reductions of these kinds of abstract entities that depend upon human mental capacities are in general 
very hard to provide. How the mind or the ‘mental’ reduces to the phenomena that science deals with, 
is an unresolved problem in philosophy, and thus introducing other kinds of reductions that involve 
this same reduction in an attempt to clarify the moral case, is of questionable value.  On the whole, 
pointing to other kinds of normativity does little to settle the debate either way. It does however show 
that morality is not alone in being a phenomenon that involves reductions that are difficult, and 
highlights that while there are not straight forward ways to philosophically account for or deal with 
such phenomena, this fact does not in general cause us to automatically jettison such kinds of 
normativity as errors. 
Joyce takes himself to have “devoted quite a lot of energy to pursuing the possibility of a moral 
naturalist finding inescapable practical authority in the world via connecting it to a naturalistically 
respectable account of sufficient reasons”154 and he concludes that “this avenue has led to a dead 
end.”155  There is more to be said about the success of this conclusion, but first it is worth considering 
the other response to Joyce’s argument: that practical clout is not in fact a necessary element of a 
suitable moral naturalism. 
 
3.2.6.2 Moral naturalism without practical clout 
The second response to Joyce’s argument against moral naturalism is to claim that we can have 
morality without thinking that it must provide us with authoritative inescapable “to-be-doneness” – 
that we can have morality without practical clout. An example is useful to show where the two 
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positions diverge. Take for instance what is supposed to be a straightforward example of a self-evident 
moral obligation from Peter Singer:  
I am walking past a shallow pond and see a child drowning in it, I ought to wade in 
and pull the child out.  This will mean getting my clothes muddy, but this is 
insignificant, while the death of the child would presumably be a very bad thing.156 
Joyce would argue that the concept of morality requires that a moral obligation to help the drowning 
child, is of a kind that provides a reason one cannot easily ignore. That is, the reason has some 
deliberative weight that one cannot ignore if one understands the situation. This does not mean that 
it is necessarily motivating but the reason for action here does not depend upon one’s own desires 
nor anyone else’s. It is simply required in some primitive, unavoidable sense. Joyce’s hypothetical 
opponent will agree that there is a moral obligation to help here. And they will certainly also agree 
that almost anyone in this situation will have strong reasons to act, ones that will override worries 
about muddy clothing. But the moral-naturalist-without-clout will not accept that there is an 
unavoidable, desire-transcendent reason to act. Instead, according to them, there will simply be a 
range of contributing reasons for action; reasons that are based upon the everyday properties, 
relations, institutions, and so on, that are part of the natural world. Perhaps these reasons will be 
based on reflection on what kind of person one is, or thoughts about if oneself or one’s child were in 
a similar situation (some kind of universalization of maxims or ‘golden rule’), or considerations of the 
consequences of acting in one way or another, or alternatively perhaps reasons based on empathy 
and sympathy and attitudes towards avoidable suffering and loss and so on provide the justification. 
Whether the moral-naturalist-without-clout settles on some combination of the above, or perhaps 
different justifications not listed, the only difference (according to them) between their account of 
wrongness, and the kind of account Joyce would give, would be in the fact that they would deny that 
all these things amount to practical clout. The reasons for action will most likely be strong reasons, 
and if the individual in question is at all motivated by moral considerations, then they will have reason 
 
156 Peter Singer, ‘Famine, affluence, and morality’, p. 231. 
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to act. But there is nothing with any more authority than other kinds of reasons; the universe does 
not ‘step in’ and make the connection between the individual recognizing it is a moral obligation and 
the individual having a reason to act that they could not avoid having, no matter the contingent facts 
about them.  
Paul Bloomfield has adopted this response, of denying that morality has practical clout, taking it to be 
obviously correct: 
What is of the last importance, and ignored by Joyce at what I saw as the 
culmination of the book’s argument (p. 199-209), is that the ancient Greeks had 
recognizably moral systems, yet no analogous conception of ‘practical clout’. Given 
Greek moral theory, we can see that practical clout is not a required feature of 
morality as Joyce, and many other philosophers, have suggested. Indeed, as G. E. 
M. Anscombe has famously argued, albeit in different terms, practical clout is a 
peculiarly modern feature of morality. Seen properly, morality without ‘practical 
clout’ is like combustion without phlogiston.157 
David Copp also ultimately concludes that this kind of practical inescapability and authority is not a 
necessary feature of morality (Copp uses the term ‘authoritative normativity’ as a synonym for 
‘practical clout’):  
There is no definitive answer to the “Why be moral?” question of the kind that 
believers in authoritative normativity have in mind…There is no way to put all such 
doubts to rest in rational reflective persons.  In my view, there is no answer to the 
“Why be moral?” question that lays it to rest by showing that it does not raise a 
serious practical question that could indicate an indecisiveness about morality in a 
rational person who had a clear understanding of morality.  If this is correct, 
morality does not have authoritative normativity.158 
This strategy is also advocated by Stephen Finlay in an exchange of four articles159 with Richard Joyce. 
Finlay’s argument is based around his view of morality whereby statements are "...oughts applying or 
 
157 Paul Bloomfield, ‘Review: The evolution of morality’, p. 179. 
158 Emphasis added. David Copp, ‘Moral naturalism and three grades of normativity’, pp. 40-41.  
159 Stephen Finlay, ‘The error in the error theory’, Richard Joyce, ‘The error in “The error in error theory”’, 




ascribed to agents independently of their desires, but with normative authority that is relative to and 
contingent upon those agents' desires."160 Finlay’s position appears somewhat contradictory at first 
glance, for it sounds like it is trying to have its cake (the authority of oughts applying to agents 
independently of their desires) and eat it too (the authority of oughts being dependent only on that 
agent’s desires – anything goes!). The question this immediately suggests is whether these oughts are 
the kind that morality actually deals in or is this an ad hoc characterisation of morality to avoid error 
theory. The answer to this question essentially what the debate between Joyce and Finlay is over, but 
it is worth noting that at first glance Finlay’s position is highly counter-intuitive and seems to require 
an explanation of why its apparently contradictory claims are not in fact in conflict with each other.  
So according to Finlay, he agrees with Joyce that practical clout161 is not feature of morality that could 
exist – that ‘objectively valid’ moral imperatives that describe un-relativized normative facts not 
contingent on or relative to any agent’s desires, institutional subscriptions, or ends, are impossible. 
However Finlay does not think this is problematic, he adds his voice to the camp of those who argue 
for moral naturalism without practical clout being unproblematic: “The bottom line is that they [Joyce 
and Mackie] and I hold basically the same view about what kinds of things the world contains; what 
we disagree about is whether this is enough to make some moral claims true.”162 
Joyce is aware that this point about the necessity of practical clout is contentious.  He submits that 
there seems to be no established way of settling such a dispute where people’s intuitions diverge163, 
164 and agrees with Michael Smith, David Lewis, and Mark Johnston who claim that which way one 
goes on the issue can come down to one’s temperament:  
Strictly speaking…genuine values would have to meet an impossible condition, so 
it is an error to think that there are any. Loosely speaking, the name may go to a 
 
160 Stephen Finlay, ‘Errors upon errors: A reply to Joyce’, p. 541.  
161 Although Finlay prefers to use his own terminology rather than Joyce’s suggested ‘practical clout’ despite his 
paper being an explicit response to Joyce’s and John Mackie’s arguments for error theory. 
162 Ibid., p. 541.  
163 Richard Joyce, The evolution of morality, p. 200.  
164 Richard Joyce, ‘Enough with the errors! A final reply to Finlay’, p. 10 
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claimant that deserves it imperfectly…What to make of the situation is mainly a 
matter of temperament.165   
However, Joyce thinks that we can do better than this – that we can go beyond blunt charges of 
asserting or denying that practical clout is a necessary feature of morality. He argues that by looking 
at the way morality is used we can assess whether some feature of the concept is necessary. If morality 
did not have practical clout, Joyce thinks we would be unable to use morality as we do.  As he puts it, 
if we look at “what the concept is used for, what practices it undergirds, and then ask whether a 
revised concept, with the problematic element discarded, could carry on playing that role”,166 then we 
will be able to assess whether this discarded element was in fact a necessary component.  
Joyce thinks that if morality does not have practical clout, then moral reasons will not always provide 
us with reasons to act (that is they are either escapable, or sometimes do not have any authority), and 
that morality would therefore be only contingently connected to what we have reason to do.167 He 
argues, if it is only contingently true that moral reasons result in actually having a reason to act, then 
there would be cases where we can say someone acted morally wrongly, for example by committing 
a murder, but that they had no reason to do other than they did. And this he thinks “imparts an 
extremely odd flavour to morality.”168  He thinks that we would not be comfortable asserting both 
that the murderer’s actions are wrong, and then in the next breath claiming that they had no reason 
at all to refrain from committing the murder.  Joyce thinks this makes morality odd because it reduces 
our ability to morally criticize wrongdoers – why should they care what we have to say, if even we 
admit that they had no reason to act other than they did? And if our ability to criticize wrongdoers is 
diminished, morality would be unable to be used as it is: it would have insufficient ‘oomph’ to provide 
normative guidance to everyone’s lives.  
 
165 Michael Smith, David Lewis, Mark Johnston ‘Dispositional theories of value’, p. 93. 
166 Richard Joyce, The evolution of morality, p. 201. 
167 Ibid., p. 208.  
168 ibid., p. 204.   
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Finlay identifies the features of morality in Joyce’s argument that show practical clout is necessary for 
it to function as follows169:  
Address: Moral imperatives or judgments are addressed as categorically applicable 
statements, to audiences who do not share the same concerns as the speaker. 
They are not addressed as statements contingent on the audience already 
subscribing to the same end as the speaker. This non-relativized usage is taken as 
evidence that moral judgments are not intended as relational in the way Finlay 
thinks morality is.170   
Expectation: Moral imperatives are addressed to non-subscribers with the 
expectation that doing so might influence the audience by provision of reasons 
they will realise or recognise the authority of.171  
Disputation: The fact that moral rightness is argued, even where parties appear to 
disagree about fundamental moral values, suggests there is an assumption of an 
absolute, non-relational moral truth to the matter.172  
Reactive attitude: our responses to those we believe have acted in morally 
significant ways are not contingent on what the actors themselves believe or the 
ends, desires, or normative standards they themselves subscribe to. This is taken 
as evidence that we expect moral norms to have practical clout – they would not 
serve their purpose if they did not.173  
Finlay’s response to these lines of argument is quite wide-ranging, but fundamentally rests on his 
positive theory of how morality is based on non-spoken institutional categorical imperatives. In 
support of this he also argues that moral conversations between parties that do not already share 
ends or normative standards are much less common than is assumed in metaethical discussion. He 
posits that most moral discourse within a society takes place between parties that share fundamental 
values and also that parties assume each other shares the same values; conversations with parties 
who do not share values, such as discussions with murderers or neo-Nazis are rare exceptions not the 
 
169 Finlay also identifies a number of other functions than are presented here but does not think they are 
serious candidates, so they have been omitted.   
170 Stephen Finlay, ‘The error in the error theory’, pp. 11-12.  
171 Ibid., pp. 11-12.  
172 Ibid., pp. 11-12. 
173 Ibid., p. 16-17. 
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norm. Joyce however argues this misses the point and that encounters with different fundamental 
moral values and outlooks are common place even if explicit conversations with parties that actually 
espouse them are not: 
Movies and novels are full of nihilistic or sociopathic baddies; the evil step-parent 
is a stock character of our children’s fairy tales; and even small homogenous 
societies have their myths and religions that are full of destructive characters 
standing outside the accepted moral order…It is a challenge (to say the least) for 
Finlay’s proposal to explain someone deliberating in her own mind over a moral 
dilemma or struggling with temptation toward immorality.”174 
Ultimately, Finlay’s argument relies upon his theory that morality is a kind of shared institution, but 
one that everyone’s subscription to is implicit. This is what allows him to argue that the authority 
morality has, is limited and dependent upon subscription to the institution of morality. For Finlay the 
authority moral speakers have (or at least the appearance of authority) is bolstered by them not being 
explicit about this relativistic component – the ends or goals that moral language assumes – and it is 
only because these are not made explicit that moral language has the surface appearance of dealing 
with fundamental moral disputes.  
There is considerable detail to this discussion between Finlay and Joyce that has not been discussed 
but it is outside the scope of what can be covered here.175 In the final analysis however, Joyce is not 
swayed by this argument, and I think rightly so. His view of Finlay’s relativistic picture of morality is 
that it cannot do the job we expect morality to do – it  lacks the practical weight and ‘oomph’ required 
to do its job.176 As Joyce puts it “we want to do things with our concept of moral rightness for which 
the relativistic substitute just doesn’t seem to provide license.”177 Thus, Joyce’s argument for practical 
clout, that we could not use morality in the way we do if it did not have its distinctive form of authority 
 
174 Richard Joyce, ‘Enough with the errors! A final reply to Finlay’, pp 8-9. 
175 Being able to properly evaluate Finlay’s position is also hampered due to a lack of a complete statement of 
his positive theory of how morality can be based on relativized imperatives despite this account being 
fundamental to his argument with Joyce.  
176 Ibid., pp. 12-13.  
177 Ibid., p. 13. 
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is not thwarted by the considerations Finlay proposes. However, Joyce’s proposals have also not 
persuaded all the cynics about practical clout either.178 It appears that there is no agreed upon answer 
as to the question of whether morality has the feature Joyce calls practical clout.  
While Joyce considers it a necessary component of morality, there are others who do not, and this 
divergence of opinion appears to be a problem for Joyce’s argument against moral naturalism. As 
Joyce himself has noted, claiming that some feature “should count as a ‘non-negotiable component’ 
of morality has a tendency to lead quickly to impasse, for there is no accepted methodology for 
deciding when a discourse is ‘centrally committed’ to a given thesis.”179  It may be that there is simply 
be no matter of fact about practical clout if the concepts themselves are not determinate enough for 
such a conclusion to be established one way or the other, and different individuals and groups use the 
concepts in varying ways.  
 
3.2.7 Does Joyce’s debunking argument succeed? 
Joyce has argued that morality is the result of our particular evolutionary history. If not for this 
particular genealogy, we would not have morality: we would not think in moral terms or use moral 
concepts at all, and therefore we would not have moral beliefs involving these concepts.  Thus, if our 
moral beliefs are to be about moral facts, they must in some way be based upon (reduce to or 
supervene on etc.) this genealogy or its products. The prospects for such a naturalisation however, 
are not good according to Joyce. He attempts to show that morality cannot easily be accommodated 
as part of the usual natural world by showing that practical clout, a purported feature of morality, 
cannot be naturalised in an acceptable way. He discusses a number of possible ways that practical 
clout could be accounted for, but concludes that none of these are suitable – none provide the kind 
 
178 As Joyce himself readily admits, citing many including Gilbert Harman, Peter Railton, David Lewis, Mark 
Johnston, Jamie Dreier, David Copp, Jesse Prinz, Simon Kirchin, and Caroline West. See ‘Enough with the errors! 
A final reply to Finlay’, p. 12 and Richard Joyce, Simon Kirchin (eds.), A world without values: Essays on John 
Mackie’s moral error theory.  
179 Richard Joyce, ‘Moral anti-realism’, sec. 4. 
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of inescapability or strength of authority that he thinks is necessary, in a naturalistically acceptable 
way. This is not the final word on Joyce’s proposed error theory 180  but so far, the presented 
considerations are not successful in refuting Joyce, which makes his argument an interesting case 
study for the present thesis.  
 
3.2.8 Implications of error theory 
In the final chapter of The Evolution of Morality Joyce discusses the potential practical implications of 
his position. Joyce thinks that it is far from clear what implications his version of moral scepticism 
would have if it did in fact turn out to be correct. His discussion is interesting as he argues that we still 
have good reasons to act in accord with what morality recommends, and the considerations he 
advances in support of this, appear to be similar to the considerations put forward by many moral 
naturalists. Joyce insists that the accusation that “anything goes” follows from his kind of moral 
scepticism is unfounded. He writes “Moral scepticism amounts to the recognition that there is, or may 
be, nothing distinctively morally wrong with stealing, but it is absolutely not to be identified with the 
proposal that ordinary people have no reason at all to refrain from stealing – and anyone who made 
such a jump would be committing a grave mistake.”181 So, if according to Joyce, moral reasons do not 
matter, what kind of reasons do we have for thinking we should not steal? Why would it be such a 
“grave mistake” to reach the conclusion that stealing would be ok, if we do not need to worry about 
morality?  
Joyce mentions a couple of answers although his discussion is brief. One reason Joyce gives is that 
moral emotions and sentiments are likely to persist, despite any epistemic ban on moral beliefs. Such 
 
180 Joyce himself accepts this, pointing out this is not the only argument or consideration weighing on the issue: 
"I should like to reiterate how narrow-minded it is to think that the moral error theory stands or falls entirely on 
this...Finlay goes so far as to say that he considers 'morality provisionally vindicated if Mackie’s and Joyce’s 
arguments are refuted'...The above argument could be totally unsound (and quite possibly is) and the error 
theory could still be persuasive.” From Richard Joyce, ‘Enough with the errors! A final reply to Finlay’, p. 2. 
181 Richard Joyce, The evolution of morality, p. 224.  
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moral emotions he thinks play important instrumental roles in our social interactions. For example, 
the emotion Joyce calls ‘indignant anger’ – an emotional response to those that cheat or free ride or 
‘rip off’ others – serves the purpose of discouraging such behaviour in others through giving 
motivation to punish, exclude, or extract reparation from transgressors, despite doing so being 
costly.182  Even if such a response is costly in the short term, establishing a reputation that ensures 
others know you will respond in this way can result in long-term gains by deterring others from 
cheating, and signalling to others that you are a trustworthy co-operator – resulting in profitable on-
going relationships.  Thus, Joyce thinks that not only are moral emotions likely to persist, but that we 
should permit them to continue to play a motivational role in our lives since doing so produces 
desirable outcomes (he claims the “should”183 here is one of prudence). Joyce even goes as far as 
claiming that a person will be “practically irrational”184 if they do not allow moral emotions to play a 
role in their practical deliberations.  
The persistence of moral emotions is not however the main reason Joyce thinks we should continue 
to refrain from stealing. He thinks that “An ordinarily situated person has many reasons to refrain 
from stealing – robust and plain reasons”185 and that “The basis of some of those reasons is the fact 
that for social creatures, as humans are designed to be, major and irreplaceable satisfactions are to 
be had from sincere participation in a community.” 186  His discussion suggests that people have 
prudential reasons (they will benefit from acting morally) and also that we have desires and needs 
that cannot be met in any other way than by acting morally - there are “major and irreplaceable 
satisfactions [that] are to be had from sincere participation in a community.” What does this phrase 
about “major and irreplaceable satisfactions” mean? Presumably Joyce means that acting in accord 
with morality (by not harming others, not stealing, reciprocating when appropriate, cooperating fairly 
 
182 ibid., chapter 4.2 and 4.3, pp. 108-123. 
183 ibid., p. 228. 
184 ibid., pp. 227-228. 
185 ibid., p. 224. 
186 ibid., p. 224.  
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and so on) is in general a pre-requisite for acceptance in a community and for obtaining the range of 
goods that such acceptance makes available. Goods such as friendship, respect, trust, participation in 
all kinds of social activities and cooperation, freedom from guilt and shame, and the freedom from 
distrust and dislike of others are all available only by abiding by the norms that are present in 
communities. These norms provide assurance to members of the community that other individuals 
are suitable partners for these interactions which result in such goods. Joyce presumably thinks that 
these goods are almost universally desirable or preferable for social creatures like us, and thus the 
vast majority of people have reasons to pursue them.  These considerations appear to amount to the 
fact that everyone has reasons to act in accord with and support morality. 
There is little to find fault with in these considerations about the social nature of humans. The difficulty 
with Joyce’s discussion is that these considerations for continuing to act in accord with what morality 
recommends, appear to be similar to the kinds of considerations put forward by the moral naturalist 
who thinks we can have morality without practical clout. If these reasons are sufficient for supporting 
his claim that we should act in ways that are in accord with what morality dictates, then Joyce has put 
forward a (somewhat unelaborated) version of moral naturalism without practical clout. No doubt 
Joyce would claim that such a conception of morality does not do justice to the usual concept of 
morality used in contemporary philosophy (not that there is likely to be a consensus on such a 
concept). So, on the one hand Joyce has identified what he thinks is an error in the commitments of 
moral discourse, but on the other, he also agrees with moral naturalists (of the without practical clout 
variety) that there are good reasons for acting morally and thus we have good reasons for maintaining 
moral practice as it is. 
Does this amount to morality being debunked? The answer that I suggest is that in the sense that it 
forces us to revise our views of the nature of morality it might, but in perhaps a more important 
practical sense it does not. Consider the following analogy.  Imagine that there is a primitive tribe of 
people. This tribe plants willow trees around the area in which they bury their deceased and believe 
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that the spirits of their ancestors infuse the willow trees with special healing powers. Because of this, 
they believe the magically infused bark and leaves of these trees can be used as a medicine that 
effectively reduces pain and fever, which in fact the bark does. Suppose then that this tribe does 
eventually come in contact with the modern world, and they learn that it is in fact salicylic acid in the 
willow bark that is responsible for the analgesic and antipyretic effects, and not the spirits of their 
ancestors causing these effects. Is their belief in their remedy for pain and fever debunked? In one 
sense yes: the causal mechanism they thought was responsible for the beneficial effects is not in fact 
what caused the beneficial effects (their ancestor’s spirits are not playing any causal role that they 
believed they were). But in another clear sense their belief is not debunked: the beneficial effects of 
the remedy were real, and will continue to be, even though the element they thought was necessary 
(the spirits) for the medicine is undermined. 
Similarly, if some or all of moral discourse has a commitment to a feature that is in fact mistaken, then 
in one sense it has been debunked. This is what Joyce’s argument, if it is sound would establish. He 
would have demonstrated that when people make moral claims that things are right or wrong, that at 
least part of what they are doing is making a claim about a concept that is incorrect: they are claiming 
that the imperatives they put forward have a kind of super-natural authority and inescapability that 
they do not in fact have.  But in another more practical sense morality has not been debunked: Joyce’s 
argument has not shown that we should cease to act in accord with what morality recommends. 
Indeed, Joyce himself thinks we still have good reasons for acting morally. Therefore, just as the 
fictional tribe’s practice of using the bark and leaves of willow trees was still an effective remedy even 
after their beliefs were shown to contain factual errors, so too morality still works for us, regardless 
of the fact our moral discourse contains a kind of factual error. It still works in the sense that it 
functions as it previously did to provide social cohesion, discourage actions that negatively impact on 
others, makes possible cooperative and productive interactions, and in general facilitates our living as 
the ultra-social creatures that humans are.   
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Thus, the conclusion is this: if by “debunked” we mean that we should abandon our concern for acting 
morally, then Joyce’s argument does not show that morality has been debunked – the evolutionary 
explanation of morality does not ‘explain away’ our reasons for acting on what morality 
‘recommends’. If by “debunked” we mean Joyce’s argument would show that moral discourse involves 
a kind of factual error – that moral discourse is committed to imperatives that purport to have a kind 
of authority and inescapability that they do not in fact have – then we can accept that Joyce’s 
argument may ‘debunk’ this apparent factual appearance of morality. Whether Joyce’s argument for 
this conclusion is sound however, depends on whether morality has a “non-negotiable commitment” 
to practical clout. And this, it seems, is hard to establish, as Joyce’s argument is not conclusive on the 
matter and many disagree with him that it is a necessary feature. Conclusions such as Joyce’s, are 
among the range of considerations used to support various ‘non-factualist’ meta-ethical positions 
including moral constructivism (the idea that moral facts exist only insofar as we decide what is 
morally right or wrong), non-cognitivism and its modern derivatives such as expressivism and Simon 
Blackburn’s quasi-realism, fictionalism, and a range of subjectivist and relativist positions. The 
arguments for such meta-ethical positions are almost all controversial (in the sense that consensus is 
at best divided if there exists any at consensus at all) and thus it should be of little surprise that the 
same is true for opinions on Joyce’s argument. Nevertheless, Joyce’s argument is a good model for 
how an empirically based consideration could have significant implications for meta-ethics and our 
understanding of moral truth, and I will discuss these implications further in chapter 4.  
 
3.3 Sharon Street’s Darwinian dilemma 
As Joyce’s argument shows the causal origins of one’s beliefs have the potential to make us re-
evaluate the epistemic credentials of those beliefs. Whether a particular belief’s genealogy is of the 
undermining or reinforcing variety is a question of what has happened in the past and whether that 
past is conducive to the beliefs that were formed being true.  Sharon Street has made a number of 
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contributions in recent years that also advance arguments about the potentially undermining role that 
evolution can play as part of the causal origin of our moral beliefs187 . Street argues that if the 
evolutionary genealogy of morality (as outlined in chapter 1) is correct, it poses a dilemma for the 
moral realist that forces them to choose between endorsing an unscientific theory and abandoning at 
least some of their realist aspirations.  
Below, I outline the target of Street’s argument, moral realism, and then describe how the dilemma 
supposedly forces the realist to choose between moral scepticism and an improbable and scientifically 
indefeasible theory of the evolution of human sociality, cooperation, and morality. After this I briefly 
describe the strategies the realist may wish to take up in an attempt to avoid the Darwinian dilemma 
and then examine some of the responses that have been made to evolutionary error theories that are 
applicable to both Street and Joyce’s arguments.  
 
3.3.1 Realist theories of value 
The targets of Sharon Street’s Darwinian Dilemma are what she calls ‘realist theories of value’. The 
defining claim of realist theories of value is that “there are evaluative facts or truths that hold 
independently of all of our evaluative attitudes.”188  The constituents of this definition are broken 
down as follows. 
By ‘evaluative truths or facts’ Street is talking about propositions such as ‘X is a reason to Y’, ‘one 
should or ought to X’, or ‘X is good, valuable, worthwhile, or morally right’. These are the moral truths 
or facts that a realist theory of value deals in. 
By ‘evaluative attitudes’ Street means the relation we have to the ‘evaluative truths or facts’; the 
judgments we make about them. These ‘evaluative attitudes’ include conative and cognitive states 
 
187 Sharon Street, ‘A Darwinian dilemma for realist theories of value’, ‘Reply to Copp: Naturalism, normativity, 
and the varieties of realism worth worrying about’, and ‘Coming to terms with contingency: Humean 
constructivism about practical reason’. 
188 Sharon Street, ‘A Darwinian dilemma for realist theories of value’, p. 110.  
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such as desires, attitudes of approval or disapproval, judgments about what one ought to do, what 
one has a reason to do, and what is morally right or correct. They include morally significant emotions 
and sentiments; attitudes that favour cooperation, reciprocation, and fairness.  
By ‘hold independently’ Street means that there are evaluative facts that could be true independently 
of the entire set of actual evaluative judgments, attitudes, or beliefs we hold, have held, or will hold. 
An example Street gives of a view that includes this kind of independence from our evaluative 
attitudes is what Russ Shafer-Landau has called ‘Stance-independent’189 realism.  
Consider the statement ‘Hitler was morally depraved’.  According to a realist about value, it might be 
(and probably is if our moral beliefs are similar to those of most moral philosophers) true that Hitler 
was morally depraved and this truth will hold independently of any stance (evaluative attitude) that 
we, Hitler, or indeed anyone else, might take toward that truth. The fact that Hitler was depraved 
does not rely on anyone actually holding the attitude or view that he was depraved. It is possible on 
this view that everyone that exists actually thinks Hitler is admirable, yet according to the realist it 
would still be true that Hitler was depraved (and everyone else had false beliefs). 
 
3.3.2 Evaluative attitudes saturated by Darwinian influence 
The Darwinian Dilemma is the result of the recognition that evolutionary forces have had a 
tremendous role in shaping our evaluative attitudes and beliefs. It is worth elaborating exactly what 
Street means by “a tremendous role in shaping” as the strength of these influences is often cited as a 
point of weakness by opponents of the Darwinian dilemma.190 The potential range of evaluative views 
that we could potentially hold is very large (possibly infinite). The size of the subset of these evaluative 
 
189 Schafer-Landau 2005, Moral Realism: A Defence. 
190 For example, David Copp presses this point in ‘Darwinian skepticism about moral realism’, pp. 190, 203-204.   
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views that humans actually hold is by comparison very small. Street gives some examples of widely 
held evaluative views that might be similar to the following (pp. 115-116): 
a. The fact that something would harm oneself is a reason not to do it. 
b. The fact that someone helped you is a reason to help them in return, or a reason to praise and 
thank them. 
c. The fact that someone has cheated or taken advantage of a cooperative situation is reason to 
stop cooperating with them, condemn them, and perhaps punish them. 
These sorts of prototypical evaluative attitudes are widely held. Further, evolution can do a very good 
job of explaining and even predicting further attitudes of this kind. Compare a) to c) with some other 
potential evaluative beliefs that humans could potentially hold (Street 2013, pp 116): 
a'. The fact that something would be harmful to oneself is a reason to do it. 
b'. The fact that someone has helped you is a reason not to help them, and is a reason to 
condemn and disparage such behaviour. 
c'. The fact that someone has cheated or taken advantage of a cooperative situation is a reason 
to cooperate further with them, praise them, and perhaps reward them. 
But these inverted versions of a) to c) still only covers a tiny part of the space of possible evaluative 
views. Consider some other potential evaluative beliefs: 
d'. One should be singularly occupied with the goal of obtaining as many pineapples as possible. 
e'. The good life consists in climbing the highest point visible at all times and diving off of it head 
first. 
Evolutionary biology provides an explanation of why tendencies such as a) to c) would have been more 
conducive to reproductive success whereas tendencies a’) to e’) would have had clearly negative or 
deleterious effects.  
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There is an important clarification that is necessary to this story; the connection between the content 
of our evaluative beliefs and the forces of natural selection that influenced them is an indirect one. 
Evolution works on traits that are genetically heritable. It is unreasonable to think that full-fledged, 
linguistically infused evaluative judgments could be genetically heritable. The evaluative judgment 
that “She owes me something in return” for example, is an implausible candidate for natural selection 
to work on.  
Instead, it is what Street calls our “basic evaluative tendencies”191 that were genetically heritable traits 
that natural selection worked on. A basic evaluative tendency is an “unreflective, non-linguistic, 
motivational tendency to experience something as ‘called for’ or ‘demanded’ in itself, or to experience 
one thing as ‘calling for’ or ‘counting in favor of’ something else”.192 It is these more basic evaluative 
tendencies that it is plausible to think were genetically heritable and due to genetic differences, that 
have been at play over the course of much of our evolutionary history. There is a striking continuity 
that is observable between the types and kinds of evaluative judgments we make and the basic social 
tendencies observable in ethology of primates and other animals. These basic evaluative tendencies 
matter however, as they are the basis of later, more sophisticated ‘fully-fledged’ evaluative 
tendencies.  
To see why this is so, consider a counterfactual case: imagine the early evolutionary history of humans 
took a path similar to that of eusocial insects such as Ants or Bees, or perhaps that of a species of one 
of the solitary Felids. If this were the case, we would expect our basic evaluative tendencies to be very 
different in a number of ways. In the latter case we would expect instincts and evaluative tendencies 
that produced behaviour that was territorial, confrontational to conspecifics except in mating 
contexts, and had little to no altruistic behaviours towards non-kin or distantly related kin. In the 
former case we might find very different evaluative tendencies that favoured extreme sociality 
 




towards kin, strong social roles or hierarchy within families, and essentially belligerent or avoidant 
behaviour towards other conspecifics.  
With these differences in the basic evaluative tendencies we would expect that, mutatis mutandis, 
our later more full-fledged (and counterfactual) evaluative tendencies would be very different from 
our actual full-fledged evaluative tendencies that follow from our actual basic evaluative 
tendencies.193 
Thus, despite the indirect manner of influence of that basic evaluative tendencies have, they still exert 
a powerful influence on what our full-fledged evaluative tendencies end up being. Full-fledged forms 
of evaluative tendencies may have been a relatively late evolutionary add-on, but the basic evaluative 
tendencies still determined the direction and nature of the overlaid cognitive and more complex forms 
of evaluative judgment.  
 
3.3.3 The Darwinian dilemma 
Summarising the above background, the dilemma can be brought into focus as follows: normative 
beliefs could potentially be anything (conceptually at least, there is an enormous possibility space). 
The actual normative beliefs we hold are in fact a very narrowly constrained subset of the possibility 
space. Evolution provides a powerful explanation why these beliefs are constrained to this subset. 
Given these facts, we can enquire from the normative realist, why would our normative attitudes that 
have been shaped by evolutionary forces know anything of the mind independent normative truths 
posited by the realist? What, if any, relation is there between the mind independent normative truths 
and the evolutionary influences that actually gave us our particular moral psychology?  
 
193 Of course, without strong selective pressure for group living, cooperation, and sociality, it is likely language 
and other necessary elements for morality would not have come into existence at all. 
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Street argues that the realist faced with this question must choose one of two options and that neither 
option is likely to appeal to them. As choosing either of the options that follow from being a realist 
result in untenable positions when viewed through the Darwinian Dilemma, the conclusion Street 
recommends is that the realist should revise their starting point and reject mind-independent 
normative truth.  
The dilemma the moral realist faces, is as follows. Either there is a relation between independent 
evaluative truth and the evolutionary forces that shaped our evaluative attitudes/beliefs about 
evaluative truth or there is no such a relationship. The first branching of the root of the diagram below 
(labelled as ‘Darwinian Dilemma’) reflects these two choices open to the moral realist: deny there is a 
relationship between “independent evaluative truth” and the evolutionary influences that shaped our 
psychology (C. in the diagram), or claim that there is some kind of relation between what happened 
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Figure 8: Sharon Street’s Darwinian dilemma 
If the normative realist opts to deny there is any relation (C), they face a further choice. They can 
choose to accept that because there is no relation between the evolutionary past and independent 
evaluative truth, whatever moral psychology evolved is overwhelmingly likely to produce beliefs that 
are not the same as the independent evaluative truths (G).  The beliefs produced by the evolved moral 
psychology is overwhelmingly unlikely to overlap meaningfully with the independent evaluative truth 
because the set of potential evaluative beliefs (recall this includes even patently nonsensical ones such 
as ‘one must obtain as many pineapples as possible’) is so astonishingly large compared to the set of 
beliefs that our actual moral psychology produces. Street argues the result of this is a kind of moral 
scepticism, if evaluative truth truly is independent of the evolution of our moral psychology, then we 
should expect their “predictions” to be independent as well. 
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If the normative realist chooses option (F.) they are committing themselves to an astonishing co-
incidence where despite the enormous possibility space, by sheer luck our evaluative beliefs have 
ended up being identical to the independent evaluative truths. Thus, Street thinks if they choose to 
deny there is a relation between independent evaluative truth and the evolutionary influences that 
shaped our evaluative attitudes, then the realist’s only plausible option is (G.): evaluative skepticism.  
Alternatively, if the realist chooses the other horn of the Darwinian dilemma and claims that there is 
a relation between the evolutionary past and our evaluative attitudes (B.), then they are committing 
themselves to a so called “truth-tracking account”, where in the environment of evolutionary 
adaptation it promoted reproductive success to directly grasp (‘track’) independent evaluative truth 
(D).  According to a tracking account, our ability to recognize evaluative truths in the evolutionary past 
conferred upon us certain advantages that resulted in differential reproductive success. 
Street notes that this is an explanatory account that will be tractable to evaluation by the standards 
of science.194 This explanation offers a hypothesis as to how some of the course of human natural 
selection proceeded and how specific features of human psychology evolved. In particular, our 
disposition to make certain kinds of judgments and believe certain kinds of beliefs is explained by the 
fact that we could somehow recognize the independent evaluative truth. The ability to discern these 
truths in turn proved advantageous for survival and reproduction.  
A concrete example may be advantageous to understanding here. If we ask why a widespread 
tendency for humans to be good at detecting cheating behaviour exists (behaviour aimed at gaining 
the benefits of cooperation without paying the price), the explanation the tracking account gives is 
that it is true that it is wrong to cheat, and that it promoted reproductive success to be able to grasp 
(track) this evaluative truth. How exactly this tracking connection functioned is left unspecified, as 
 
194 Ibid., p. 126.  
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there does not seem to be a plausible way for tracking to operate if the evaluative truths were truly 
independent. 
This makes the difficulty of endorsing a truth-tracking account evident: there is an alternative 
hypothesis which is eminently more plausible and scientifically defeasible.  The alternative hypothesis 
is that our tendencies to make certain kinds of evaluative judgments in the evolutionary environment 
of adaptation created a “link” between the circumstances our ancestors found themselves in and 
certain adaptive responses to the problems of social living. By making those evaluative judgments 
which they did, our ancestors were caused to respond by judging, feeling, and acting in ways that were 
advantageous for survival and reproduction. Street terms this the “adaptive-link account” because 
instead of tracking independent evaluative truths, our ancestors simply made judgments and formed 
beliefs that are “adaptively linked” to certain responses and beliefs.195 
In the cheating example, the explanation the adaptive-link account gives is that it promoted 
reproductive success to hold certain beliefs about and attitudes towards, those discovered cheating. 
These beliefs or attitudes, for example, thinking that the cheaters’ actions count as a reason in favour 
of punishing or excluding them, form the link between the judgment about the cheater’s unfair actions 
and the adaptive response of penalising or shunning them. 
Street argues there are at least three grounds on which the adaptive-link account is superior to the 
truth-tracking account. Firstly, the adaptive-link account is more parsimonious – it involves fewer 
entities and is simpler. The tracking account requires an extra element – independent evaluative truth 
– to explain why we make the judgments that we do. The adaptive-link account does not require us 
to posit this extra element, and thus can explain the existence of our evaluative beliefs and attitudes 
more simply, without needing the extra element of normative truth to play a role. 
 
195 Ibid., p. 127.  
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Secondly, the adaptive-link account is superior to the truth tracking account because it is clearer. The 
mechanisms involved are easily identified and understood. The tracking account argues that we have 
the evaluative beliefs and attitudes we do because they were true and holding true beliefs about the 
independent evaluative truths was an evolutionary advantage. However, the truth-tracking account 
does not tell us why it was an evolutionary advantage to hold these beliefs. Why would those 
organisms that grasped such truths be reproductively more successful? Therefore, not only is the 
adaptive link account more parsimonious than the truth-tracking account, it is also clear in how it 
functioned, something that cannot be said for the truth-tracking account. 
Thirdly, the adaptive-link account has superior explanatory power and tells us more about the 
explanandum in question. It can tell us why certain judgments are made rather than others, and show 
us the relation between our evaluative judgments – namely that they link the circumstances that 
engender evaluative judgments and the responses we make that would have been likely to promote 
the differential reproductive success of our ancestors.  In contrast to the adaptive-link account, the 
truth tracking account has no explanatory or predictive power of this kind. It cannot tell us why our 
evaluative judgments are of the kinds and variety and subject matter that they are. When combined 
with the lack of an actual account of how truth-tracking account might latch on to truth and the 
comparative parsimony of the adaptive link account, Street thinks it is clear that the adaptive-link 
account is preferable over the truth tracking account.  
Returning to the diagram, if the realist chooses to affirm there is a relation between our evolved moral 
psychology and independent evaluative truth (choosing the horn labelled B.), then they must support 
a truth tracking account. Unfortunately for the realist, a truth tracking account can be rejected on 
scientific and explanatory grounds as the adaptive link hypothesis is superior so this horn of the 
dilemma is an unattractive option overall for them. 
The evaluative realist must therefore deny there is a connection between our evolved moral 
psychology and the independent evaluative truth (C.) and must choose between either (F) and claim 
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that there was a remarkable and improbable coincidence whereby what evolved just happened to 
overlap substantially with independent evaluative truths or they must accept that we should not trust 
our moral psychology to provide us with insight into evaluative truth – our moral beliefs are likely to 
be wildly off track (G).  
 
3.3.4 If evaluative facts are identical to natural facts, can the dilemma be avoided? 
Up in till this point, it may appear that the above argument is missing an obvious and important line 
of thought which would show the Darwinian Dilemma to be something of a false dichotomy. This line 
of thought represents a position Street terms the ‘Value Naturalist’. 196  For the Value Naturalist, 
evaluative facts (including moral facts) are in some sense constituted by or identical with (some) 
natural facts. That is, they reduce to, supervene on, or in some other unspecified way, just are the 
natural facts in question about humans, their environment, and their “patterns of reaction to it” and 
therefore are the kinds of things that can play a causal role in explanations.  
Value naturalism of this sort is often raised as a response to arguments that aim to show that realism 
is too metaphysically or ontologically strange or mysterious. 197  By locating moral facts as being 
identical to or the same as natural facts that figure in everyday explanations, there appears to be a 
way in which the evaluative realist can show that independent evaluative facts might play a 
straightforward role in the evolutionary story of our moral psychology. If there is a plausible account 
of why we might have evolved to track these particular natural facts, then there is an account available 
to the realist of the relation between evolutionary pressures on our evaluative judgments and the 
independent normative truth. If this is so it would diffuse Street’s Darwinian Dilemma.   
Street’s response to this line of thought is to remind us of the commitments of the evaluative realist 
and show why such a value naturalist could not connect our evolved judgments with independent 
 
196 Ibid., p. 112.  
197 As typified by John Mackie’s ‘Argument from queerness’ in Ethics: inventing right and wrong, pp. 38-42. 
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evaluative truths in the manner suggested by the value naturalist and still remain a thorough-going 
evaluative realist. For Street, to be a genuine evaluative realist, one must hold that there are 
evaluative truths that will hold independently of our evaluative attitudes. Her target for the Darwinian 
Dilemma is any kind of normative realism that holds that there are evaluative truths that are entirely 
independent of our evaluative attitudes.  
The following chart shows the structure of Street’s response to the value naturalist. Starting from the 
left, the value naturalist argues that the evaluative facts E just are the same as some set of natural 
facts N. Street then asks for clarification: does the truth of E depend in some way upon our evaluative 
attitudes? If the evaluative facts do depend on our evaluative attitudes, then they are not sufficiently 
independent evaluative truths to count as a thorough-going realism that the Darwinian Dilemma 
targets. If this is the case, then her argument is successful in showing that mind independence cannot 
be a feature of morality. 
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Figure 9: Street’s response to the value naturalist 
If on the other hand the truth of E does not depend in any way upon our evaluative attitudes, then 
this version of value naturalism can count as a “thorough-going” evaluative realism. However, this 
stipulation means that the resulting theory has other difficulties. 
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The evaluative beliefs and natural facts must be connected through the evolutionary process, but at 
the same time, they cannot be contingent on what our evaluative attitudes are, otherwise they no 
longer qualify as independent evaluative truths. This results in a serious problem for the evaluative 
naturalist, as they must then explain how the natural-evaluative identity is fixed. They must either 
deny there is a relation between the evolutionary influences and the natural-evaluative identities, in 
which case the natural-evaluative identities are thoroughly “contaminated” with the distorting 
influence of selective pressures. Or, if there is a relation, then it must be something like the tracking 
account: selective pressure for those who could track independent facts about natural-normative 
identities. But as explanations go, the adaptive-link account is clearly preferable. As Street concludes: 
To the extent that a view insists on there being evaluative facts which hold 
independently of all our evaluative attitudes, it is impossible to reconcile that view 
with a recognition of the role that Darwinian forces have played in shaping the 
content of our values. 198  
Once it is made explicit that our evaluative judgments are influenced in this way external forces, Street 
concludes that we are compelled to adjust our metaethical view to become some variety of antirealist. 
 
3.4 General responses to evolutionary error theories 
3.4.1 Capacity etiology versus content etiology debunking 
William Fitzpatrick has criticised evolutionary debunking arguments, explicitly including those of Joyce 
and Street.199  Fitzpatrick focuses on debunking arguments that aim to undermine ethics due to 
epistemic considerations. Specifically, he identifies what he takes to be two kinds of debunking 
arguments in the literature: those that focus on the etiology of our capacities for moral judgment and 
those that focus on the etiology of the content of our moral judgments.  Fitzpatrick does not think 
either kind of debunking is ultimately successful: capacity etiology arguments do not raise any serious 
 
198 Sharon Street, ‘A Darwinian dilemma for realist theories of value’, p. 33. 
199 William Fitzpatrick, ‘Debunking evolutionary debunking of ethical realism’. 
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problems for realism, and content etiology arguments rely on assumptions about the evolutionary 
genealogy and its relation to our moral practice which are not supported by the evidence.  
Fitzpatrick proposes that capacity etiology arguments have roughly the following form. Our mental 
capacities, including mental capacities we employ in making moral judgments, are the product of 
evolutionary forces. These capacities were not designed to, and do not, track independent moral 
truths (even if they exist). Instead, evolution shaped our cognitive capacities to track facts “relevant 
to competitive gene propagation in ancestral environments.”200 Therefore, either the capacities we 
employ in making moral judgments do not result in cognition that reliably tracks moral truths, or, if 
they do, it would be by an implausibly lucky coincidence. Either of these options raise sceptical 
problems.201  Fitzpatrick argues that this argument is invalid as it stands, but that it can be made valid 
by adding the following premise to the argument: the only way in which our cognitive capacities can 
result in judgments that are non-accidentally and reliably truth-tracking, is if evolution made them 
that way.  
However, Fitzpatrick thinks this premise is false and the converse is likely true:  
This assumption overlooks the alternative possibility of our taking general 
cognitive capacities bequeathed by natural selection and developing them in 
cultural contexts, through relevant forms of training within traditions of inquiry 
into the subject matter in question, and thus making our cognitive dispositions in 
the relevant domain non-accidentally reliably truth-tracking.202  
Applied to the moral case, this process can used to avoid the sceptical conclusion. It is enough that we 
take the capacities that evolution gave us (regardless of whether they originally produced off-track 
judgments with regard to moral truth) and learned to use critical reflection and reasoning in normative 
 
200 Ibid., p. 885.  
201 Adapted from ibid., p. 884.  
202 Ibid., p. 886. 
119 
 
contexts, and through this process we can learn to “reflect accurately on how it’s good and right to 
live.”203    
Fitzpatrick maintains that because of the possibility of developing our moral capacities, we need not 
posit dubious stories about how our mental capacities might directly track moral truths or how 
through sheer luck they produce beliefs about independent moral facts. It is enough that we have 
developed the capacities evolution bequeathed us, and have then developed these through the use 
of critical reasoning, training, reflection, dialogue, experimentation, and so on to discover 
independent moral truths.  
Fitzpatrick thinks proponents of the capacity etiology argument might accept that this story is true for 
some or perhaps even most cognitive capacities, that we can and do use cognitive capacities to 
produce beliefs and discover truths that go beyond what evolution designed those capacities for. 
However, Fitzpatrick claims that proponents of the capacity etiology argument would still reject this 
story as an explanation of moral capacities and independent moral truth. Their reply would be that 
moral reasoning is not an extension or development of any kind of reasoning that our moral capacities 
were designed for. It is instead a “sui generis domain of emotion-laden thinking that, if favored by 
natural selection, was favored not for accuracy but just for direct contributions to biological fitness.”204 
Fitzpatrick disagrees however, and thinks that moral reasoning can be viewed as an extension of forms 
of reasoning that our mental capacities were designed to do accurately. Fitzpatrick claims that both 
the logical reasoning and conceptual analysis required in the moral domain are continuous with our 
broader cognitive capacities. He cites David Enoch, who maintains that:  
Given a starting point of normative beliefs that are not too far-off, presumably 
some reasoning mechanisms (and perhaps some other mechanisms as well) can 
get us increasingly closer to the truth by eliminating inconsistencies, increasing 
 
203 Ibid., p. 887. Note that Fitzpatrick seems to think that it is obvious that being able to reflect ‘accurately’ on 
“how it’s good and right to live” can be used synonymously with being able to track independent moral truth. 
However, it is far from obvious that we can conclude these two things are one and the same unless we already 
assume Fitzpatrick’s argument is successful.  
204 Ibid., p. 888. 
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overall coherence, eliminating arbitrary distinctions, drawing analogies, ruling out 
initially justified beliefs whose justificatory status has been defeated later, etc.205 
But crucially, this requires a starting point of normative beliefs that are “not too far-off”; beliefs that 
are already within reasoning distance of the independent moral truths. Firstly, it is not clear why, 
without it being an ad hoc response to the error theorist, this assumption should be granted. Note 
that it is not sufficient to think that the things that were helpful or harmful in social contexts of our 
evolutionary past seem relatively close in some respects to what we consider to be morally good and 
bad. The explanation required must show how, even if those social contexts of our evolutionary past 
were entirely different, we would still end up with the same things we considered morally good or bad. 
Secondly, Enoch’s argument starts with beliefs and not capacities that are ‘not too far off’. At this point 
Fitzpatrick also slips into talking of conceptual content in his argument:  
At a formal level, we employ the same logical and analytic abilities in moral 
reasoning as in other forms of reasoning. And in terms of conceptual content, 
moral reflection and reasoning is continuous with broader evaluative and 
normative thinking that our cognitive capacities were plausibly designed to do 
accurately.206 
It is not surprising that the conceptual content of morality is handled using the same kinds of reasoning 
and logic as other kinds of conceptual content – that is not what is at issue and does not contribute to 
showing that morality is not somehow sui generis with regard to truth-tracking. Fitzpatrick’s argument 
does not explain how off-track moral capacities can get us to the conceptual content of the 
independent moral truth when there is no guarantee that the starting-point is anywhere near where 
it needs to be.   
The above argument highlights a difficulty in Fitzpatrick’s dichotomy of moral capacities versus moral 
content that results ultimately in his argument being unpersuasive. If he takes moral capacities to 
 
205 David Enoch, ‘The epistemological challenge to metanormative realism: how best to understand it, 
and how to cope with it’, p. 428.  
206 William Fitzpatrick, ‘Debunking evolutionary debunking of ethical realism’, p. 888. 
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simply be the same kinds of reasoning and thinking capacities as humans use generally, then it is not 
clear that there is anything to them that marks them as being distinctively moral. It is no surprise then 
that on Fitzpatrick’s account, the moral capacities are continuous with the general capacities that we 
do think can be truth-tracking. The sticking point is that his argument against moral capacities must 
choose some kind of distinctively moral content as a starting point for it to be a moral capacity that 
has an error-prone etiology. And as soon as this evolutionary starting point about content is 
introduced, Fitzpatrick needs to explain how this starting point relates to the independent moral 
truths (or in his version, how it is close enough to reason from that starting point to the independent 
truth) that does not depend on the contingent fact that they already seem quite close.  
Because of this, it is unlikely an error theorist would be swayed by Fitzpatrick’s capacity argument. 
However, despite this, they would likely agree with much of his conclusion about the evolutionary 
etiology of our moral capacities which: 
… impose[s] a constraint on realists as we go forward in developing a positive 
moral epistemology: any such account must at least square with our best scientific 
understanding of the sorts of capacities evolution gave us to work with, avoiding 
reliance on capacities we could not plausibly have developed from such 
psychological materials. That is a useful result and may pose an interesting 
challenge for some realists…207 
For the present thesis, this is perhaps the more interesting result, and is closer to Joyce and Street’s 
final positions about the nature of moral truth and moral realism.  
There are a number of features of Fitzpatrick’s arguments that there is not room to address, but 
perhaps the most interesting is that neither Joyce’s nor Street’s arguments can be cleanly categorised 
as either capacity or content etiology arguments. Instead, they are both best categorised as arguments 
about the etiology of both the capacity and content to greater or lesser degrees. Joyce and Street both 
take there to be something uniquely troubling about the epistemic origins of morality that includes 
 
207 Ibid., p. 889.  
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both our moral capacities that are closely tied to our evolutionary past and the content of our moral 
beliefs that are too close to the content of the beliefs that are fitness enhancing in the proposed 
evolutionary genealogies of morality.  
Fitzpatrick’s content etiology argument depends mostly on arguing that the evolutionary influences 
on our moral beliefs are not as strong or as troubling as the error theorist proposes. He suggests that 
a debunking argument would only be successful if “evolutionary influence on our moral beliefs is 
somehow so distorting and difficult to expose that it undermines our ability to develop and employ 
reflective techniques to home in on independent moral truths.”208 The error theorist is unlikely to have 
any quarrel with this description as this is ultimately what they are themselves suggesting: that not 
only are the capacities we use to arrive at moral beliefs of a kind that are distorting but that the 
starting point of our beliefs, their content, is also thoroughly saturated with evolutionary influence.  
 
3.4.2 The reliability of moral cognition 
Benjamin Fraser argues that the evolutionary influences on our moral cognition and beliefs are in fact 
distorting, and, are actually more troublesome than evolutionary debunking arguments and their 
opposers have typically assumed. 209  Fraser focuses on the question of whether an evolutionary 
explanation of morality gives us reason to think that our moral faculty is, in actuality, unreliable. He 
argues there are a number of conditions that need to be assessed to establish whether an evolved 
capacity is epistemically reliable. The conditions he identifies are:  
1. The environment condition: the mechanism is operating in an environment 
relevantly similar to that in which it evolved. 
2. The information condition: information is not high cost, thus it is not adaptive 
to employ a cheap, error-prone mechanism. 
 
208 Ibid., p. 901. 
209 Benjamin Fraser, ‘Evolutionary debunking arguments and the reliability of moral cognition’. 
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3. The error condition: asymmetrical error costs are unlikely to have selected for 
systematic bias in the mechanism. 
4. The tracking condition: the function of the mechanism is to track features of the 
agent’s environment.210 
Fraser does not think these features constitute necessary and sufficient conditions for epistemic 
reliability of an evolved capacity, but instead suggests that unless all or most of these are met, we 
should provisionally expect the evolved cognitive mechanism is now unreliable.  
The environment condition highlights the need for cognitive mechanisms to be operating in 
circumstances which they are well suited to – usually this means the environment they were selected 
for or one that is relevantly similar. For example, ‘fast and frugal’ heuristics can have low costs for 
impressive results in the environment in which they evolved while providing disastrous results outside 
that environment.211  While there is significant overlap between the evolutionary environment and 
today, Fraser concludes that the differences are sufficient to provide prima facie reason to suspect 
this condition is not met.212  
For the information condition, the evolutionary benefit must outweigh the costs of building the 
cognitive mechanism if we are to expect it to be reliable. To do so, the evolutionary cost of accurate 
information must not be so high relative to the cost of errors that it would be more adaptive to adopt 
an error-prone but cheap mechanism. The kinds of costs that are relevant are the costs of gathering 
and processing relevant information. If the moral facts in question are non-natural facts, then it is not 
clear at all how to assess the costs of gathering and processing this information, so Fraser does not 
attempt to do so. Alternatively, if there are no moral facts, then no amount of information could 
contribute to epistemically reliable inputs. Focusing on the non-question begging option, that 
naturalistically respectable moral facts exist, Fraser suggests that the relevant kinds of information 
 
210 Ibid., p. 461.  
211 P Todd, G Gigerenzer, ‘Simple heuristics that make us smart’. 
212 Benjamin Fraser, ‘Evolutionary debunking arguments and the reliability of moral cognition’, p. 465. 
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will include “information about the intentions, motives and interests of other agents, and the 
consequences of actions, especially harms and benefits to others.” 213  Fraser judges the costs of 
gathering this information for an agent, and the costs of errors as likely to be high.  For example, 
misjudging one’s moral obligations could result in reputational damage or punishment, or even 
exclusion from the social systems. Fraser deems this condition is also unmet – at least based on 
available research so far.214  
The error condition states that for an evolved cognitive mechanism to be reliable, it must be unlikely 
that the costs of errors are asymmetrical, as this tends to lead systematic bias via adaptive 
unreliability. By ‘asymmetrical costs’, Fraser means that the cost for false positives and false negatives 
differs greatly; that in some cases one of these kinds of errors can be more costly in terms of 
evolutionary fitness than the other. In such cases “selection can favour belief-formation mechanisms 
that overgenerate the less costly type of error so as to reduce the chance of a potentially disastrous 
error of the other type.”215 Assessing this in the case of the evolution of morality is very difficult, given 
the great variety of kinds of information and costs involved, and the lack of empirical evidence we 
have to evaluate them. At best, any attempt is likely be highly speculative. Fraser suggests the 
following example: 
Consider moral judgements about obligations to help others in danger or need. 
Helping in the mistaken belief that doing so is morally required incurs costs—e.g. 
time, energy, resources, or risk—but this kind of error could result in a net gain, if 
supererogatory helpfulness builds social capital. But even if such an error is on 
balance costly, failing to help in the mistaken belief that doing so was not required 
may be more costly still, if punishment and damage to reputation ensue. When it 
comes to helping others in danger or need, it may be better to save (and be saintly) 
than to stand by and be sorry. If this is right, then for this class of moral judgments, 
error costs are asymmetrical, and the error condition appears not to be met.216 
 
213 Ibid. 
214 Ibid., p. 466. 
215 Ibid., p. 462. 
216 Ibid., p. 466. 
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It is hard to assess however whether this example is at all representative of error costs. Fraser’s verdict 
is again that it is not clear if the error condition is met. Although he thinks there is some reasons to be 
doubtful, a safer conclusion is probably that there is a lack of information; there is no positive evidence 
to indicate the condition is met.217  
The tracking condition is the familiar question of whether a cognitive mechanism’s function is to track 
the relevant facts, or whether it was adaptive in some other way. Unlike the other three conditions, 
the tracking condition has been extensively discussed in the literature. As discussed in §3.3.2 and 
§3.4.2, there is not much agreement as to whether this condition can be met by realist accounts of 
morality. Fraser concludes, again tentatively, that the tracking condition is not met.218   
Fraser’s discussion addresses several empirical issues about the reliability of moral cognition that are 
under-discussed in the literature. His overall verdict is that if none of the conditions are conclusively 
met, “then it is reasonable to conclude that our moral faculty is actually unreliable.”219 However, the 
first three conditions he discusses are arguably mostly relevant in establishing the truth of the fourth: 
truth tracking. The differing environment, the informational costs, and the costs of informational 
errors in that environment are considerations that contribute to establishing that the function of the 
evolution of morality was not to track independent moral truths. Thus, Frasers considerations, while 
highlighting interesting empirical concerns and providing further reasons for taking arguments about 
evolutionary error theories seriously, do not significantly alter the landscape of the debate.  
  
 
217 Ibid., p. 467. 
218 Ibid., pp. 466-471.  
219 Ibid., p. 472. 
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Chapter 4 Analysis of the implications of evolutionary arguments for 
ethics 
In the previous chapter, I examined three separate attempts to argue from biological or evolutionary 
considerations to conclusions or positions in philosophical ethics.  In this chapter, I review these 
arguments to see where they were successful, where they were not, and what we can learn from 
them. From looking at these attempts, I construct a framework to assist in assessing arguments of this 
empirical or evolutionary sort and to provide guidance for non-philosophers venturing into 
philosophical territory. As noted in chapter 1, the intended audience of this framework is non-
philosophers working on interdisciplinary research involving philosophy, philosophers supplementing 
philosophy’s methodology with the methods and tools of the sciences, or simply non-philosophers 
who discover their research appears to have philosophical conclusions.  
 
4.1 Are Wilson, Joyce, and Street’s arguments sound? 
The success of arguments by E. O. Wilson, Richard Joyce, and Sharon Street that claim to extract 
philosophically significant results for ethics from the facts about the evolution of morality differs 
markedly. Wilson makes a number of claims, all of which are prima facie sensible in their approach. I 
argue however, that in some cases, mistakes are made and none of Wilson’s four strands of 
‘biologicization’ goes far enough in laying out the argument or in engaging with the actual problems 
of moral philosophy.   
In contrast, Richard Joyce and Sharon Street take a much more thorough and distinctly philosophical 
approach to their arguments. While Joyce’s evolutionary debunking argument may not by itself 
establish the strong form of scepticism or moral error theory that he perhaps aspired to originally, the 
argument effectively pushes the burden of proof on to the moral realist who claims moral naturalism 
is true, and challenges them to come up with a plausible account of moral naturalism that can 
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adequately meet the desiderata of the concept of morality.  Sharon Street’s Darwinian dilemma 
establishes that realist theories of value which include a claim of mind-independence are very likely 
to be false, and, to date, none of the published replies to Sharon Street’s argument have successfully 
discredited its soundness. 
As discussed in chapter 1, there is no simple rule of thumb, principle, or formula that can be used to 
assess arguments that attempt to derive philosophical significance from empirical considerations. 
However, it is unsatisfactory to state that all we can do is examine attempts on a case-by-case basis. 
To improve on this situation, in the sections that follow I examine the manner in which Wilson, Joyce, 
and Street have attempted to extract implications for moral philosophy from empirical information 
about the evolution of morality, explore the manner in which these arguments have been successful 
and unsuccessful, and explain what lessons we can learn from their attempts. The purpose of doing 
so is to use these lessons to come up with a framework that can be applied either when assessing such 
attempts or when attempting to make such arguments in the first place. It may not be feasible to build 
road through Philip Kitcher’s swamp of empirical ethics in this thesis; however, it is possible to begin 
to lay some planks to avoid the most treacherous areas.  
 
4.2 Lessons from E. O. Wilson 
The four ways in which Wilson thought an understanding of Sociobiology would allow for the 
‘biologicizing’ of ethics were: 
1. The metaphysics of morality would be demystified and become apparent 
2. An explanation of the problem of altruism would be provided 
3. Our biology and evolutionary past might tell us what it is possible for us to do or be, and so 
constrains what we should do.  
4. Whether something was natural would aid us in deciding its ethical status.  
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In the case of 1., an understanding of the on-going attempts at naturalising morality and the debates 
about the nature of moral reality and metaphysics is needed to contribute in a meaningful way to 
questions about the ontology and metaphysics of morality. Claims that some other discipline will be 
able to biologicize and thereby demystify ethics by removing it from the hands of moral philosophers 
should be viewed with scepticism if there is not considerably more that can be said by way of 
argument. Metaethics is a complex discipline in its own right and many metaethical problems are non-
obvious, as is the understanding of them that has developed dialectically over long periods. To ignore 
this body of already existing understanding is effectively to start from scratch again. Indeed, this point 
applies to all of 1. to 4.: the problems identified by Wilson are all problems that have long been 
identified by moral philosophers (naturalising morality, explaining altruism, can-not implies ought-not, 
equating naturalness with goodness). 
In the case of 2., Wilson conflates a problem of biology with a related, but not identical, problem in 
philosophy. The problem of explaining biological altruism via evolutionary mechanisms was resolved 
in the 1960’s and 1970’s and subsequent developments in game theory and genetics reinforced these 
discoveries. So, in the mid to late 70’s when Wilson published his Sociobiology and On Human Nature, 
it was perhaps natural to think that these explanations may be novel to other areas of inquiry and, 
therefore, also solve problems in other disciplines. However, the problem of altruism in philosophy is 
importantly different to the biological problem with the same name. Wilson either does not 
acknowledge or does not recognize these differences. This means his argument is unlikely to be of 
interest to philosophy, as the fact that people can be altruistic (in the non-biological sense) was 
already long established. The fact that biological altruism has an evolutionary explanation does not 
contribute anything further to the philosophical concept.  
The third way in which ethics may be ‘biologicized’ has promise; our biology and evolutionary past 
might tell us what it is possible for us to do or be, and so constrain what we should do. However, 
Wilson’s claims of limits for our nature and behaviour is more an indication of the direction one might 
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make an argument about rather than a sufficiently elaborated argument itself. There is obviously a 
sense in which Wilson’s claim is true: cannot implies ought not; if we are unable to carry out an action, 
this implies that it cannot be the case that we ought to perform the action. However, recognition of 
this fact is not new. And, Wilson fails to provide examples which would allow for a proper analysis. If 
the claim is that X is not possible for humans or societies due to some feature of their biological nature, 
then it is impossible to assess this argument without knowing what X is.   
This type of reasoning is also very vulnerable to being used to push a particular moral or political 
agenda and is open to all the criticisms made against biological determinism. That is, that we need to 
be very careful in claiming anything as strong as a kind of genetic determinism when talking about 
human behaviour, as behaviours are the result of complex interactions between both biology and the 
environment. It is very hard to establish what is possible based on what currently is the case.    
Finally, for point 4., and Wilson’s argument that discovering whether something is natural or not could 
help determine its ethical status, there is no need to labour this point: some arguments are simply not 
sound. It is worth noting that it is well accepted in philosophical literature that naturalness is not an 
infallible guide to goodness, and if input had been sought from philosophers, there would no doubt 
either be a much more interesting argument that might show why this should not be dismissed 
immediately, or the argument would have been omitted.  
 
4.3 Lessons from Richard Joyce’s debunking argument 
In contrast to Wilson’s relatively unelaborated positions, Richard Joyce presents significantly better 
developed and more sophisticated arguments. An important feature of Joyce’s arguments is that they 
have been revised numerous times over the years and been responsive to replies and criticisms of 
their content. Joyce’s methodology is distinctly more philosophical and importantly takes as his 
starting point other positions in philosophy. He discusses potential and actual responses to his 
arguments, engages with the literature that already exists on the areas his arguments concern, and 
130 
 
references or extends similar ideas (for example John Mackie’s arguments for error theory, and 
Michael Ruse’s arguments about evolution). Joyce also makes clear the role of the empirical 
information used in his arguments. He argues that evolutionary theory and evidence shows that 
morality had a particular function, which was to produce moral beliefs. The moral beliefs themselves 
contributed social cohesion and facilitated group living. In Joyce’s argument the empirical information 
is ultimately information that uncovers facts about the epistemology of our moral beliefs – that they 
originate in concepts that have a causal history that is unrelated to truth. 
 
4.4 Lessons from Sharon Street’s Darwinian dilemma 
Sharon Street also provides a good model of philosophical methodology for empirical or evolutionary 
approaches to moral philosophy. Street spends considerable time precisely delineating and defining 
the targets of her evolutionary arguments. Street argues that scientific accounts of the evolution of 
morality provide novel considerations that count against versions of moral realism that endorse mind-
independent evaluative truth. By targeting her argument at very specific and well-defined 
philosophical positions, she does not attempt to conclude too much, and her argument has fewer 
potential weaknesses. Street also does not make giant leaps of reasoning and does not make any 
unexplained jumps from the descriptive to the normative. Instead, she argues from descriptive 
premises about what entities were present in the evolutionary account of the development of 
morality, and shows there is no way to introduce mind-independent value into that evolutionary 
account in a scientifically defensible manner. While this is a much more limited kind of evaluative 
skepticism than many evolutionary error theories or moral skepticisms, it is a more defensible 
argument because of it. Additionally, while its conclusion by itself may not be a revolutionary 
conclusion or one with significant normative significance, it can be used in more general or ambitious 
sceptical arguments as a premise.  
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In the course of her argument against mind-independent evaluative truth, Street deploys a number of 
arguments against moral naturalism. While these arguments cover much of the same ground as 
previous arguments in the philosophical literature, their flavour is distinctly empirical and focused on 
showing that mind-independent evaluative truth cannot be naturalised because it is in conflict with 
naturalism more broadly construed: it requires an unscientific account to introduce the mind-
independence. Thus, one form of argument that she succeeds in using is to apply the epistemic 
standards of empirical research to philosophical arguments. 
 
4.5 Developing a framework for evaluating empirical arguments in ethics 
Drawing from the above considerations from each of the discussions of Wilson, Joyce, and Street, the 
following ideas are offered as guidelines for assessing empirical and evolutionary approaches to 
morality. 
Lesson / Guideline  Case study / Source  
Removing some area of philosophy entirely from the 
context of philosophical discourse, with the hope of 
revolutionising it with some new insight from 
another field of inquiry, is unlikely to be a successful 
project without the provision of good reasons for 
that rehoming of the problem. 
§3.1.1 ‘The metaphysics of morality’  
Wilson argues ethics will be revolutionised by 
treating it as a biological problem but does not 
describe how this will happen or provide any reasons 
for thinking it would be successful. Removed from 
the context of the existing discourse it is hard to see 
what form this revolution takes.   
Examine the philosophical literature to ensure that 
the problem that empirical research purportedly 
solves is a genuine problem of philosophy, and is not 
a seemingly similar, but philosophically uninteresting 
or unrelated, problem. 
§3.1.2 ‘The problem of altruism’  
Wilson argues that altruism is possible, but the kind 
of altruism he argues is possible is a biological 
conception of altruism rather than a philosophically 
interesting moral one.  
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Lesson / Guideline  Case study / Source  
Examine the current state of philosophical debate on 
the topic in question, both within literature and via 
engagement with philosophers with expertise in the 
particular area. There is not much to be gained (for 
philosophy anyway) in re-solving problems which 
philosophy has already moved on from. 
§3.1.2 ‘The problem of altruism’  
It is well accepted that some forms of altruism exist. 
If Wilson had engaged with the philosophical 
literature on the topic, he would have recognised 
that the problem he was proposing to solve was 
already settled.  
Ascertain the relationship between what you are 
attempting to argue and well-known philosophical 
rules, for example, rules about deriving an ‘ought 
from is’ or about the relationship between 
naturalness and goodness. If one’s argument 
appears to be an exception to a particular rule, then 
examine exactly how and why it is an exception and 
make this explicit. Arguments should not attempt to 
rehash old or well-accepted positions unless they 
have something new to contribute to the debate or 
have discovered a clear problem with the received 
view. 
§3.1.4 ‘Naturalness and morality’  
Wilson appears to leap uncritically from what is 
natural to what we ought to do without awareness 
of the existing literature or that philosophers 
generally consider this argument fallacious.  
 
Present a full argument, including review and 
response from philosophers: one way to ensure an 
unsuccessful attempt to integrate evolutionary or 
biological considerations into philosophy is to have 
no engagement with pre-existing philosophical 
dialogue. 
§3.1.1 ‘The metaphysics of morality’  
Wilson suggests that taking a scientific approach and 
“removing ethics from the hands of philosophers” 
will clarify the metaphysics of morality. However, he 
does not provide any indication of how or what this 
would look like. The arguments advanced here 
would all have benefited from engagement with the 
existing philosophical dialogue and ensuring they 
were complete enough to say something 





Lesson / Guideline  Case study / Source  
Arguments need to be complete, including 
establishing the premises are true and how they lead 
to the conclusion. Where the conclusion is a general 
one, it is helpful to provide specific examples that 
demonstrate the general point, rather than simply 
asserting the general conclusion without context.  
 
§3.1.1 ‘Naturalness and morality’ 
Wilson’s argument that the naturalness of certain 
behaviours is relevant to their ethical status was 
incomplete, and lacked both clear premises, a clear 
logical form, or any specific examples of how the 
ethical status was established.   
Ensure that discussion includes potential responses 
to likely objections based on existing philosophical 
theories and actual objections from other 
philosophers and researchers. 
§3.2 ‘Richard Joyce’s evolutionary debunking 
argument’ 
Joyce integrates evolutionary considerations into the 
existing philosophical debate on moral error theory.  
Provide the context of the argument by discussing 
similar arguments, whether solely philosophical or 
also attempting to incorporate empirical 
considerations.  Make clear how the argument 
differs from previous arguments.  
 
§3.2 ‘Richard Joyce’s evolutionary debunking 
argument’ 
Joyce compares his arguments with those of Mackie 
and other error theorists to show where the 
similarities lie and how his argument differs.  
Where possible, make clear the role of empirical 
information or empirical considerations in the 
argument in question.  
 
§3.3 ‘Sharon Street’s Darwinian Dilemma’ 
Street discusses how our evaluative attitudes are 
shaped and thoroughly saturated with evolutionary 
forces – they would have not been recognisable as 
the kinds of things they are without that 
evolutionary influence. She is explicit about how the 
empirical facts constrain the possibilities for realism 
and the impact these have for the metaethical status 





Lesson / Guideline  Case study / Source  
Consider seriously potential and actual responses 
made to arguments based on both empirical and 
philosophical grounds and revise the position 
accordingly if necessary.   
 
§3.2 ‘Richard Joyce’s evolutionary debunking 
argument’  
Joyce has engaged in ongoing dialogue over the 
years and has revised his conclusions from the strong 
forms of moral scepticism to a more limited 
conclusion that moves the burden of proof to the 
moral realist and challenges them to come up with a 
plausible account of naturalism. 
Applying epistemological standards from other 
disciplines can shed light on stubborn problems if 
done carefully. However, to do this, analysis is 
required to determine whether the epistemic 
standards are appropriate to the argument and 
philosophical work is required to analyse the 
implications.  
§3.1.1 ‘The metaphysics of morality’  
Wilson attempts to apply scientific methodology to 
establish the existence of certain philosophically 
interesting phenomena – in this case altruistic 
behaviour. However, his analysis of the phenomena 
is insufficient meaning the argument targets an 
apparently similar but philosophically less 
interesting sense of the concept altruism.  
Often when empirical considerations are applied to 
moral philosophy, the goals of the arguments are 
sweeping and revolutionary. It is easy to overlook 
sound and potentially noteworthy philosophical 
conclusions that are revealed when arguing for these 
sweeping or revolutionary goals. These limited and 
more easily established and defended conclusions 
can often themselves be premises or assumptions in 
other philosophically interesting arguments or 
positions that are overlooked by focusing on the 
more revolutionary or dramatic conclusions.  
§3.2 ‘Richard Joyce’s evolutionary debunking 
argument’ 
§3.3 ‘Sharon Street’s Darwinian dilemma’ 
These arguments initially tried to show that moral 
error theory or scepticism was true and that the 
entire practice of ethics needed a fundamental re-
evaluation. However, while these conclusions may 
not have been conclusively established, more limited 
and potentially interesting considerations about 
certain aspects of moral naturalism, such as the 
mind-independence of moral truth or the contingent 
nature of morality, have been uncovered as part of 
those arguments.  




Chapter 5 Moral psychology 
5.1 Models of moral judgment 
How people make moral judgments has been the subject of investigation in primarily two disciplines: 
philosophy and psychology. The approach of these two disciplines however differs significantly. Moral 
philosophy’s interest in how moral judgments are made has often been an instrumental one: 
assumptions and claims about the process of making moral judgments have been made as part of 
wider meta-ethical accounts. Nevertheless, philosophical treatments of moral judgment often make 
many assumptions or claims about how we do in fact make moral judgments.  
These philosophical accounts typically rely on a priori arguments or anecdotal examples and 
observations.  Studies of moral judgment within psychology have tended to be more concerned with 
a posteriori methods, but often also included some a priori assumptions or starting points as in 
philosophy.  Early research done on the moral development of children by Lawrence Kohlberg for 
example was empirical in nature; it examined people’s actual responses to moral dilemmas to 
ascertain how judgments are made at different stages of a child’s moral development.  However, an 
unquestioned assumption in this work was that the process producing moral judgments was always 
kind of formal reasoning, and individuals were only judged as being competent at each stage if the 
justifications they gave showed reasoning of a pre-defined kind; a rational thought process based on 
prudential, conventional, and universalizing principles.220 This historical separation between different 
methodologies is not however absolute and many researchers from both philosophy and psychology 
have begun to take a more interdisciplinary approach to moral psychology in the last few decades.221  
The focus of this chapter is on the empirical approach to moral judgments: what science can tell us 
about how we make moral judgments.  
 




The structure of this is as follows. Firstly, I present three simplified models or processes that are 
involved in most accounts of the production of moral judgments. These models I call the ‘Rationalist 
model’, the ‘Emotivist model’, and the ‘Intuitionist model’.222 The terms for them have been chosen 
so as to be descriptive of the dominant process in each model; they do not directly correspond to any 
ethical theories in philosophy with the same or similar names.   These three models are used, either 
exclusively or in various combinations with different weights given to each component, in most 
accounts of how moral judgments are made. Following this, I consider some of the research that has 
been done to establish how these models should be combined to produce a realistic account of how 
moral judgments are actually made. 
 
5.1.1 Rationalism 
Rationalism in moral judgment, as I shall use the term, is where moral judgments are produced by a 
process of reasoning. When some morally relevant situation or event takes place, the details of the 
situation are used as inputs to a process of explicit reasoning involving conscious deliberation which 
subsequently produces a moral judgment (by ‘conscious’ it is meant that “the process is intentional, 
effortful, and controllable and that the reasoner is aware that it is going on”223).  Generally the process 
of reasoning that occurs is said to be some kind of assessment of whether actions meet or violate a 
set of rules, or a kind of weighing up of the evident consequences and likely future consequences 
(perhaps as in utilitarian or consequentialist ethical theories), or even possibly the application of 
appropriate general moral principles regarding whether moral duties and obligations have been met 
by the participants in the eliciting situation (as in a kind of deontological model). Alternatively, it might 
also be taken to be a more traditional Kantian model where actions are examined to see whether they 
 
222 This is loosely based on Marc Hauser’s terminology in Moral minds: How nature designed our universal sense 
of right and wrong, as they turn out to be fairly accurate representations of the elements of most models of 
moral judgment.  




are appropriate candidates that could serve as a universal law or maxim. This very simple model might 






Figure 10: Rationalism in moral judgments 
Early work in psychology on moral judgment was focused mostly on the process of conscious 
reasoning as the dominant process in arriving at moral judgments. Prominent in early research was 
the work of Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg.  Their view of moral judgments was that they were 
“based on the ability to reason through the terrain of moral dilemmas, concluding with a judgment 
that is based on clearly defined principles.”224  As children developed morally, they acquired access to 
different relevant moral principles at each stage.  The earliest stages involved principles to do with 
parental authority, punishment, and obedience, moving through to later stages which focused on 
things such as basic rights, the legal arrangements of a society, and ultimately adherence to universal 
ethical principles at the most morally developed stage. This was the default view of the development 
of moral judgment in psychology for a long time, however recent work has begun to focus on other 
elements thought to be involved: emotion and intuition.  
 
5.1.2 Emotivism 
The emotivist model is based on the idea that judgments of rightness and wrongness are arrived at 
primarily as reactions to emotions.  The roots of this model can be seen in the work of David Hume 
who claimed that our “taste” (here meaning our perception of our emotions: our sentiments, likes, 
dislikes, desires, feelings and so on) “has a productive faculty, and gilding and staining all natural 
objects with the colours, borrowed from internal sentiment, raises in a manner a new creation.”225  
 
224 Marc Hauser, Moral minds: How nature designed our universal sense of right and wrong, p. 16. 
225 David Hume, An enquiry concerning the principles of morals, p. 88.  
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The basic idea here is that when we see some morally pertinent situation – a dog being beaten say, to 
use a Humean example – it arouses in us feelings of sympathy, and perhaps anger or disgust at the 
perpetrator of the beating, and these feelings give rise to Hume’s ‘new creation’ – a judgment of moral 
wrongness of the situation.  Thus, the emotivist picture of moral judgment is that we feel an emotion 
response to our perception of some event. We interpret the actions involved in the event as right or 
wrong depending on the emotional response and express this as a moral judgment. As Marc Hauser 
writes for example “in the same way that we automatically and unconsciously see red, hear music, 
smell perfume, and feel roughness, we perceive helping as right because it feels good and cheating as 
wrong because it feels bad.”226  A representation of the emotivist model in its simplest form is as 
follows: 
Perception of Event Emotional Response Moral Judgment
 
Figure 11: Emotivism in moral judgment 
 
5.1.3 Intuitivism 
Intuitionism is the idea that our moral judgments are the result of special kinds of intuitions. Intuitions 
are differentiated from reasoning in that they are produced almost instantaneously, and do not 
involve any kind of explicit evaluating or conscious deliberation. Such judgments are generally 
characterized as appearing “suddenly and effortlessly in consciousness, without any awareness by the 
person of the mental processes that led to the outcome” and that the judgment process “does not 
advance in careful steps rather, it involves manoeuvres based seemingly on an implicit perception of 
the total problem”227 Intuitions simply come into the mind unbidden as a response to some event that 
has been perceived. That moral judgments are the result of intuitions was a popular thought in early 
 
226 Marc Hauser, Moral minds: How nature designed our universal sense of right and wrong, p. 24.   




twentieth century philosophy, with theorists such as G.E. Moore, W. D. Ross, and H. A. Pritchard 
putting forward various kinds of ethical intuitionism. 228  The corresponding basic model for 
intuitionism is as follows:  
Perception of Event Moral Intuition Moral Judgment
 
Figure 12: Intuitivism in moral judgment 
How intuition is cashed out here varies. In philosophical ethical intuitionism, intuitions were 
sometimes said to be a species of belief, the truth of which is somehow simply self-evident, or that 
they are a kind of sui generis insight that apprehends the moral features or properties of the world. A 
more recent take on intuitionism, in psychology in the work of Marc Hauser, characterizes intuition as 
the output of an evolved moral faculty, that produces judgments of rightness or wrongness in a 
manner that is analogous to how people judge whether a sentence is grammatical or not.  
 
5.2 Composite models of moral judgment 
All three processes of the §5.1 are easily recognizable as features of our moral lives.  Firstly, moral 
judgments can clearly involve reasoning: moral philosophy is evidence that this can and does occur. 
One might wish to argue otherwise, however, if it is not admitted that at least some of the time moral 
philosophy does involve reasoning, then it will be hard to imagine anything that would satisfy the 
definition of a process involving ‘reasoning’. Even if the other elements are present, it would be hard 
to deny that some reasoning and rational deliberation do occur in making at least some moral 
judgments. Secondly, emotion is a persistent feature of moral judgments.  Morality is important and 
relevant to us in virtue of the fact that it involves things that we care about or feel strongly about: 
 
228  Seminal statements in: G. E. Moore, Principia ethica, H.A. Prichard, ‘Does moral philosophy rest on a 
mistake?’, W.D. Ross, The right and the good. 
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anger, gratitude, indignation, disgust, sympathy, contempt, shame, guilt, pride229 – to name a few – 
are keenly felt when situations of a genuinely moral nature present themselves to us. Thirdly, 
something like intuition also appears to play a regular part in arriving at moral conclusions:  judgments 
often seem to appear suddenly in consciousness, “without any conscious awareness of having gone 
through steps of searching, weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion”230. These intuitions are not 
themselves reasoning, but they do not appear to be emotions either: they produce output that is 
belief-like, similar to that of reasoning, rather than simply an affective state. Any adequate account of 
moral judgments must be able to explain how these elements fit together in producing moral 
judgments. In the following sections I look at a number of theorists who have attempted to produce 
such an account, based on either their own research, or a collation of other studies done in 
psychology. 
 
5.2.1 Greene et al.’s model 
The first of the models that I look at comes from the work of Joshua Greene.231  In Greene’s study on 
moral judgments, participants were presented with a number of moral dilemmas which they had to 
make judgments about, while researchers administered fMRI232 scans.  The moral dilemmas presented 
to participants were split into two varieties: ‘personal’ and ‘impersonal’ moral dilemmas.  An example 
of an impersonal dilemma is the well-known trolley problem: 
A runaway trolley is headed for five people who will be killed if it proceeds on its 
present course. The only way to save them is to hit a switch that will turn the trolley 
 
229 List of emotions from Richard Joyce, The evolution of morality, p. 94.  
230 Jonathan Haidt, ‘The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment’, p. 
818.  
231 See J. D. Greene, R. B. Sommerville, L.E. Nystrom, J. M. Darley, and J. D. Cohen, ‘An fMRI investigation of 
emotional engagement in moral judgment’.  
232 fMRI or Functional magnetic resonance imaging, looks at changes in blood flow and blood oxygenation in the 
brain to determine regions of increased neural activity. 
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onto an alternate set of tracks where it will kill one person instead of five. Ought 
you to turn the trolley in order to save five people at the expense of one?233 
And an example of a personal dilemma used is a modified version of the above dilemma called the 
‘footbridge problem’: 
As before, a trolley threatens to kill five people. You are standing next to a large 
stranger on a footbridge that spans the tracks, in between the oncoming trolley 
and the five people. In this scenario, the only way to save the five people is to push 
this stranger off the bridge, onto the tracks below.  He will die if you do this, but 
his body will stop the trolley from reaching the others. Ought you to save the five 
others by pushing this stranger to his death?234 
The purpose of carrying out the fMRI scans while the participants made judgments about the 
dilemmas was to reveal which areas of the brain were active during the processing of personal and 
impersonal moral dilemmas and to evaluate the hypothesis that “the crucial difference between the 
trolley dilemma and the footbridge dilemma lies in the latter’s tendency to engage people’s emotions 
in a way that the former does not”235.  The results showed that the areas of the brain usually associated 
with emotion were much more active during consideration of personal dilemmas compared to 
impersonal dilemmas. Additionally, the actions in the personal dilemma were more often judged to 
be less permissible than the impersonal dilemmas and when the events in the personal dilemmas were 
judged to be permissible, these judgments took significantly longer to make. Green hypothesized that 
the increased duration in such judgments was due to a “countervailing emotional response” that 
caused a kind of “emotional interference”236 in such cases. Thus, the picture of moral judgments that 
we get from Greene’s research is that judgments involving ‘personal’ situations are either influenced 
by, or produce a greater level of affective response, whereas impersonal moral dilemmas produce 
 
233 Ibid., p. 2105.  
234 Ibid.  
235 Ibid., p. 2106. 
236 Ibid.  
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judgments mostly through reasoning. While, Greene et al. do not provide a complete model of 










Emotional Response Moral Judgment
 
Figure 13: Greene et al.’s model of moral judgment 
In this model impersonal moral situations do not trigger emotional responses of the same level as 
personal moral situations, and therefore judgments of the impersonal kind are arrived at primarily as 
a result of conscious reasoning.  In personal moral dilemmas, emotional systems are triggered and 
play a major role in determining the outcome of the judgment.  The links to conscious reasoning in 
personal moral judgments, and emotional response in impersonal moral judgments, are dotted to 
indicate the decreased role they play in such judgments. Thus, Greene’s study provides some initial 
evidence for thinking that ‘personal’ and ‘impersonal’ moral dilemmas are processed differently, and 
that emotional and reasoning centers of the brain are involved to varying degrees in making moral 
judgments.  
 
5.2.2 Shaun Nichols’ sentimental rules model 
In his book Sentimental Rules: On the natural foundation of moral judgment, Shaun Nichols presents 
a model he calls the ‘sentimental rules account of moral judgment’.  His account is limited to what he 
calls “core moral judgment” – judgments of the kind that are easily distinguished as moral, even by 
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children as young as 3 years, in typical moral/conventional task psychological studies.237  For Nichols, 
the capacity for moral judgment is one that allows us “to recognize that harm-based violations [of 
moral rules] are very serious, authority independent, generalizable and that the actions are wrong 
because of welfare considerations.”238  It is important to note that while this may capture a significant 
part of what we refer to as ‘moral judgments’, it certainly does not exhaust the scope of what we use 
the term ‘moral’ to refer to.239  To take one of Nichols’ own examples, we generally think that there is 
something morally wrong with tax avoidance or fraud240 (benefiting from other’s taxes, while not 
contributing oneself even though one meets the qualifying criteria), but this kind of case does not 
trigger the directly harm-based type of judgment implicated in the moral/conventional distinction and 
thus is a moral judgment that is not covered by Nichols’ model of how moral judgments are made. 
Nichols’ account of the process of moral judgment involves both an emotional response (an ‘affective 
system’) and a kind of reasoning about transgressions of an internalized set of rules – what he calls a 
‘normative theory’.  By normative theory, Nichols means something very basic and is not intended in 
any inflated sense. Rather, even a basic set of rules prohibiting certain behaviours will count as a 
normative theory.  Internally represented rules concerning table manners, for instance, will count as 
a normative theory.”241   The relation between the two mechanisms is not fully specified, but he argues 
that the affective response adds moral weight to the system of rules, as he puts it “the affective 
response infuses the harm-norms with a special non-conventional status.”242   He argues that an 
informative parallel is the disgusting/conventional distinction.  Moral norms are a set of norms about 
harm transgressions that are backed by an affective system whereas conventional norms lack this 
 
237 As first exemplified in the research of Elliot Turiel, see Shaun Nichols, Sentimental rules, p. 5. 
238 Shaun Nichols, Sentimental rules: On the natural foundation of moral judgment, p. 7.  
239 Indeed, a recent article has highlighted the fact that all of the studies Nichols uses to support his theory 
employ a very narrow range of moral/conventional transgressions: those of the “sort that primary school 
children might commit in the schoolyard” – even when participants in the study were convicted adult 
psychopaths in prison. See Daniel Kelly, Stephen Stich, Kevin J. Haley, Serena J. Eng, and Daniel M. T. Fessler, 
‘Harm, Affect, and the Moral/Conventional Distinction’  
240 Shaun Nichols, Sentimental rules: On the natural foundation of moral judgment, pp. 6-7. 
241 Ibid., p. 16. 
242 Ibid., p. 29. 
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emotive component. Likewise there is also a set of ‘disgust norms’, which have an affective element 
that go along with them that distinguish them from conventional norms.  Breaking disgust norms is 
viewed as more serious, authority independent, and applicable to all contexts (generalizable) and the 
reason for this is that not only are people aware that there are rules against such actions, but that we 
have an affective response as well (i.e. transgressions just seem gross) and therefore appear to be 
more serious regardless of how well entrenched or explicitly important the rules about them are, 
authority independent because the affect does not disappear even if an authority excuses a 
transgression, and generalizable because the emotional response is produced reliably, regardless of 
the situation (something that is gross, is gross regardless of the context).  So, in the same way as 
disgust norms are backed by emotive responses, so are moral norms, and this leads us to treat them 
as distinctive and as having the features described above.  
Thus Nichols proposes that moral judgments are made by assessing whether particular actions or 
situations are transgressions of some set of shared rules, and additionally, they get their importance 
and special status from the affective reactions that accompany them. Nichols thinks that moral 
judgments are not made by any special kind of ‘moral sense’, but are instead simply a particular kind 
of judgment about norms that have developed through a process of cultural evolution. Traditionally a 
number of accounts of moral judgment have included a unique “moral sense as the source of 
distinctive feelings of approval and disapproval which are triggered by the perception of virtue or 
vice”.243 Nichols however argues that no such unique moral sense is necessary or present: on his 
account all that is needed is the accompanying affective reaction which “plays a crucial role in leading 
people to treat harmful transgressions as wrong in a distinctive way.”244  Basic emotions from other 
contexts supply the sentiment to moral judgments and “No further moral feeling is invoked as a 
necessary part of core moral judgment.”245  Nichols’ model looks like the following: 
 
243 Ibid., p. 62. 
244 Ibid., p. 63. 
245 Ibid.  
145 
 









Figure 14: Shaun Nichols’ sentimental rules model of moral judgment 
Nichols provides support for his model by using results from studies on the moral/conventional task 
and research into the disgust/conventional distinction.  In these studies, participants are asked to 
judge whether a transgression is of a moral or conventional nature: the studies explicitly ask whether 
a transgression has taken place. The first question in standard versions of the task checks for the 
permissibility of an action – and thus whether it breaks some set of rules or norms. So, typical moral 
judgments involve assessing whether a norm has been broken. Further, there is, in 
moral/conventional tasks, a probe that is often used to distinguish between transgressions and non-
transgressions which involves asking the subject whether punishment is appropriate for certain 
events. Nichols gives the examples of a natural disaster and a child falling over and skinning their knee 
– both of these are bad, but neither make sense to punish for – they do not involve transgressions.246 
Thus in Nichols’ model, judgments that something is morally bad or good involve an assessment of 
whether a transgression has taken place.  
The evidence for the second half of his model, that moral harm norms are backed by an affective 
mechanism that gives them their special moral features, is drawn from two sources. Firstly, studies 
done on psychopaths247 show that while psychopaths possess the capability to recognize that moral 
transgressions involve breaking rules or expectations, they lack the ability to distinguish moral 
 
246 Ibid., p. 15.  
247 Such as R. J. R. Blair, ‘A cognitive developmental approach to morality: investigating the psychopath’. 
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transgressions involving harmful actions from conventional ones. 248   Additionally psychopaths’ 
judgments lack any emotional content: they do not have any affective response to the suffering of 
others involved in cases of moral transgressions involving harm.249  Secondly, Nichols uses studies on 
disgust which show that norms prohibiting disgusting actions are treated as more serious, authority 
independent, and universal (features which moral norms also have compared to conventional rules) 
when they are accompanied with an affective response to the disgusting action. As Nichols writes “If 
we find that other affect-backed norms [such as disgust norms] are also distinguished from 
conventional norms along the dimensions of permissibility, seriousness, authority contingency, and 
justification type, then this will provide an independent source of evidence for the Sentimental Rules 
account.”250  And this is precisely what two studies on disgust violations undertaken by Nichols do 
show.251 
 
5.2.3 Jonathan Haidt’s social intuitionist model 
Jonathan Haidt has proposed what he calls the ‘Social intuitionist’ model of moral judgment.252 The 
thoughts motivating this model are that moral reasoning is not the main cause of moral judgments, 
but is instead usually a post hoc construction, generated after a moral judgment has been reached, 
and that moral judgment regularly has a social element. Haidt’s somewhat complicated looking model 
is as follows253: 
 
248 Shaun Nichols, Sentimental rules: On the natural foundation of moral judgment, p. 19. 
249 Ibid., p. 19. 
250 Ibid., p. 21.  
251 See Shaun Nichols, ‘Norms with feeling: Towards a psychological account of moral judgment’. 
252 Jonathan Haidt, ‘The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment’.  
253 Ibid., p. 815.  
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Figure 15: Jonathan Haidt’s model of moral judgment 
In Haidt’s model, moral judgment is most usually the result of an intuition (link 1 in the model, called 
the “intuitive judgment link”). Reasoning according to the model is engaged in after a judgment is 
made, to search for arguments that will support the conclusion (link 2, the “post hoc reasoning link”). 
The third link (the “reasoned persuasion link”) consists of moral reasoning that is produced and sent 
forth verbally to others to justify one’s moral judgments.  While this link is sometimes efficacious, 
discussions about moral judgments are “notorious for the rarity with which persuasion takes place.”254  
The fourth link in the model, is the “social persuasion link.”  This link comes from the recognition that 
the mere fact that other people – friends, family, allies, and acquaintances – have made a moral 
judgment “exerts a direct influence on others, even if no reasoned persuasion is used.”255  These four 
links in the model constitute the core of Haidt’s model: moral intuitions, post hoc reasoning, and 
influences from our social interaction about moral judgments.  The fifth and sixth links in the model 
are hypothesized to occur less frequently and be less influential in causing judgments.  This is indicated 
in the model by the use of dashed lines.  The fifth link, the “reasoned judgment link” is where “people 
 




reason their way to a judgment by sheer force of logic.”256 This link recognizes that in rare cases people 
do engage in genuine, non-post hoc reasoning about judgments they have already made, and this 
results in a revision or change of judgment.  This most often happens when the initial intuition is weak 
or inconclusive. The “private reflection link” is the sixth link in the model. This is where in the course 
of reflecting on the situation or issue, a person may initiate an intuition that differs from their original 
intuitions that caused their judgment.  
Haidt offers four reasons for doubting the causal efficacy of reasoning in moral judgments and 
preferring his social intuitionist account.  The first is that it is widely accepted in psychology that other 
kinds of judgment often involve two kinds of processing systems (a rapid intuitive or automatic system 
and a slower reasoning based one), usually called dual process models, and he thinks there is good 
reason to think moral judgment works in a similar way.257  Normally in such models, the affective or 
intuitive system “has primacy in every sense: it came first in phylogeny, it emerges first in ontogeny, 
it is triggered more quickly in real-time judgments, and it is more powerful and irrevocable when the 
two systems yield conflicting judgments”258  Haidt thinks that evidence from relevant studies show 
judgments to be best described as “a set of automatic processes [rather] than as a process of 
deliberation and reflection”259, that people’s “impressions that they form from observing a ‘thin slice’ 
of behaviour (as little as 5s[econds]) are almost identical to the impressions they form from much 
longer and more leisurely observation”260, and that people “categorize other people instantly and 
automatically, applying stereotypes that often include morally evaluated traits.”261  All of the findings 
illustrate an intuitive process whereby “the perception of a person or an event leads instantly and 
automatically to a moral judgment without any conscious reflection or reasoning.”262   
 
256 Ibid., p. 819. 
257 Ibid. 
258 Ibid. 
259 Ibid., p. 820. 
260 Ibid. 
261 Ibid.  
262 Ibid.  
149 
 
Haidt’s second reason for questioning the rationalist picture of moral judgment is what he calls the 
“motivated reasoning problem” – that the moral reasoning process seems more like a lawyer 
defending a client than a judge or scientist seeking the truth.263  That is, the reasoning process’ 
purpose seems to be to formulate arguments that support one’s intuitive conclusions rather than 
having a role in determining the outcome of the moral judgment itself.  In support of this claim, Haidt 
cites a number of studies which show that reasoning is often biased by motives concerning ‘impression 
management’ and ‘smooth interaction’ with others (what Haidt calls “relatedness motives”), and 
defensive mechanisms that are triggered by threats of incoherence or invalidity of one’s views (so 
called “coherence motives”). These mechanisms make people “act like lawyers” and defend their 
claims through any reasoning they can. Although Haidt thinks that sometimes moral reasoning may 
be efficacious at working to produce moral judgments, this occurs only in very limited circumstances.  
In most real situations, such as when people are arguing about a morally relevant situation, 
relatedness and coherence motives will underlie much of the reasoning: “under these more realistic 
circumstances, moral reasoning is not left free to search for truth but is likely to be hired out like a 
lawyer by various motives, employed only to seek confirmation of preordained conclusions.”264 
The third reason is that the reasoning process that constructs ‘rational’ justifications for intuitive 
judgments often produces reasoning that is inadequate in terms of explaining the judgment.  For 
example, in a study done by Haidt,265 a fictional case of consensual incest between a brother and sister 
on holiday is described to participants. Most people immediately judge the actions wrong, but struggle 
for sufficient justifications for their judgment when questioned.  Eventually participants end up 
claiming that the brother and sister will end up harming themselves emotionally despite the fact that 
the story told to them intentionally rules out any possible harm to the participants.  Ultimately many 
people end up saying something like “I know it’s wrong, but I just can’t come up with a reason why.”266  
 
263 Ibid., p. 820.  
264 Ibid., p. 822.  
265 J. Haidt, F. Bjorklund, S. Murphy, ‘Moral dumbfounding: When intuition finds no reasoning’ 
266 Ibid., p. 11.  
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Clearly this reasoning is not sufficient for rationally producing the judgment and it does not appear 
that the judgment could have been based upon reasoning at all. Haidt also thinks that this feature of 
the process can explain the “bitterness, futility, and self-righteousness”267 of a lot of moral discourse 
or argumentation. Because the reasoning is usually not part of the making of judgments, rational 
arguments often fail to be persuasive, regardless of their soundness. As Haidt explains: 
In a debate about abortion, politics, consensual incest, or what my friend did to 
your friend, both sides believe that their positions are based on reasoning about 
the facts and issues involved… Both sides present what they take to be excellent 
arguments in support of their positions.  Both sides expect the other side to be 
responsive to such reasons… When the other side fails to be affected by such good 
reasons, each side concludes that the other side must be closed minded or 
insincere.  In this way the culture wars over issues such as homosexuality and 
abortion can generate morally motivated players on both sides who believe that 
their opponents are not morally motivated.  
Haidt’s fourth reason for thinking intuition is the cause of judgments and reasoning is a consequence, 
is that moral action co-varies with moral emotion more than with moral reasoning. While there is 
some evidence that moral reasoning is correlated with moral action, emotional and self-regulatory 
capacities seem to be much better determinants of negative morality – refraining from behaviour 
generally judged as immoral.268  Additionally, positive morality – the active helping of others – is most 
likely precipitated by emotional reactions.  Empathy aroused by the perception of suffering evokes 
altruistic motivations.  Haidt sums up his review of the empirical support for this claim as follows: 
“people are often motivated to help others and…the mechanisms involved in this helping are primarily 
affective, including empathy as well as reflexive distress, sadness, guilt, and shame.”269 
 
 
267 Ibid., p. 823.  
268 See Ibid., pp. 823-824.   
269 Ibid., p. 825. 
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5.2.4 Marc Hauser’s Rawlsian model 
Marc Hauser, in his book Moral Minds, presents a model of moral judgment which draws inspiration 
from John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice where he compares our capacity to make moral judgments to our 
capacity to make judgments of the grammaticality of sentences. Rawls’ insight was that our process 
of making judgments of right or wrong involves a kind of intuitive analysis, just as our process of 
judging whether a sentence is grammatical does.  We make rapid, unconscious, and automatic 
analyses of the features of sentences, and produce near instant judgments of whether they are 
grammatically correct or not. Hauser thinks we analogously make rapid, automatic analyses of the 
moral features of situations and it is this analysis which produces moral judgments rather than 
emotional responses or reasoning. Once an individual perceives an action or event, the moral faculty 
provides a rapid analysis of the intentions and motivation underlying the action, its causes, and its 
intended and foreseen consequences. This non-conscious analysis then produces an intuition: a 
judgment that some action is permissible, obligatory, or forbidden.270 
Building on the linguistic analogy, Hauser proposes that just as there is a kind of innate ‘universal 
grammar’ in linguistics, there is a kind of innate moral faculty that he calls a ‘grammar of action’.271  
The linguistic universal grammar is the innate capacity or ‘toolkit’ that facilitates the learning of our 
native languages.  Hauser suggests that humans are equipped with a parallel innate moral capacity: a 
universal ‘moral grammar’ – a toolkit for building our specific culture’s morality.  As Hauser writes “in 
the same way that grammaticality judgments emerge from a universal grammar of principles and 
parameters… ethicality judgments would emerge from a universal moral grammar, replete with 
shared principles and culturally switchable parameters.”272  Once we have acquired the moral norms 
of our culture, a process which, according to him is “more like growing a limb than sitting in Sunday 
school and learning about vices and virtues” we are able to intuitively judge whether actions are 
 
270 Marc Hauser, Moral minds: How nature designed our universal sense of right and wrong, p. 46. 




Figure 16: Marc Hauser’s moral grammar model of moral judgment 
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“permissible, obligatory, or forbidden, without conscious reasoning and without explicit access to the 
underlying principles.”273 
One of the reasons Hauser thinks that there must be an intuitive process of analysis that is carried out 
before any emotion is felt is that something must tell us which emotion is appropriate to the situation. 
Hauser states this problem as follows: “Neither we nor any other feeling creature can just have an 
emotion. Something in the brain must recognize – quickly or slowly – that this is an emotion worthy 
situation.”274  In Hauser’s model, the first step after the perception of the event that will result in a 
moral judgment is his intuitive analysis of the moral features of the situation.  Once this analysis of 
the intentions and motivation underlying the action, its causes, and its intended and foreseen 
consequences has taken place, a moral judgment is arrived at.  This judgment then gives rise to 





In support of the claim that conscious reasoning typically follows after moral judgments have been 
made, Hauser cites similar research and evidence as Haidt does. His evidence for claiming that 
emotional responses follow from, rather than are causally involved in determining, moral judgments 
is somewhat limited.275 It is worth noting that his argument that before any emotional response takes 
place there must be an analysis of what kind of affective response is appropriate, does not show that 
the affective response must take place after the moral judgment is made, only that it must be 
 
273 Ibid., pp. xvii-xviii  
274 Ibid., p. 8. 
275 See J. Nado, D. Kelly, and S. Stich, ‘Moral Judgment’, pp. 10-12. 
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preceded by something, and thus both the analysis and emotion could potentially come before the 
judgment.  
 
5.3 Current models of moral judgment 
The prior sections introduced four different empirically based psychological models of moral 
judgment. Most of the models that come from recent work in moral psychology focus on intuition or 
intuitive analysis of some kind as the primary way of arriving at moral judgments, although it is often 
also recognized that it is possible to arrive at moral judgments in more than one way (for example in 
Haidt’s and Greene’s models).  Greene’s model suggests that there is variation in the systems or sets 
of processes that produce moral judgments, depending on the eliciting situation and its relation to the 
individual making the moral judgment.  Greene’s study also indicates that more research on how 
different kinds of judgments are made is needed, and that it is unlikely that all judgments are made in 
the same way.  Shaun Nichols claims in his model, based on moral judgments exemplified by those 
used in moral/conventional task research, that there are two kinds of processes necessary for making 
judgments.  The two processes he suggests are an analysis (which could be a form of conscious 
reasoning or some kind of subconscious analysis), about whether a transgression has taken place, and 
an affective response that infuses the judgment of the transgression with its importance, authority 
independence, and universalizability.  Jonathan Haidt’s social intuitionist model of moral judgments is 
more complex and contains influences from the moral judgments of other individuals as well. 
However, in Haidt’s model the dominant process is what he calls the “intuitive judgment link” – a kind 
of intuition. Judgments, according to Haidt, can be revised through reasoning and private reflection, 
reasoned persuasion by others, and also brute social biases such as what he calls “coherence” and 
“relatedness” motives.  Marc Hauser’s model is yet another model that explicitly favours intuitions. 
These, according to Hauser, take the form of a rapid, unconscious analysis of the situation, which 
results in a judgment that an act or event is “morally permissible, obligatory, or forbidden”.  Explicit 
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reasoning and emotional responses follow after the moral judgment in Hauser’s model, although 
there is some parallel with Haidt’s in that he thinks the function of these is both to tip the weight of 
some moral dilemmas one way or the other, and to provide reasoning to others, often with the aim 
of changing their judgment.    
 
5.4 How are moral judgments made? 
While this research shows much promise and is often insightful, it is still relatively exploratory and for 
the most part the empirical evidence at present does not allow for a complete picture of the processes 
involved in moral judgment or any definite conclusions about how people typically make moral 
judgments in specific situations.  However, such work is useful for showing where more research is 
required and the paths of enquiry that might be fruitful.  The models that have been presented provide 
relatively crude characterizations of the process of moral judgment, and some of them disagree upon 
which processes should be included in the model or where the different processes should be located. 
Further, they tend not to take into account variations in the eliciting situation or any other variables 
dependent upon the nature of the moral dilemma that is being judged. Nevertheless, the research to 
date has shown that answering the descriptive question of “how are moral judgments actually made?” 
is tractable using the empirical methods of psychology, and gives us sufficient reason to think that 
more accurate models will be produced that provide a more robust and complete account of moral 





Chapter 6 Moral psychology and ethics 
A number of moral philosophers have taken an interest in the empirical findings of moral psychology, 
and claim that they have significant implications for ethics. While there is still an often-mentioned rule 
of thumb in ethics that one cannot directly derive normative prescriptions from descriptive 
information, this need not rule out moral psychology having implications for the less obviously 
normative field of meta-ethics – the study of the meaning, nature, and foundations of ethics. And 
further, there are some philosophers who do argue that there are significant normative conclusions 
that can be drawn from the findings of moral psychology. For example, Shaun Nichols, an enthusiastic 
proponent of applying psychological data to ethics writes, “it turns out that there is a great deal of 
extant empirical work that is philosophically instructive”276 and that his psychological account of moral 
judgment which I discussed in the previous chapter, “has broad ramifications for philosophical 
ethics.”277 Even more sweepingly he states that “many of the deepest issues concerning the nature of 
morality would be illuminated if we had an adequate account of the nature of moral judgment.”278 
Similarly John Doris and Stephen Stich write that “consideration of work in the biological, behavioural, 
and social sciences promises substantive philosophical contributions” and that “philosophical ethics 
can, and indeed must, interface with the human sciences.”279 
Moral psychologists themselves are usually reserved in their claims about the direct consequences of 
their research for moral philosophy. They do however comment on how a lack of understanding of 
moral psychology has somehow resulted in the failure of moral theorising to have an impact on 
people’s actions, and that if we want to make decisions and policies that are successful, we should pay 
attention to what moral psychology has to say. For example, Marc Hauser writes:  
The dominant moral-reasoning view has generated failed policies in law, politics, 
business, and education.  I believe that a primary reason for this situation is our 
 
276 Shaun Nichols, Sentimental rules: On the natural foundation of moral judgment, p. vii.  
277 Ibid., p. viii.  
278 Shaun Nichols, Sentimental rules: On the natural foundation of moral judgment, p. 4.  
279 Doris and Stich, ‘As a matter of fact: Empirical perspectives on ethics’, p. 146.  
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ignorance about the nature of our moral instincts and about the ways they work 
and interface with an ever-changing social landscape.  It is time to remedy this 
situation.”280  
Similarly, Jonathon Haidt writes “A correct understanding of the intuitive basis of moral judgment may 
therefore be useful in helping decision makers avoid mistakes and in helping educators design 
programs (and environments) to improve the quality of moral judgment and behavior.”281 In addition 
to direct claims of significance from philosophers and psychologists there has been pressure in the 
last century within philosophy for ethical theories to be ‘naturalistically acceptable’: that they should 
cohere with, or ‘fit’ with, what science tells us about the natural world. Therefore, moral psychology 
has also been perceived to be increasingly important as it tells us, in part, what science has to say 
about the moral domain. An ethical theory that commends actions, obligations, commitments, and 
ways of living that are at odds with how people can realistically be expected to act or to be, according 
to science, is one that is increasingly at a serious competitive disadvantage. Since science tells us about 
the way people are (or importantly, if it can tell us about how people can be), then it can aid us in 
determining which ethical theories are viable and which are not.  
While moral philosophy and moral psychology are both ‘about’ morality, their focus is of course, 
importantly different. While this may appear obvious, it is worth emphasizing, as where there is 
excitement about the implications of moral psychology there is often little discussion of what makes 
the methodological approaches and aims of each discipline dissimilar and these important facts 
sometimes get lost or forgotten in the ensuing discussion. Thus, I begin with a discussion of the ways 
in which moral philosophy and moral psychology differ with respect to their aims and methodology, 
and the impact these differences have on how moral psychology can contribute to ethics. There are 
however limits to the usefulness of discussing in the abstract how important the implications of moral 
psychology for ethics are, and thus following these general remarks I examine two different attempts 
 
280 Marc Hauser, Moral minds: How nature designed our universal sense of right and wrong, p. 2. 




to draw philosophical conclusions from work done in moral psychology. The first focuses on the work 
of Shaun Nichols who argues that the various findings from moral psychology on how moral judgments 
are made pose a challenge to various kinds of ‘moral rationalism’. The second looks at an argument 
advanced by John Doris and Stephen Stich (among others) who argue that virtue ethics is committed 
to a picture of moral psychology that is at odds with the picture portrayed by psychology, and because 
of this virtue ethics is in serious trouble.  
 
6.1 Methodological differences 
Psychology is the scientific investigation of the human mind and human behaviour. Moral psychology 
is therefore the scientific study of the mind and behaviour of humans in moral contexts.  Moral 
philosophy is less easy to define concisely for there is no charter or well-marked limits to what is an 
acceptable question for philosophical discourse other than the willingness to be taken seriously and 
discussed by philosophers. Nevertheless, moral philosophy has traditionally had a distinctive focus 
which differentiates its interests from that of moral psychology: it is concerned with what we ought 
to do; how we ought to live, how we should act, what policies and reforms we should support, what 
would be just or right or good, and so on. In short, the foremost difference between moral philosophy 
and moral psychology is that moral philosophy is normative whereas moral psychology is descriptive. 
Of course, moral philosophy is not limited just to discussing how we ought to act in any particular 
situation: there are many subtle distinctions involved in evaluating which judgments should be made, 
whether such judgments are true, or correct, or justified, or ‘appropriate’ in some other sense. These 
subsequent questions are questions about the nature of moral debate – questions that are usually 
considered to fall under the subject matter of metaethics.  
Metaethics is prima facie non-normative or at least normative to a much lesser degree, and it is often 
thought that it is within metaethics that moral psychology is likely to be most relevant. However, it 
can be somewhat misleading to define metaethics as simply ‘the study of the nature of morality’, as 
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this makes it sound as though it is the kind of thing science can directly investigate – that metaethics 
might be itself a kind of descriptive domain. But the questions metaethics traditionally deals with are 
not obviously amenable to being dealt with in an empirical manner. When philosophers inquire about 
the nature of morality, they are asking questions such as the following: 
• When we make moral judgments are we stating facts? If so, what kind of facts are they? Or, 
are we instead expressing our attitudes or desires?  
• Can moral judgments be true or false? If not, can they be more or less ‘correct’ or 
‘appropriate’? How are they justified? Are they ever justified? 
• How do we come to know that they are true or correct or justified? Can we have moral 
knowledge? What kind of epistemology is appropriate in the moral domain? 
• Is there such a thing as objectivity in ethics? Or is ethics fundamentally subjective or relative 
to some agent or group of agents? Can we say what the objective/subjective distinction 
amounts to in ethics? 
• Is there such a thing as moral progress? What does it consist in, and how do we know it has 
been made? 
None of these questions (or other questions that fall under the umbrella of metaethics) appears to be 
easily addressed empirically.   We should be cautious however of therefore assuming or jumping to 
the conclusion that empirical information or research is irrelevant to these questions.  
James Rachels presents an analogy which attempts to show that biological and psychological 
information about morality is unlikely to be important, and on the basis of that analogy jumps to such 
a conclusion about the irrelevance of empirical information. His analogy is between mathematics and 
the study of the psychology of mathematics – that is, the study of people’s mental processes involved 
in mathematical problem solving – and the moral philosophy and the study of the psychology of 
morality.282 What would the study of the psychological processes involved in mathematical decision 
 
282 James Rachels, Created from animals: The moral implications of Darwinism, p. 78.  
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making contribute to solving mathematical problems? The answer is that mathematics and the 
psychology of mathematics tell us two very different kinds of things: one gives us solutions, the other 
tells us about the human mental processes and behaviour involved. Only by actually doing the 
problem-solving task can we hope to arrive at actual answers to mathematical problems.  
Rachels points out that while information on how we solve mathematical problems will no doubt be 
of great interest to mathematicians, it is much less likely to help them solve any particular problem. 
For knowing which parts of the brain are involved, or what environmental or biological factors 
influence people’s mathematical capacities, or just about any conceivable psychological information, 
does not contribute to the actual solution of any given mathematical problem. Similarly in the case of 
moral philosophy, while psychology’s discoveries about moral judgments will undoubtedly be of great 
interest to moral philosophers, it is not clear how they could actually contribute to the problems of 
moral philosophy: deciding what to do and addressing all the philosophical questions the notion of 
“what to do” raises.  
But this seems to be too fast. Simply supposing that because it is intuitively plausible to Rachels (or 
indeed any or all philosophers) that any descriptive information about the psychology of mathematics 
is not going to be helpful in solving actual mathematical problems does not mean we can therefore 
conclude that it is in fact of no use for mathematics. Further, Rachels’ analogy is comparing the 
empirical understanding of human mathematical ability and the activity itself of mathematics with the 
empirical understanding of morality and the activity of moral philosophy (or normative ethics). A more 
relevant analogy for moral psychology and metaethics would be to compare the empirical study of 
the psychology of maths and its implications for the philosophy of mathematics. It seems likely that 
the philosophy of mathematics plays a similar role for mathematics as meta-ethics does for moral 
philosophy – if this is the case, then it would seem very hasty to draw the conclusion that Rachels has. 
If the philosophy of mathematics is the study of the assumptions, foundations, and implications of 
mathematics then discoveries in the philosophy of mathematics may well have implications for 
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mathematics (which few philosophers of mathematics would deny) and there needs to be more 
careful examination by those in a position to do so to conclude anything of the kind Rachels does.  
There is at least one non-trivial283 exception to this general rule about the relevance of psychological 
data to normative conclusions. This exception derives from the fact that it cannot be the case that one 
ought to do something if doing that thing is impossible – the principle of “ought implies can”. Thus, it 
is possible from some descriptive data about the limitations of what is possible to do, that we can 
conclude that it is not the case that we ought to do something. If psychology discovers that some 
action, behaviour, or mental process is impossible – either for all people or some subset of people – 
then the result can be that we change our normative judgments about such cases. For example, if 
psychology shows that people who suffer from some disease or natural impairment are thereby 
rendered incapable of understanding that how they act is morally wrong, then we do not think that 
the deserts such actions merit are the same as the for those who act in a similar manner but do 
understand the nature of their actions. While this may appear to be a fairly limited exception – 
perhaps relevant only to cases involving a legal defence of pleading insanity or those without the 
cognitive capacities for understanding morality and so on – it can also be used in evaluating ethical 
theories as a whole. If it were true that some moral theory asks us to act in some way that is impossible 
or unrealistic to expect, then it casts doubt on the legitimacy of such a moral theory.        
 
6.1.1 Terminological differences between disciplines 
Before looking at some attempts to derive moral implications from psychological data, it is worth 
noting that there are differences in the way in which the same or similar terms are used between 
 
283 It is of course possible to derive trivial ethical propositions from descriptive propositions via various logical 
tricks. For example: “Tea-drinking is common in England; therefore either tea-drinking is common in England or 
all New Zealanders ought to be shot” (from A. N. Prior, ‘The autonomy of ethics’, p. 201.) Such statements are 
what Prior calls contingently vacuous: given the particular premises used to derive the conclusion, we could 
replace the moral predicate with any grammatically correct proposition and the truth value of the whole would 
remain unchanged. Thus, the ethical content in cases such as this are not really derived from the premises, and 
certainly this kind of logical derivation is no use to us in deciding what we ought morally to do.  
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disciplines, and the range of confusions this creates in attempting to draw philosophical conclusions 
from moral psychology. Moral psychologists often use the terms ‘rationalism’, ‘emotivism’, and 
‘intuitionism’ to refer to the theses that moral judgments are the ‘product’ of the respective faculties. 
For example, Jonathan Haidt writes: 
 Moral psychology has long been dominated by rationalist models of moral 
judgment…Rationalist approaches in moral psychology…say that moral knowledge 
and moral judgment are reached primarily by a process of reasoning and 
reflection.284 
Similarly, the terms ‘emotivism’ and ‘intuitionism’ are used in psychology for the ideas that moral 
judgments are ‘primarily the result of’ or ‘causally flow from’ emotional or intuitive processes. Moral 
psychologists also sometimes term the psychological version of rationalism a ‘Kantian’ approach, and 
psychological emotivism a ‘Humean’ approach.285 Generally, the use of all these terms does not map 
cleanly on to the way the same terms are used in philosophy. In moral philosophy, ‘emotivism’ is 
generally taken to be the view that moral judgments do not express beliefs, but instead function to 
express our feelings or attitudes when we make moral judgments. ‘Intuitionism’ is used in a number 
of ways, but is perhaps most often linked with the (now unpopular) epistemological and metaphysical 
view, that moral goodness and badness is apprehended by some form of intuition and is in some sense 
metaphysically sui generis. Similarly, ‘rationalism’ in moral philosophy is used in a large number of 
ways that differ from the sense used in psychology. The range of meanings attributed to moral 
rationalism in philosophy are too varied and complicated to summarise simply, but it suffices here to 
note that it does include the psychological idea that moral judgments are the result of a rational 
process, but also goes well beyond this to deal with issues such as justification (why we should act 
 
284 Jonathan Haidt, ‘The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment’ p. 
814. 
285 For example, Marc Hauser, terms his three possible models of the process of moral judgment ‘Kantian’ 
(judgments are made rationally), ‘Humean’ (judgments are the result of emotive responses), and ‘Rawlsian’ 
(judgments are the result of a moral faculty that judges intuitively whether an action is right or wrong based on 
what he terms a “grammar of action”), see Moral minds: How nature designed our universal sense of right and 
wrong, pp. 12-55.    
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morally) and what the concept of morality is about (that our concept includes the idea that moral 
requirements are requirements of reason or rationality).  
Of course, the fact that different disciplines use the same terms in differing ways does not mean that 
work from different disciplines cannot be integrated. As long as the different meanings of terms is 
kept in mind and where there is overlap it is made clear which sense is intended this ought to pose 
little difficulty. As discussed in the following sections on the work of Shaun Nichols, this is not as easy 
a task as it may appear. Nichols’ attempts run in to difficulty as many of his argument miss their 
philosophical targets due to their use of conceptions of terms such as ‘rationalism’ and ‘moral 
judgment’ that differ to those used in the relevant philosophical debates.  
 
6.2 Shaun Nichols and moral rationalism 
In Sentimental Rules, Shaun Nichols presents a psychological account of the elements involved in 
moral judgment (as outlined in Chapter 5), and argues that this model, and the psychological data that 
supports it, has important implications for ethics. Nichols examines how well his empirical model fits 
with what he calls ‘moral rationalism’ – the idea that “morality is grounded in reason or rationality 
rather than the emotions or cultural idiosyncrasies.” 286  ‘Moral rationalism’ without any kind of 
qualification is somewhat ambiguous as this term is used in a number of ways in metaethics – it is 
applied to a range of ideas, some of which refer to particular traditions in moral philosophy, the ideas 
of various groups of philosophers, or sometimes it is applied generally to just about any moral 
theorising which connects reasoning or rationality in some way with morality. Nichols describes the 
 
286 Shaun Nichols, Sentimental rules: On the natural foundation of moral judgment, p. 66. 
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basic idea of moral rationalism simply as the idea that morality is “founded on reason or rationality”287, 
“derives from reason”288, is “grounded in reason or rationality”289, or that it “is a product of reason”290.   
Nichols suggests two different theses that he takes the philosophical moral rationalist to be advancing 
by these kinds of claims. The first he terms ‘Empirical rationalism’: 
It is an empirical fact that moral judgment in humans is a kind of rational judgment; 
that is, our moral judgments derive from our rational faculties or capacities.291 
As its name suggests, this claim is a descriptive claim about how moral judgments are ‘produced’ – it 
is claiming that when we make a moral judgment, it is produced by, or flows from, our rational 
capacities. The second idea he identifies is what he calls ‘Conceptual rationalism’: 
It is a conceptual truth that a moral requirement is a reason for action.292   
This is the idea that it is part of the concept of morality that moral requirements are rational 
requirements: it is true as part of our concept of morality that if one acts immorally it entails that one 
is also acting irrationally. Nichols thinks that a variety of empirical evidence has implications for both 
these versions of rationalism. In the following sections I examine whether these are relevant 
philosophical positions, and then evaluate the success of his arguments about his empirical and 
conceptual rationalisms.  
 
6.2.1 Are Nichols’ rationalisms positions held by philosophers? 
Nichols presents the following quotes which he takes to be representative of the ideas of a number of 
moral rationalists:  
 
287 Ibid., p. 65.  
288 Ibid.  
289 Ibid., p. 66.  
290 Ibid., p. 70. 
291 Ibid., p. 67. 
292 Ibid.  
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1. “Just as there are rational requirements on thought, there are rational requirements on 
action, and altruism is one of them…If the requirements of ethics are rational requirements, 
it follows that the motive for submitting to them must be one which would be contrary to 
reason to ignore.”293  
2. “The objective badness of pain…is…just the fact that there is reason for anyone capable of 
viewing the world objectively to want it to stop.  The view that values are real is… that our 
claims about value and about what people have reason to do may be true or false 
independently of our beliefs and inclinations.”294  
3. “The Kantian approach to moral philosophy is to show that ethics is based on practical reason: 
that is, that our ethical judgments can be explained in terms of rational standards that apply 
directly to conduct or to deliberation. Part of the appeal of this approach lies in the way that 
it avoids certain sources of scepticism that some other approaches meet with inevitably. If 
ethically good action is simply rational action, we do not need to postulate special ethical 
properties in the world or faculties in the mind in order to provide ethics with a foundation.”295 
4. “If our concept of rightness is the concept of what we would desire ourselves to do if we were 
fully rational, where this is a desire for something of the appropriate substantive kind, then it 
does indeed follow that our moral judgments are expressions of our beliefs about an objective 
matter of fact.”296 
Nichols writes, that as these passages show, “the consequences are profound and reassuring if moral 
rationalism is true”297 but that despite this appeal, the empirical evidence he presents shows that 
“rationalism is an implausible view.”298 Which then of these quotes supports Nichols’ empirical and 
conceptual rationalism interpretations?  
 
293 Thomas Nagel, The possibility of altruism, p. 3. 
294 Thomas Nagel, The view from nowhere, p. 144. 
295 Christine Korsgaard, ‘Skepticism about practical reason’, p. 311. 
296 Michael Smith, The moral problem, p. 185 
297 Shaun Nichols, Sentimental rules: On the natural foundation of moral judgment, p. 67. 
298 Ibid.  
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Quote 1 from Nagel is claiming that there are rational requirements on how we should act – we ought 
to act ethically because not doing so would be irrational. Nagel is talking directly about morality here, 
not simply the concept we hold of it, so this quote is not about the conceptual issue that Nichols’ 
conceptual rationalism concerns. Nagel’s concern is with why we should act ethically; with our “motive 
for submitting” to moral requirements. Nagel’s quote also does not appear to concern how moral 
judgments are proximally caused – instead it is concerned with the standard of evaluation of those 
judgments – whether acting in accord with them would be ‘rational’ or not.  
Quote 2, also from Nagel, is stating that the objectivity of moral requirements means that everyone 
has a reason to act in accord with them, and that these reasons apply regardless of any beliefs or 
desires to the contrary.  Again, neither of empirical rationalism or conceptual rationalism captures this 
idea of why we should act ethically and the independence of this fact from our beliefs and desires.  
Quote 3 from Christine Korsgaard is about showing that ethics can avoid various kinds of moral 
scepticism by giving it a rational ‘foundation’ – a basic justification for why we should act ethically. 
Thus, here again the claim is that moral rationalism is a theory that shows that the reason we should 
act in accord with morality is because doing so is rational. Quote 4, the final quote that Nichols 
provides, from Michael Smith’s The Moral Problem, appears to concern something like Nichols’ 
conceptual rationalism and the implications of it being true. Smith claims that if it is true that our 
concept of rightness (morality) is “what we would desire ourselves to do if we were fully rational” then 
moral judgments express beliefs about something we believe to be an objective matter of fact.  
It is extremely difficult to draw conclusions about moral rationalism in general, as it is a term used in 
many different contexts for a number of theories or ideas. This variety of theories connects morality 
to rationality in a range of different ways, and as such there is no single thesis that is denoted by the 
term ‘moral rationalism’. Nichols’ interpretation of the various moral rationalist claims he cites seems 
to miss this point, and further, Nichols’ interpretations fail to target perhaps the most philosophically 
important moral rationalist idea.  
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The first three of these quotes are all about why we should act in some particular way: they concern 
rational justification for acting ethically. This suggests that a large part of what moral rationalists are 
talking about is not Nichols’ empirical or conceptual rationalist claims, but the idea that we ought to 
act ethically because it would be rational to do so or irrational to not do so. This idea we might call 
‘Justificatory Rationalism’: 
Moral requirements are justified on the grounds that it would be irrational not to 
do as they recommend: we should not act immorally, because doing so is 
irrational. 299  
This interpretation captures the main elements of the first three quotes that Nichols includes. 
Additionally, Nichols notes that one of the main motivations for ‘moral rationalism’ is that it has been 
seen as one of the most promising ways of securing a kind of objectivity for moral claims.300 However, 
he does not discuss why objectivity itself may be desirable, and this is important for understanding 
moral rationalism. In general, the reason that moral objectivity has been seen as attractive is that 
objectivity imbues moral claims with a kind of authority or special importance: if moral imperatives 
are objectively true, then we have a powerful motive to do what they say. So, the focus of many moral 
rationalists appears to be on why we should act ethically; objectivity, so the argument goes, implies 
importance or authority, which implies we have reason to act as morality dictates. 
The implication of this for Nichols’ argument is that it significantly weakens his claims that “rationalism 
is an implausible view.”301 Firstly, because it is unlikely that most who identify themselves moral 
rationalists would endorse Nichols’ conceptual or empirical rationalisms as fair interpretations of their 
views on morality. Secondly, because in general, one of the main motivations for moral rationalism is 
to provide an account of rational justification for following the dictates of morality and none of the 
 
299 Richard Joyce suggests a similar idea in ‘What neuroscience can (and cannot) contribute to metaethics’. 
300 Shaun Nichols, Sentimental rules: On the natural foundation of moral judgment. p. 66. 
301 Ibid., p. 67. 
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considerations or arguments against empirical or conceptual rationalism are applicable to such a 
justificatory project.  
A justificatory rationalism is compatible with just about any account of the proximal mechanisms that 
produce moral judgment. Whatever the proximal mechanisms involved turn out to be, it has little 
bearing on whether we would be justified in acting on those judgments. If the proximal mechanisms 
that produced moral judgments were some kind of intuition, or were simply the expression of an 
attitude or emotion, we could still rationally evaluate whether acting in accord with such judgments 
would be justified. Thus, justificatory rationalism appears to be unaffected by the status of empirical 
rationalism.  
Justificatory rationalism is also unaffected by the truth of conceptual rationalism, at least based on 
any considerations Nichols provides. The fact the concept of morality includes the feature that 
someone is acting irrationally when they act immorally, is independent of the fact that actually justifies 
moral judgments. The concepts that people hold do not necessarily track the truth, thus conceptual 
rationalism and justificatory rationalism can be true or false independently of each other. Further, it 
is hard to see how any possible descriptive information might have an impact on justificatory 
rationalism as it is ex hypothesi an attempt to base morality on a priori considerations and thus almost 
no empirical data (other than perhaps if we were to discover that no one existed that met the 
requirements for being rational) could show that we cannot justify our actions rationally.  This is not 
to say that justificatory rationalism is in any way vindicated by the lack of bearing these empirical 
issues have on it. For it may turn out that we cannot rationally justify the content of our moral 
judgments purely by providing an a priori argument – they may in fact be unjustified. The important 
point is that empirical data or the truth of Nichols’ versions of rationalism does not impact on the truth 
of the justificatory rationalism.  
So, Nichols’ interpretations of the claims moral rationalism makes are somewhat off target, and thus 
his conclusion that ‘moral rationalism’ in general is too strong, simply because it misses what is 
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perhaps the main motivation and idea of moral rationalism. Nevertheless, while his arguments do not 
generalise to all of moral rationalism, Nichols is still correct that both conceptual and empirical 
rationalism are claims of interest and importance. In the next sections I examine Nichols’ arguments 
from the psychological evidence to conclusions about empirical and conceptual rationalism, beginning 
with empirical rationalism.   
 
6.2.2 Empirical rationalism 
The idea of empirical rationalism is that moral judgments are the result of a rational mental process. 
When one makes a novel moral judgment about some issue or event, according to the empirical 
rationalist the judgment is caused by or generated from, some kind of process of reasoning or rational 
deliberation. Empirical rationalism holds that moral judgments are always the result of a rational 
process: it is not simply the view that moral judgments sometimes causally flow from rational faculties, 
for if this was the thesis, then it would be straightforwardly true. Nichols gives the following example 
that shows this. Sometimes we trust a person’s moral views on a range of issues. On this basis, we 
might accept their testimony that it is morally wrong to buy new furniture made from the wood of 
old-growth forests and come to hold this view ourselves. Thus it looks like we have reasoned our way 
to a conclusion that buying such furniture is morally wrong.302 If cases such as this were all that was 
required to show empirical rationalism is true, then it would be an easily established, but relatively 
unimportant thesis.303 However, the point of empirical rationalism is supposed to be that rational 
faculties are the “basic font of our moral judgment”304 – that all moral judgments if traced back to the 
original evaluation that gave rise to them, are ultimately the result of rational deliberative processes. 
Thus, in the above example, an empirical rationalist would hold that not only was the derivative moral 
 
302 Shaun Nichols, ‘Moral Rationalism and Empirical Immunity’, p. 395.  
303 Easy because we would need only to confirm some cases like the above exist, and unimportant because it 




judgment arrived at rationally, but that the original judgment made by the person whose moral views 
we trust, necessarily ‘stemmed’ from, or was caused by, a rational deliberative process. So, Nichol’s 
empirical rationalism is the thesis that all moral judgments originate at their source, from a rational 
process of deliberation.  
Empirical rationalism appears to be a purely descriptive thesis: it simply characterises the proximal 
mechanisms involved in making novel or original moral judgments as a rational process of 
deliberation. As such it appears to be a thesis that suitable research in moral psychology could provide 
evidence for or against. Despite empirical rationalism’s apparently purely descriptive nature, 
philosophy has a long history of theorising about the capacities involved in making moral judgments 
and their relationship to the nature of morality.  One of the reasons for this interest in people’s 
perceptions of having moral obligations is the thought that “many of the deepest issues concerning 
the nature of morality would be illuminated if we had an adequate account of the nature of moral 
judgment.”305 One of the issues which Nichols thinks could be resolved is that if empirical rationalism 
turned out to be true – if human moral judgment were the product of a rational reasoning process, 
then this fact would provide “justification for thinking that human morality is in fact objective.”306 The 
reason for this is because if moral judgment derives from our rational faculties, then everyone who 
has such faculties should arrive at the same moral views. On this point Nichols references Michael 
Smith who makes the analogy between our convergence on mathematical truths due to a shared 
capacity for reasoning and morality: 
…something like such a convergence in mathematical practice lies behind our 
conviction that mathematical claims enjoy a privileged rational status. So why not 
think that a like convergence in moral practice would show that moral judgments 
enjoy the same privileged rational status?307 
 
305 Ibid., p.398.  
306 Shaun Nichols, Sentimental rules: On the natural foundation of moral judgment, p. 71 
307 Michael Smith, ‘Realism’, p. 408. 
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Based on this analogy, Nichols offers a second characterization of empirical rationalism:  
The psychological capacities underlying moral judgment are, like the psychological 
capacities underlying mathematical judgment, rational mechanisms.308  
So, Nichols thinks that an important implication for moral philosophy of such an empirical rationalism 
being correct is that all rational creatures could converge on agreement about moral claims in the 
same way they do about mathematical claims. The result of this would be that these moral claims 
could be seen to have a special status of objective ‘correctness’.309 Thus, while empirical rationalism 
is itself a purely descriptive claim, Nichols argues that it can be used to argue for a philosophical 
position with potential philosophical and normative importance: that morality is in an important sense 
objective.310  
Nichols argues that evidence from psychology concerning psychopathy shows that empirical 
rationalism is false. The basic idea of Nichols’ argument is simple: people who are classified as 
psychopaths appear to have intact rational capacities (indeed, in some cases what might be 
considered exceptionally well-developed rational abilities), and yet they are unable to make and 
properly comprehend genuine moral judgements. Thus psychopaths appear to have the pre-requisites 
for making moral judgments according to the empirical moral rationalist, and yet, without exception, 
they are deficient in their capacity to do so. This, according to Nichols’ argument, indicates that 
rational deliberation is not sufficient for making moral judgments.   
However, there are two difficulties with Nichols’ argument; a philosophical problem and a problem 
with the empirical evidence he cites. The philosophical issue is that the question of whether 
 
308 Shaun Nichols, Sentimental rules: On the natural foundation of moral judgment, p. 69 
309 Ibid., p. 72.  
310 There is much needed filling out of what is meant by this, which Nichols doesn’t do, which makes it difficult 
to be sure what his conception of objectivity is (although of course this is itself a difficult task and any provided 
conception of objectivity is likely to be controversial). The claim that morality is objective appears to be a 
descriptive claim, but like much of metaethics it is not clear that this is completely true. If I claim that some or 
all moral claims are objective, then I am (according to many philosophers) saying that it is True with a capital T 
that you must do some things – and this sounds normative.  
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psychopaths are able to make moral judgments is dependent upon how we interpret the concept of 
‘moral judgment’.  Second, the evidence concerning psychopaths’ capacity for moral judgment that 
Nichols cites is significantly limited in the scope of its relevance to the broad range of moral judgments 
that people make, and there are serious empirically backed doubts about the validity of the 
moral/conventional distinction upon which Nichols’ evidence about psychopaths depends. I discuss 
these two objections in the following sections.  
 
6.2.2.1 What is wrong with psychopaths? 
Nichols uses evidence from R. James Blair’s work on the performance of psychopaths on the 
‘moral/conventional task’ to support his argument.311  The moral/conventional task, pioneered in 
research conducted by Elliot Turiel, aims to empirically explore the development of people’s ability to 
distinguish what Turiel termed ‘moral rules’ from ‘conventional rules’. According to this research, 
moral rules are characterized as “unconditionally obligatory, generalizable, and impersonal insofar as 
they stem from concepts of welfare, justice, and rights.” 312  In contrast, conventional rules are 
characterized as “part of constitutive systems and are shared behaviours (uniformities, rules) whose 
meanings are defined by the constituted system in which they are embedded”.313 Moral rules have 
the following features: 
• Moral rules are not dependent on the authority of any individual or institution: they apply no 
matter what someone else says. 
• Moral rules are generalizable: not only do they apply here and now, they apply to other 
contexts, including other locations and at other times in history. 
• Moral rule transgressions typically involve injustice, harm to specific individuals, or rights 
violations. 
 
311 Shaun Nichols, Sentimental rules: On the natural foundation of moral judgment, p. 76. 
312 E. M. Turiel, ‘Morality: Its structure, functions, and vagaries’, pp. 169-170. 
313 Ibid.  
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• Moral rule transgressions are considered much more serious than violations of conventional 
rules. 
Conventional rules differ from moral rules in the following ways: 
• Conventional rules are rules that facilitate social coordination and organization. Accordingly, 
they can be suspended or changed by an authority or institution. 
• Conventional rules are applicable only in their original contexts. They do not generalize to 
other locations or times in history. 
• Transgressions of conventional rules do not involve injustice, harm, or rights violations. 
• Transgressions of conventional rules are less serious than violations of moral rules.314 
Nichols’s examples of moral violations include pulling another person’s hair, stealing, pushing another 
child off a swing, and hitting another person. Examples of conventional rule violations include chewing 
gum in a class, violations of etiquette (e.g. drinking soup from a bowl), and violations of family rules 
such as not clearing one’s dishes.  
Nichols claims that Blair’s evidence concerning psychopaths’ performance on the moral/conventional 
task shows that “psychopaths really do have a defective understanding of moral violations.”315 Their 
defective understanding consists in the fact that although psychopaths generally appear to know right 
from wrong – they are readily able and willing to pronounce that it is wrong to break into houses, 
wrong to rob a bank, or wrong to hit others – they do not appear to make any distinction between 
these kinds of moral violations and the much less serious non-moral violations of rules or conventions. 
Non-psychopathic individuals make significant distinctions concerning permissibility, seriousness, and 
authority contingence on the moral/conventional task.316 Psychopaths do not make any distinctions 
on these dimensions. Further, the justifications psychopaths give for moral rules typically resemble 
 
314 List of the characteristics of moral/conventional norms adapted from Daniel Kelly and Stephen Stich et al., 
‘Harm, affect, and the moral/conventional distinction’, p. 118. 
315 Shaun Nichols, Sentimental rules: On the natural foundation of moral judgment, p. 76.   
316 R. J. R. Blair, ‘A cognitive developmental approach to morality: investigating the psychopath’.  
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the justifications non-psychopathic subjects give for conventional rules, and rarely refer to the welfare 
of victims or the harm done to them as non-psychopaths do when attempting to justify moral norms. 
As Nichols summarises psychopaths’ deficiency, “although there is a sense in which psychopaths do 
know right from wrong, they don’t know (conventional) wrong from (moral) wrong.”317 
Thus, Nichols thinks that we are justified in maintaining that psychopaths do not qualify as making 
moral judgments, despite their being apparently fully rational. If this is the case, then the argument 
against empirical rationalism could go through by citing a real world, actual example of individuals 
who are fully rational and yet do not make moral judgements.  
However, the status of psychopaths’ moral judgment-making capacities is not clear-cut. Psychopaths 
do appear to make the same kinds of pronouncements on moral questions as non-psychopathic 
individuals, but they do not appear to be motivated by moral prohibitions in the same way normal 
people are.318 Therefore, to settle the question of whether the existence of psychopaths shows that 
empirical rationalism is false, we must be clear about whether this lack of motivation amounts to the 
fact that we should not attribute to them the capacity to make ‘moral judgments’. Does the lack of 
ability to be motivated to act on moral pronouncements mean that a moral judgment has not been 
made?  
This appears to be a problem for Nichols’ argument against empirical rationalism, for the question 
appears to depend on the answer to a conceptual question; it is not simply a matter of looking at the 
evidence. This conceptual question is at the heart of a familiar debate in metaethics about moral 
motivation. On one side of this debate is the view known as moral motivation internalism (simply 
‘internalism’ hereafter). This is the view that one cannot make a sincere moral judgment without being 
necessarily motivated, at least to some degree, to act in accordance with that judgment. The opposing 
view, moral motivation externalism (hereafter ‘externalism’) holds that one can make a moral 
 
317 Shaun Nichols, Sentimental rules: On the natural foundation of moral judgment, pp. 76-77. 
318 Ibid., p77.  
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judgment without being motivated to abide by that judgment: there is no necessary connection 
between moral judgment and motivation. According to externalists, while moral judgments do 
typically cause people to act, the impact that moral judgments have on individuals’ deliberations and 
actions varies widely, and it is entirely possible to make a moral judgment without being personally 
motivated by it.319  
Thus, if we think an internalist concept of ‘moral judgment’ is the correct conception to use, then 
psychopaths cannot be said to be making moral judgments, since they do not appear to be 
appropriately motivated by moral judgments or to fully understand their motivational force, 
importance, or seriousness. Therefore, if our picture of moral judgment is that of internalism, then 
psychopaths do present a counter-example to empirical rationalism, for they have full rational 
capacities but do not make genuine moral judgments. At best they could be said to make ‘moral 
judgments’ in the inverted commas sense.320 However, if the conception of moral judgment we accept 
is an externalist one, then psychopaths present no difficulty for the empirical rationalist. Under an 
externalist conception, psychopaths meet the requirements for making genuine moral judgments, as 
it is not a necessary condition that they be motivated by the moral judgments they make. The 
externalist concept of moral judgment is ipso facto one that does not require motivation as a 
necessary element.  
There is no consensus in metaethics concerning which account of moral motivation is correct or what 
the implications of differing accounts are.321 While the debate between internalism and externalism 
is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is sufficient to note that this debate has resulted in something of 
an impasse, with each side presenting an array of examples in the hope of triggering intuitions they 
 
319 For an overview of the motivation internalism debate see Gunnar Björnsson, Caj Strandberg, Ragnar F. 
Olinder, John Eriksson, Fredrik Björklund, Motivational internalism: contemporary debates. 
320 This is a typical response to cases such as psychopaths or the ‘rational amoralist’, see §6.2.3  
321  Gunnar Björnsson, Caj Strandberg, Ragnar F. Olinder, John Eriksson, Fredrik Björklund, Motivational 
internalism: contemporary debates, pp. 12-16.  
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feel support their position.322 The implication of this for Nichols’ argument is that it cannot simply 
assume one account of moral motivation, and without being able to do so, it is hard to see how 
evidence on psychopaths can be taken to provide a counter-example to the idea of empirical 
rationalism.  
 
6.2.2.2 The moral/conventional distinction 
The second difficulty for Nichols’ argument against empirical rationalism is that there are questions 
about the robustness of the moral/conventional distinction, especially with regards to its use or 
application for resolving questions about the nature of moral judgment itself. Early work on the 
moral/conventional distinction focused explicitly on developmental moral psychology and used young 
children as subjects.323 The examples of moral and conventional rule transgressions in such studies 
were of the kind that would be familiar to such children – transgressions such as hair pulling, pushing 
another child off a swing, or chewing gum in class. Subsequently the research was expanded to 
examine the responses of a wider range of subjects to the moral/conventional task. However, the 
range of transgressions used in the experimental task was not similarly expanded. Nearly all of the 
transgressions used in subsequent studies were of the same schoolyard variety as the early research 
– the kinds of examples used in the original studies so as to be familiar to very young subjects.  The 
evidence Nichols cites regarding psychopaths’ performance on the moral/conventional task also uses 
these kinds of transgressions, despite the fact that the subjects in question are convicted adult 
criminals in adult jails.324 Thus the evidence about the moral/conventional distinction is quite limited 
in its scope. There is a good chance that convicted criminals will view all of the schoolyard 
transgressions described as being of similar seriousness. It seems highly plausible that they might find 
 
322 For example, see R. Francén, ‘Moral motivation pluralism’ and Michael B. Gill, ‘Indeterminacy and variability 
in meta-ethics’ 
323 J. G. Smetana, 'Preschool children’s conceptions of transgressions: Effects of varying moral and conventional 
domain-related attributes' and D. Weston, E. Turiel, 'Act-Rule relations: Children's concepts of social rules'. 
324 R. Blair, ‘A cognitive developmental approach to morality: Investigating the psychopath’, and R. Blair, L. Jones, 
F. Clark, and M. Smith, ‘The psychopathic individual: A lack of responsiveness to distress cues’. 
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being caught chewing gum in class and a bit of schoolyard hair-pulling to both be at the less serious 
end of the scale of transgressions. Compared to serious transgressions such as murder or robbery or 
rape, the schoolyard-type transgressions are likely to be lumped together at the trivial end of the 
scale. Given that empirical rationalism is supposed to cover the whole range of moral judgments, 
Nichols’ argument is based on a very limited sample for the general conclusions about empirical 
rationalism that he reaches. 
This difficulty could be remedied by further research that considered a wider range of transgressions 
on both normal and psychopathic populations. If the same pattern of responses were found – if normal 
populations make the same distinctions and psychopaths do not – then we could be more confident 
that the research was representative of the full range of moral judgments. Part of this research has 
already been done. A study on non-psychopathic individuals was conducted by Kelly et al., who 
noticed this fact about all of the prior moral/conventional task studies using schoolyard type examples 
of behaviour.325 Kelly et al. examined people’s performance on the moral/conventional task using a 
much broader set of transgressions. They found that for the moral transgressions they tested 
(including, a captain of a cargo ship administering excessive discipline, abuse of military trainees, and 
cannibalism), most or all of the dimensions considered part of the signature moral response were 
missing or inconsistent. When more general, adult transgressions are used, the distinctive pattern of 
responses to the moral/conventional task is not evident. Subjects did not make the distinctions 
between authority independence, generalizability, or seriousness, which the paradigm predicts. As 
Kelly et al. focused only on a sample from the general population, there is no further data on 
psychopaths. However, even were such a study to be done, the Kelly et al. study suggests that there 
would not be a clear pattern of signature responses in the moral/conventional task that normal 
populations make to compare them too. They think that if they are correct, then their results suggest 
that “the moral/conventional task is not a good assay for the existence of a psychologically important 
 




distinction”,326 and thus we should be cautious about concluding too much about moral judgment 
based on these possibly questionable, and definitely narrowly sampled research results.   
 
6.2.2.3 Is empirical rationalism supported by the evidence? 
Empirical rationalism is the theory that moral judgments are produced by ‘rational’ mental faculties. 
It is one of two rationalist ideas that Nichols identifies as being impacted by empirical research in 
moral psychology. The philosophical importance of empirical rationalism comes from the idea of 
morality being objectively true in the same way that mathematical claims appear to be objectively 
true. In principle, it appears to be a question that is tractable to empirical methods, as the thesis simply 
describes which mental processes are at work when we make moral judgments.  However, Nichols’ 
attempt to use evidence concerning psychopaths to show that it is false faces two significant 
difficulties. The first is that it is not clear that the evidence shows something about moral judgment. 
Instead the evidence tells us something about moral motivation, what people do once they have made 
a judgment on some moral issue. This is a problem, as the debate about moral motivation is split into 
two broad camps: internalists and externalists. Only internalism holds that motivation is necessary to 
have made a moral judgment, and thus Nichols’ argument is only successful if we assume internalism 
is true. Thus, there is a conceptual issue that requires settling before the evidence can be useful in 
settling the empirical issue. 327  The second difficulty for Nichols’ argument is that the evidence 
concerning psychopaths makes use of research based on a distinction that requires further research 
before it is clear whether or not it is robust or psychologically real and important with respect to moral 
judgments in general. At the very least, studies involving psychopaths need to be done which test for 
more general kinds of moral transgressions. In the next section I evaluate Nichols’ claims concerning 
the second rationalist thesis: conceptual rationalism.  
 
326 ibid., p. 129.  
327 If indeed the dispute is solvable; it is possible that the concepts involved are not determinate enough for 




6.2.3 Conceptual Rationalism and moral motivation 
According to Nichols, the basic idea of his conceptual rationalism is that it is a conceptual truth that a 
moral requirement is a reason for action. As previously mentioned, this is one of a class of theories 
concerning the connection between making a moral judgment and the reasons or motivation to act in 
accord with that judgment, usually called ‘moral internalism’ (or just ‘internalism’).  
The core claim of internalism is that: 
If an agent judges they are morally required to ϕ, then they are at least to some 
extent motivated to ϕ. 328  
This will be referred to as the ‘simple’ version of internalism in what follows. It easy to see why this is 
an appealing position. We make moral judgments to provide guidance on what we ought to do, so it 
would be odd if there were no connection that tied the moral judgments made and the causes of 
actions following those judgments together. The opposing view, that an agent who makes a moral 
judgment need not be motivated by it, is termed ‘externalism’.  
However, the simple version of internalism is often taken to be saying too much, as it implies there 
are no cases where moral judgment and moral motivation can exist without each other. The 
externalist argues we can countenance ‘amoralists’ who we can conceive of making a moral judgment, 
but not being motivated to act accordingly. The internalist response is to argue that when this 
happens, it can be explained in a number of ways that does not impugn the internalist intuition that 
moral motivation is inherent to the concept of moral judgment.  The explanations given might be that 
it is because of some psychological malady such as apathy, depression, exhaustion, emotional 
disturbance or simply a lack of rationality. In response to this, the simple version of internalism is 
 
328  Gunnar Björnsson, Caj Strandberg, Ragnar F. Olinder, John Eriksson, Fredrik Björklund, Motivational 
internalism: contemporary debates, p. 7. Note that the wording has been changed to be in line with that used 
by Michael Smith’s Practicality Requirement below, but nothing hinges on this for the present purposes.  
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usually refined to account for these potential conditions by adding a caveat that the motivation need 
not follow judgment if certain conditions obtain: 
If an agent judges they are morally required to ϕ, then they are at least to some 
extent motivated to ϕ, as long as not condition C. 
The condition C describes the type of defect the amoralist suffers from that allows us to explain their 
lack of moral motivation. In surveying the literature, Bjornson et al. identified three broad kinds of 
conditions that defenders of internalism have offered as a way of accounting for cases where 
motivation is lacking without these cases constituting ‘amoralist’ counterexamples:329 
1. Psychologically abnormal: Normal psychological functioning is required for motivation to be 
expected as a result of moral judgment. Thus, moral judgments will be motivating except in 
cases where the agent is not in a psychologically normal state: where they are depressed, 
apathetic, exhausted, emotionally disturbed, or in some other disordered mental condition. 
2. Morally imperceptive: If an agent does not truly perceive the moral nature of a judgment, they 
may appear to make moral judgments but are really ‘going through the motions’ and thus a 
lack of associated motivation can be explained.   
3. Practically irrational: The types of conditions outlined in 1. above are mitigating factors 
because in some sense they remove from the agent in question the fullness of their usual 
deliberative abilities and rational control over actions and desires.  That is, we expect moral 
judgments to imply motivation to some degree when an agent is rational. A lack of moral 
motivation following a moral judgment can be explained if we know the agent is not rational.  
 
 
329 Ibid., p. 7.  
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The variety of internalism that Nichols identifies as his target as part of his argument against 
conceptual rationalism is of this last kind, in particular a version defended by Michael Smith.330 This 
feature of this form of internalism Smith terms the ‘Practicality Requirement’331:  
If an agent judges that it is right for her to ϕ in circumstances C, then either she is 
motivated to ϕ in C or she is practically irrational.332  
According to the Practicality Requirement, if an agent makes a moral judgment and they are rational, 
they will be motivated to act in accordance with the moral judgement.  Conversely, the Practicality 
Requirement implies that if the agent were irrational, it would be no contradiction to the truth of 
conceptual rationalism if they were to make a moral judgment but did not act in accord with that 
judgment.   
Nichols argues that the concept people hold of a psychopath provides us with a counter-example to 
the Practicality Requirement. Nichols holds that because psychopaths are taken to be rational, they 
cannot fall under the group that are ‘practically irrational’ and yet, for psychopaths, moral judgments 
and moral motivation do not go hand in hand. Nichols argues therefore that the concept of a 
psychopath is that they are rational, they know what is right or wrong, but simply do not care and thus 
are not influenced by those judgments.  
However, instead of going down the usual path of conceptual analysis to attempt to establish this 
conclusion about the features of our concept of a psychopath (which as noted earlier, he argues 
readily devolves into a stalemate), Nichols attempts to use empirical evidence to settle the debate.  
 
330 Nichols is explicit his target is Smith’s Internalism and the Practicality Requirement, see Sentimental rules: On 
the natural foundation of moral judgment, p. 71.   
331 Nichols writes “For current purposes, the crucial feature of conceptual rationalism is its account of the link 
between moral judgment and motivation. Smith maintains that conceptual rationalism entails the Practicality 
Requirement, according to which ‘It is supposed to be a conceptual truth that agents who make moral judgments 
are motivated accordingly, at least absent weakness of the will and the like’ (Smith 1994, 66).” Note that this is 
not Smith’s definition of the Practicality Requirement which Smith explicitly gives on p. 61 and labels as such on 
p. 62. Instead what Nichols identifies it is part of a comment Smith makes about the Practicality Requirement 
on p. 66. Smith’s actual definition is as provided above.  
332 Michael Smith, The moral problem, p. 61. 
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Nichols carried out surveys of undergraduate students by presenting them with vignettes about a 
fictional psychopath ‘John’ who says he knows that it is wrong to hurt other people but does not care 
if he does things that are wrong. Survey respondents are then asked “Does John really understand 
that hurting others is morally wrong?” with the intention of establishing whether respondents’ 
concepts of moral judgment includes that John could be making a real moral judgment without being 
motivated by it. The full description and question given to survey participants is as follows333:  
Description: John is a psychopathic criminal. He is an adult of normal intelligence, 
but he has no emotional reaction to hurting other people. John has hurt and 
indeed killed other people when he has wanted to steal their money. He says that 
he knows that hurting others is wrong, but that he just doesn’t care if he does 
things that are wrong.  
Question: Does John really understand that hurting others is morally wrong? 
The responses to the survey were that nearly 85% answered that John does understand that hurting 
others is morally wrong. Nichols concludes on the basis of this result that “the common conception of 
psychopaths is precisely that they really do know the difference between right and wrong, but they 
do not care about doing what’s right”334 and that “[c]ontrary to the conceptual rationalist claims, 
psychopaths are commonly regarded as rational individuals who really make moral judgments but are 
not motivated by them.”335  
There are a number of comments to make about Nichols’ argument here. Firstly, as Daniel Eggers has 
noted, Nichols’ questions do not focus strongly on moral motivation. 336  The description Nichols’ 
survey gives of John does not make it explicit that John lacks moral motivation.  The only indication 
given is John’s self-report that “he just doesn’t care if he does things that are wrong”, and it is not 
 
333 Shaun Nichols, Sentimental rules: On the natural foundation of moral judgment, p. 74. 
334 Ibid. 
335 Shaun Nichols, Sentimental rules: On the natural foundation of moral judgment, p. 82.  
336 Daniel Eggers, ‘Unconditional motivational internalism and Hume's lesson, p. 100. 
182 
 
clear that the concepts of ‘not caring’ that things are wrong and ‘lacking all moral motivation’ are the 
same thing; it certainly is not an explicit connection.  
The second thing to note is that while Nichols’ evidence may provide prima facie support for rejecting 
the simple version of internalism, it is less clear that his argument can apply in the way he claims to 
Smith’s conditionalized version: to the Practicality Requirement. Nichols has targeted his view at 
Smith’s version because it is apparently about rationality, something that is purportedly not a 
deficiency of psychopaths.337 However, as pointed out by Caj Strandberg and Fredrik Björklund,338 
Nichols’ description does not mention practical rationality, or in fact, rationality at all. The only 
comment that comes close is that John is of ‘normal intelligence’. There is nothing in the description 
that directly addresses the question of whether a psychopath could be considered ‘practically 
irrational’ and one can suffer from any number of rational defects while still being of normal 
intelligence. Thus, it is entirely possible that participants responded that John did understand that 
hurting others was wrong, but with the idea in mind that he is also not a rational person (or is suffering 
from some condition that would constitute practical irrationality). The above two considerations mean 
Nichols argument in its current form is not successful; the evidence Nichols gives does not show 
Smith’s version of internalism to be false. However, this is not necessarily fatal, it would be possible 
to modify the description of John to explicitly check that respondents thought he was not practically 
irrational.  
Strandberg and Björklund set out to do this by attempting to replicate Nichols results but also refining 
them with explicit checks so as to avoid these objections. They undertook surveys which describe 
various actors in different mental conditions and attempt to more carefully formulate their scenarios.  
 
337 Nichols examines the possibility that psychopaths suffer from a systematic defect in their faculty of reason 
but rejects the possibility, see Shaun Nichols, Sentimental rules: On the natural foundation of moral judgment., 
pp. 78-81. 
338 Caj Strandberg and Fredrik Björklund, ‘Is moral internalism supported by folk intuitions?’  
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 They began by providing a simple scenario to test people’s responses about moral motivation, then 
varied it by adding in additional pieces of information. The simple scenario was: 
Simple: Anna is watching a TV programme about a famine in Sudan. In the TV 
programme, it is shown how the starving are suffering and desperately looking for 
food. At the same time, Anna is not motivated at all, not to any extent, to give any 
money to those who are starving. 
Question: Could it be the case that Anna thinks she is morally required to give 
some of her money to the starving even if she not motivated at all to do so? 
The variations on this initial scenario included stipulating that Anna is mentally healthy and normal or 
that she was apathetic, deeply depressed or a psychopath, and her lack of motivation in these later 
cases was due to the condition described in each.  Contrary to Nichols’ results, a majority of the 
participants responded in ways indicating that both simple and conditional versions of internalism are 
not supported by the linguistic intuitions of the sampled population. For the Simple case, a majority 
of respondents affirm that Anna is making a moral judgment despite not being motivated to act 
accordingly. In the cases where it is also specified that Anna is mentally ‘normal functioning’, a 
majority of respondents reported it was possible that Anna made a moral judgment without 
motivation. The cases where Anna is described as apathetic or deeply depressed also had majorities 
of respondents affirming an externalist understanding of the concept of moral judgment where 
motivation did not necessarily follow. Interestingly in the Psychopath case only a minority of 
respondents said it was possible Anna made a moral judgment without being motivated by it. This is 
the opposite result to that reported in Nichols’ survey (and the only result that might support an 
internalist conception of moral motivation which would run counter to Nichols’ argument).  
Thus, according to Strandberg and Bjorklund’s study a majority of the participants regarded it as 
entirely possible that someone can make a moral judgment without being motivated by that 
judgment.  They conclude that this is “contrary to what they [respondents] should be expected to do 
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on the assumption that any of these internalist claims were correct”339 and that simple and conditional 
internalism do not appear to be supported by the folk intuitions of the study participants. The 
modifications to the surveys that Strandberg and Bjorklund made address the criticisms raised earlier 
against Nichols’ survey, while the results are contrary to those of Nichols. However, there are other 
difficulties for Nichols and Strandberg and Bjorklund’s conclusions. The difficulties concern the 
forcefulness of their claims, when it is not clear that the evidence actually supports such strong 
conclusions. The reason for this is the manner in which the empirical results are interpreted as 
supporting or not supporting their conclusions. The nature of the support that a majority of survey 
respondents provides for a philosophical conclusion is left unexamined and looks likely to be a 
significant weakness for their arguments.   
In both Nichols and Strandberg and Bjorklund’s studies, agreement by a majority of anywhere from 
60% to 84% of respondents in a survey is taken as more or less conclusive that the conceptual feature 
identified is a platitude about that concept.  So even in the case with the highest majority, where 84% 
of Nichols’ respondents said that John the psychopath made moral judgments but was not 
motivated,340 16% of respondents held the contrary view. In Strandberg & Bjorklund’s experiments 
the results were even less conclusive. The majorities were Simple: 76%, Normal functioning: 79%, 
Apathy: 60%, Depression: 79%. The least conclusive case is precisely that which Nichols argument is 
based on – Psychopath, where 42% of the respondents had externalist intuitions about motivation, 
which means presumably that the remaining 58% of respondents had internalist intuitions. This is not 
a result that can be interpreted as providing clear support for either camp. Focusing on the actual 
figures for different responses in the surveys shows that while there may be a majority in each case, 
this does not constitute a consensus, or anything close to it, about people’s intuitions about cases of 
moral judgment and corresponding moral motivation.  
 
339 Ibid., p. 335.  
340 Shaun Nichols, ‘Is it irrational to be amoral? How psychopaths threaten moral rationalism’, p. 289.  
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What then should we make of the fact that for some it is a platitude that an individual can be judged 
as rational and make a moral judgment without it being motivating, while for others (a minority in 
most of the tested cases, but still large proportions of the respondents) this is not a possibility? The 
way in which Nichols and Strandberg and Björklund appear to be interpreting the results is that if there 
is any majority (although if that is indeed the cut-off point it is not made explicit anywhere), then the 
result is taken as wholesale and decisive evidence supporting only one interpretation of the concept. 
But interpreting the results in this way misconstrues the results of the survey. For what this kind of 
evidence is really telling us about respondents’ intuitions is something quite different to a decisive 
verdict on a concept. A more accurate interpretation would be one of two possibilities.  
The first possibility is that different respondents may have interpreted the question in different ways 
(or comprehended the content and facts of the situation differently). For example, in Nichols’ 
questionnaire, some may have had the expectation that John is practically rational based on the 
comment that “he is of normal intelligence” whereas others may have not interpreted this as any kind 
of commentary on his practical rationality. If this is the case, then the results of the surveys do not 
reflect the participants’ intuitions on the intended question.  
Alternatively, where the interpretation of the scenario by participants is relatively uniform and the 
questions are well elaborated and explicit about features of concepts they are examining, different 
proportions of respondents having differing intuitions may simply be due to not sharing the same 
platitudes about the concept in question. What the surveys discover, if this is the case is, that there is 
no single interpretation or meaning of the concepts involved – respondents have differing working 
analyses of that concept.   
Where 42% answer in one way, and 58% another, such as in Strandberg and Bjorklund’s psychopath 
case, all we can actually know about this sample is that there is disagreement with marginally under 
half categorising it into one of the two options, and remainder into the other option of those 
presented in the survey. Even if we did have a representative sample of everyone who used these 
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concepts, a mixed result would still leave us with a question of interpretation that must be addressed. 
This problem of reconciling different intuitions in conceptual analysis is not a new one; essentially, we 
are back to the same situation as that faced in traditional conceptual analysis where different 
philosophers do not share intuitions. 341  In such situations of conflicting intuitions there is no 
established or agreed upon procedure for resolution, beyond focusing on the arguments for each 
position, or trying again with different thought experiments in the hope of eliciting more consistent 
or persuasive intuitions.342  
For now, I will simply conclude that much more would need to be said for Nichols, Strandberg and 
Bjorklund to have been successful in establishing arguments that would or should be accepted by 
moral internalists or externalists as settling the issue one way or the other. Especially, given the known 
lack of diversity in the samples in the studies presented (which surveyed groups of undergraduates at 
the respective universities of Nichols, Strandberg and Bjorklund), we should refrain from drawing 
conclusions based on these results as indicative of anything about the concepts themselves.  At most, 
their surveys establish that there is some variability of concepts of moral judgment and the modality 
of the link between moral judgment and moral motivation within philosophically untrained 
undergraduates.  This variability appears to be sensitive to a number of influencing factors, as 
highlighted by Strandberg and Bjorklund, but not limited to those they identify. The variability in 
 
341 There are some interesting differences in analysing the differences between the traditional first-person 
approach to conceptual analysis and a third-person approach. For a comparison of the merits see Kirk Ludwig, 
‘The epistemology of thought experiments: first person versus third person approaches.’ Ludwig examines 
among other factors, “how…[survey respondents] understand the task, their background beliefs, empirical and 
nonempirical, how they think what they say will be taken, loose analogies they may draw with other sorts of 
situations, how they understand the scenario, whether they pay adequate attention to relevant details, whether 
they think clearly and hard enough to see what to say in response to the kind of question asked, assuming they 
understand it correctly, how they think that their interlocutor will (or interlocutors generally would) understand 
what they say or more generally what they would be trying to convey by what they say or how they respond, as 
well as perhaps various shortcuts or rules of thumb in reasoning, or plain mistakes”, p. 144. 
342 It has also been argued that intuitions of these sorts are not actually the basis of conceptual analysis – at least 
not in the sense of being evidence for or against a particular interpretation of a concept. Instead, while 
conceptual analysis may make use of hypothetical cases or thought experiments and intuitive reactions to these 
scenarios, it is the arguments that philosophers make about these intuitions that should more rightly be treated 
as the evidence for the claims in question. See Max Deutsch, The myth of the intuitive: Experimental philosophy 
and philosophical method for a defense of this theory. Such a thesis would make the present empirical results 
interesting, but not helpful in settling matters.   
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intuitions is interesting, and it may be that the irresolvability of the issues around moral motivation is 
partly due to this variation and different understandings – the concepts involved may simply not be 
determinate enough, in the sense of everyone sharing the same meanings. 
 
6.3 Adina Roskies and moral motivation internalism 
Adina Roskies has advanced an argument that is similar to that made by Nichols. Roskies however has 
focused expressly on motivational internalism rather than conceptual rationalism. Roskies contends 
that motivation internalism can be shown to be false based on empirical considerations. She argues 
that certain brain-damaged patients constitute walking counterexamples to an internalist conception 
of moral judgment and further that her argument “stands as an example of how empirical evidence 
can be relevantly brought to bear on a philosophical question typically viewed to be a priori.”343  
Roskies formulation of motivation internalism that is the target of her argument is as follows: 
If an agent believes that it is right to Φ in circumstances C, then he is motivated to 
Φ in C344 
This view is what she calls the ‘substantive internalist thesis’. She argues that this substantive 
internalist claim is false and can be shown to be so due to empirical evidence. Roskies’ walking 
counterexamples which show the substantive internalist thesis to be false are patients who have 
suffered damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex area of the brain later in life (hereafter VM 
patients). These VM patients have what neuroscientist Antonio Damasio has termed ‘acquired 
sociopathy’.  They are able to make appropriate moral judgments when queried and appear to make 
the same judgments as normal people. Despite this capability to make moral judgments, their ability 
 
343 Adina Roskies, ‘Are ethical judgments intrinsically motivational? Lessons from “acquired sociopathy”’, p. 52. 
344 Ibid., p. 55. 
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to act effectively on these judgments is impaired. They report and display a lack (or reduced intensity) 
of affect when faced with moral situations that reliably elicit emotions in normal subjects. 345 
Roskies interprets the character of VM patients’ acquired sociopathy to have two features that are 
important for her argument. Firstly, their mastery of the concept of moral judgment and ability to 
employ it normally in making moral judgments means they are suitable test subjects for investigating 
the connection between moral judgment and motivation. The second relevant feature that Roskies 
argues VM patients display is that they show a striking lack of motivation following many of the moral 
judgments that they make. Together these two features mean that VM patients constitute a 
counterexample to the idea that motivation is necessarily part of the concept of moral judgment, as 
they are agents who make such judgments, but are not motivated by them. Note that VM patients 
need not be lacking motivation following all the moral judgments they make, the conceptual 
possibility could be demonstrated by VM patients only sometimes lacking motivation following a 
moral judgment.  
In defence of the first of these characteristics, that VM patients should count as making real moral 
judgments, Roskies argues there is no evidence or reason to think that VM patients who were 
previously competent at moral judgment subsequently lose this capability. Tests and interviews with 
VM patients show no sign that they lose their mastery of moral language or ability to reason about 
moral ideas.346 There is also no evidence to show that VMPFC lesions affect declarative knowledge of 
any kind, including knowledge about moral norms and categories of moral behaviour. Unlike 
psychopaths, VM patients can be presumed to have functioned at a normal level of moral competency 
prior to their injuries. To avoid being entirely ad hoc, any argument that VM patients lack mastery of 
moral knowledge will have to explain why and how they happen to lack this knowledge despite there 
 
345 General characterisation of VM patients adapted from Ibid., pp. 56-57.  
346 For example, VM patients appear to respond with normal competency in structured interviews that attempt 
to assess the level of moral competency on Kohlberg's moral reasoning scale. See J. L. Saver & A. R. Damasio, 




being no apparent deficit or independent reason to expect a deficit. Roskies highlights this 
analogously: it might be plausible to maintain that a congenitally blind person never has full 
knowledge of colour terms, but it would be implausible to argue that a newly blind (or person closing 
their eyes) suddenly loses knowledge of the meaning of colour terms if they happen continue to use 
those terms in the same way once they can no longer see.347  
Additionally, to argue that VM patients only make moral judgments in some inverted commas sense 
would also appear to be groundless.  Unlike the prototypical ‘amoralist’ of philosophical literature, 
with VM patients there is no reason to believe they wish to seem as though they make moral 
judgments (either consciously or otherwise) while in reality attempting to hide their real intentions so 
as to appear as a genuinely morally concerned individual. VM patients respond to experimenters 
similarly about their moral and non-moral beliefs without apparent incongruity or apparent intention 
to deceive listeners about the real nature of their character. These considerations lead Roskies to be 
confident in the view that the ability of VM patients to make moral judgments is undisturbed.    
The above assessment appears to be persuasive; at least when applied to abstract reasoning about 
moral situations of the kinds involved in studies of VM patients’ moral judgment making abilities. 
However, importantly for Roskies’ argument, the moral judgments that VM patients make, also need 
to be tested for accompanying motivation. Jeanette Kennett and Cordelia Fine have noted that in the 
studies of VM patients that Roskies uses as evidence, the scenarios presented to subjects are all moral 
situations that are both hypothetical and are posed in the third person.348  The cited studies require 
that the subject respond to moral dilemmas that involve making judgments about how the 
hypothetical participants in a moral dilemma ought to act. They contrast this with what they term 
first-personal ‘in situ’ moral reasoning – where subjects would make judgments about how they 
themselves should act in a given moral dilemma.  
 
347 Ibid., p. 60.  
348 Jeanette Kennett, Cordelia Fine, ‘Internalism and the evidence from psychopaths and "acquired sociopaths"’, 
pp 181-183, and ‘Could there be an empirical test for internalism?’, pp. 220-224. 
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Kennett and Fine argue that these hypothetical third-personal scenarios are not a good test for 
whether VM patients lack motivation following moral judgment. The reason for this is that such third-
personal scenarios do not constitute a situation in which the subject of the interview are ever 
themselves be motivated to act. For moral judgments of these kinds, in these circumstances, the only 
possible actors in the scenarios are third parties who also happen to be hypothetical.  Thus, Kennett 
and Fine argue that the evidence Roskies presents about VM patients’ ability to make moral 
judgments, focuses on moral judgments of a kind that could not be used to disconfirm moral 
internalism. The kind of moral judgment used to test for moral motivation must be one where the 
moral judgment is made by the subject about their own current situation and actions; it must be a 
first-personal in situ moral judgment.349 
Roskies and Michael Smith both separately complain that this restriction to first person in situ 
judgments mis-understands the nature of moral requirements and looks unnecessarily ad hoc.350 They 
interpret the conclusion of Kennett and Fine’s argument as a view on the nature of internalism (that 
it is only applicable to first personal in situ circumstances) and as a restriction on when we should 
expect moral motivation to follow moral judgment according to motivation internalism.351  Smith and 
Roskies argue that moral requirements are by their nature applicable and motivating to all parties at 
all times; they do not stop being applicable or motivating simply because the judging agent is not 
themselves involved in a situation requiring an immediate moral choice and action. But this is a 
misinterpretation of what Kennett and Fine are arguing; their requirement that the relevant kind of 
moral judgments are first person in situ judgments is solely for the purposes of empirically verifying 
whether VM patients constitute a counterexample to motivational internalism. Kennett and Fine are 
 
349 Jeanette Kennett, Cordelia Fine, ‘Internalism and the evidence from psychopaths and "acquired sociopaths"’, 
p. 182.  
350 Michael Smith, ‘The truth about internalism’, pp. 208-210, and Adina Roskies ‘Internalism and the evidence 
from pathology’, pp. 194-195.  
351 Smith is quite explicit that this is his interpretation of their argument. He writes ”the conclusion of Kennett 
and Fine’s argument…is that we should restrict internalism to in situ judgments”, Ibid., p. 209, and “The version 
of internalism that Kennett and Fine propose…can be stated as follows: Other things being equal, if an agent 
makes the in situ judgment that she ought to φ in circumstances C—that is, if she judges that she ought to φ in 
circumstances C, believing herself to be in those circumstances—then she is motivated to φ.”, Ibid., p. 208.  
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not attempting to define a new more restricted version of internalism that their argument will apply 
to. Instead they are contending that for empirical tests of motivation internalism to be valid, the tests 
must use first personal in situ moral judgments instead of third personal hypothetical judgments. Thus, 
the research Roskies cites is not sufficient to show VM patients are making moral judgments that could 
be tested for motivation. This is not to say however, that such tests would be impossible; just that the 
such research has not yet been carried out.  
For the second consideration important for her argument, that VM patients are not motivated by 
moral judgments, Roskies provides two kinds of evidence: reports of the behaviour VM patients from 
case histories and the results of Skin-conductance response tests to ‘ethically charged’ situations. The 
reports of VM patient behaviour are limited, coming from descriptions of Phineas Gage and the VM 
patient referred to in the literature as ‘EVR’. Phineas Gage is a commonly mentioned figure in 
psychology and neuroscience, famous for surviving a severe brain injury from an iron tamping rod 
being driven through his head and for having notable personality and behavioural changes as a result 
of this accident.  His case was one of the first to suggest that damage to specific parts of the brain 
might differentially affect different capabilities or personality traits. 
However, there are significant challenges to using Gage as evidence about the nature of VM patients. 
At the time of his injury, reports in medical journals mostly focused on his surprising survival rather 
than on the impacts of the injury on his behaviour. The descriptions by his physician of his personality 
and behavioural changes were limited in length to a few hundred words, and have since been re-
interpreted and in many cases exaggerated to reflect varying theoretical assumptions of neurology 
depending on the theory in question.352 Further, the characterisation of Gage’s brain injury as being a 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex lesion is problematic- both due to limitations of the physical evidence 
(only his damaged skull is available for analysis) and the reports from the time of his injury in the mid-
 
352 For a critical analysis of how Gage has been presented and discussed in neuroscientific literature see Zbigniew 
Kotowicz, ‘The strange case of Phineas Gage’.  
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1800s. Modern attempts to pinpoint the location of the damage indicate trauma was likely to be 
limited to the left frontal lobe,353 while others indicate that the effect to other areas of the brain due 
to network connectedness was severe and widespread in addition to the trauma to the left frontal 
lobe.354 These considerations make Gage an unreliable source of evidence as a VM patient; it is not 
clear that his brain injury was limited just to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and our knowledge of 
his resulting behavioural impairment and case history is both limited and controversial.  
The evidence provided for EVR’s lack of moral motivation is more reliable, however it is still quite 
limited in quantity and the interpretation is contentious. Roskies cites Damasio’s description of EVR’s 
behaviour that he “…entered disastrous business ventures (one of which led to predictable 
bankruptcy), and was divorced twice (the second marriage, which was to a prostitute, only lasted 6 
months). He has been unable to hold any paying job since the time of the surgery, and his plans for 
future activity are defective.”355  From this Roskies concludes that “Clinical histories and observation 
suggest that VM patients are impaired in their ability to act effectively in many moral situations.”356 In 
response to criticisms about the limited nature of this evidence,357 Roskies cites a number of studies, 
but these do not address the motivational aspect of the evidence (that VM patients act immorally 
despite appearing to be competent moral judgers or are unmotivated by their judgments).358  
 
353 See Peter Ratiu, Ion-Florin Talos, , ‘The tale of Phineas Gage, digitally remastered’ 
354  See J. D. Van Horn, A. Irimia, C. M. Torgerson, M. C. Chambers, R. Kikinis, and A. W Toga, ‘Mapping 
connectivity damage in the case of Phineas Gage’ 
355 Adina Roskies, ‘Are ethical judgments intrinsically motivational? Lessons from “acquired sociopathy”’, p. 56 
356 Ibid., p. 57. 
357  See Jeanette Kennett, Cordelia Fine, ‘Internalism and the evidence from psychopaths and "acquired 
sociopaths"’, pp. 182-186. 
358 Roskies argues “Kennett and Fine are mistaken in claiming that my evidence comes entirely from the case 
study of EVR. This is the most detailed case study available in the literature, but similar studies have been carried 
out with other VM patients, with a similar profile of results (Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1990 [‘Individuals with 
sociopathic behavior caused by frontal damage fail to respond autonomically to social stimuli’]; Adolphs & 
Hauser, personal communication). A new study of seven VM patients (Young, Cushman, Adolphs, Tranel, & 
Hauser, 2006[‘Does emotion mediate the relationship between an action's moral status and its intentional 
status? Neuropsychological evidence’]) also shows that these patients’ judgments of moral culpability and 
intention mirror those of normals, in almost every way.” However, these studies do not address the motivational 
aspect or immoral behaviour of VM patients: the paper by Young, Cushman, Adolphs, Tranel, & Hauser discusses 
the contribution that affect makes to the decision-making process in VM patients; not the motivational state 
after such decisions have been made. The paper by Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio describes subjects who develop 
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The second kind of evidence Roskies proposes, to show VM patients lack of motivation following moral 
judgments, is their atypical Skin-Conductance Responses (SCR) to “ethically charged” scenarios 
presented to them during studies. Roskies notes that normal subjects produce an SCR response to 
value-laden stimuli, whereas VM patients do not. She asserts that while SCRs are usually taken as a 
measure of general physiological arousal, for the purposes of her argument the presence of a 
measurable SCR can be taken as evidence of motivation, and the lack of an SCR to be indicative of no 
motivation.359 This argument however has been criticised for the cited studies not actually testing 
“ethically charged” scenarios as the stimuli for SCRs360 and further that contrary to what Roskies 
claims, SCRs are not a good indicator of moral motivation.361  
Roskies ultimately accepts the deficiencies of the presently available research, both in relation to the 
requirement that the relevant moral judgments for an empirical test of internalism must be first-
personal and the requirement that SCRs be first established as a reliable indicator of moral motivation. 
She concludes that her argument could still succeed however, if research was carried with a focus on 
answering the philosophical dispute between motivational internalists and externalists: “the ideal 
experiments to resolve this question would (1) test the hypothesis that SCRs are a reliable indication 
of moral motivation in normals, and (2) measure SCRs in VM patients and normal simultaneously as 
they make both first- and third-person moral judgments.”362  
There is reason to be sceptical however of this more limited conclusion due to more recent research 
that does contradict some of Roskies assumptions about the nature of VM patients moral reasoning 
 
defects in decision-making and planning that are shown in abnormal social conduct. The conduct often has 
negative personal consequences for the subjects but is not clearly categorised as moral or immoral. 
359 She argues “this simplification is warranted: the presence of the SCR is reliably correlated with cases in which 
action is consistent with judgment, and its absence is correlated with occasions in which the VM patient fails to 
act in accord with his or her judgments. Thus, the SCR is a reliable indicator of motivation for action” Roskies, 
‘Are ethical judgments intrinsically motivational? Lessons from “acquired sociopathy”’ p. 57, see also Roskies’ 
endnotes, 9, 10, 11, and 12.   
360 Jeanette Kennett, Cordelia Fine, ‘Internalism and the evidence from psychopaths and "acquired sociopaths"’, 
p. 187, and ‘Could there be an empirical test for internalism?’ p. 221. 
361 Jeanette Kennett, Cordelia Fine, ‘Internalism and the evidence from psychopaths and "acquired sociopaths", 
p.188. 
362 Adina Roskies, ‘Internalism and the evidence from pathology’ p. 201. 
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capabilities. There appears to be significant differences between the moral judgments that VM 
patients make about themselves and their own actions when compared to hypothetical judgments 
about others. For example, in one study VM patients were presented with ‘trolley problems’, which 
require the chooser to either personally push a man off a bridge to stop a trolley from colliding with a 
group of people or refrain from pushing the man in front of the trolley resulting in the death of the 
group. Contemplating this choice, VM patients did not show the usual signs of emotional reaction 
when compared to controls and were likely to decide to push the man off the bridge in contrast to 
control subjects who were unlikely to do so.363  VM patients also tend to make decisions based on 
different and less relevant criteria when making choices for themselves,364 and tend to look less far 
into the future, compared to controls.365 These kinds of deficiencies in judgment and decision making 
are better able to explain the poor social outcomes in VM patients’ lives than the lack of moral 
motivation that Roskies attributes to them.   
Additionally, the current understanding of the mechanisms causing poor performance in VM patients’ 
personal moral decision making, is that there is a lack of emotional input from the damaged 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex into the reasoning and judgment process that would normally be 
present. In normal subjects this emotional component attaches itself to various decision options and 
adds weight to some and detracts from others, prior to a judgment being made. VM patients’ absence 
of this emotional processing as part of their moral judgments and social decision making in their own 
lives results in their abnormal moral judgments and poor social choices.366 
 
 
363 Giovanna Moretto et al., ‘A Psychophysiological Investigation of Moral Judgment after Ventromedial 
Prefrontal Damage’. 
364 L. K. Fellows, ‘Deciding how to decide: Ventromedial frontal lobe damage affects information acquisition in 
multi-attribute decision making’. 
365 L. K. Fellows, M. J. Farah, ‘Dissociable elements of human foresight: A role for the ventromedial frontal lobes 
in framing the future, but not in discounting future rewards.’ 
366 Neil R. Carlson, Physiology of Behaviour, 11th ed., pp 368-370.  
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6.4 Social psychology and empirically based arguments against virtue ethics 
John Doris and Stephen Stich have argued that a number of the findings of psychology have important 
implications for virtue ethics. 367  Virtue ethics is often considered to be one of the three major 
approaches in normative ethics, with its basic premise being that instead of focusing on which action 
is right or good, or what obligations or duties people have, ethics should focus on what sort of person 
one should be. Therefore, the central question of virtue ethics is ‘what traits of character make one a 
good person?’ Virtues or character traits, as used in virtue ethics, are taken by Doris and Stich to be 
“settled patterns of motive, emotion, and reasoning that lead us to call someone a person of a certain 
sort (courageous, generous, moderate, just, etc.)”368 They also write that according to the virtue ethics 
tradition, “virtues are supposed to be robust traits; if a person has a robust trait, she can be confidently 
(although perhaps not with absolute certainty) expected to display trait-relevant behaviour across a 
wide variety of trait-relevant situations, even where some or all of these situations are not optimally 
conducive to such behaviour.”369 
Doris and Stich’s argue that a large body of research in psychology conflicts with claims that virtue 
ethics makes. The type of research they cite is termed ‘situationism’ in psychology, which holds that 
the behaviour of people is extraordinarily sensitive to the situations in which they find themselves. 
Doris and Stich think there is an extensive body of evidence that supports their argument, and they 
cite the following findings as representative: 
• Mathews and Canon found subjects were five times more likely to help an apparently injured 
man who had dropped some books when ambient noise was at normal levels than when a 
power lawnmower was running nearby (80 per cent v. 15 per cent). 
 
367 John Doris, Stephen Stich, ‘As a matter of fact: Empirical perspectives on ethics’. 
368 ibid., p. 117. 
369 ibid, pp. 117-118.  
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• Darley and Batson report that passers-by who were not in a hurry, were six times more likely 
to help an unfortunate who appeared to be in significant distress than were passers-by who 
were in a hurry (63 per cent v. 10 per cent). 
• Isen and Levin discovered that people who had just found a dime were twenty-two times more 
likely to help a woman who had dropped some papers than those who did not find a dime (88 
per cent v. 4 per cent).  
• Milgram found that subjects would repeatedly ‘punish’ a screaming ‘victim’ with realistic (but 
simulated) electric shocks at the polite request of an experimenter. 
• Haney et al. describe how college students role-playing in a simulated prison rapidly 
descended to Lord of the Flies barbarism.370 
Doris and Stich’s argument, based on these findings and others like them, is as follows. Virtue ethics 
assumes that people have robust, reliable dispositions or character traits. If people have these robust 
character traits, we should expect them to behave consistently and dependably in the manner 
associated with the specific traits: honest people should behave in a reliably truthful and fair manner, 
compassionate people in a reliably sympathetic and humane way, and so on for all the virtues. There 
is however, a large body of research, exemplified by the studies above, which indicates that 
‘insubstantial’ situational factors powerfully influence how people actually act. Because people are so 
easily induced by various situational factors to act in ways which are contrary to acting virtuously, this 
research shows that people do not generally have the robust character traits of the kind assumed by 
virtue ethics. As Doris and Stich state, such research shows that “behaviour is not typically structured 
by the robust traits that figure centrally in virtue theoretic moral psychology.”371 Virtues of the kind 
virtue ethics deals with will not be realised, as psychological data has shown that people do not have 
robust character traits of the kind required. Doris and Stich therefore conclude, “it looks as though 
 
370 Summarised from ibid, p. 118. 
371 ibid., p. 119. By “virtue theoretic moral psychology” Doris and Stich mean the account of moral psychology 
that virtue ethics assumes or implicitly accepts.  
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attribution of robust traits like virtues may very well be unwarranted in most instances, programmes 
of moral education aimed at inculcating virtues may very well be futile, and modes of ethical reflection 
focusing moral aspirations on the cultivation of virtue may very well be misguided.”372 
 
6.4.1 Normative and descriptive claims 
The first and most obvious reply to Doris and Stich, is to point out that virtue ethics is simply not in 
the business of making claims about what people are like. Instead, virtue ethics is concerned with how 
people ought to be. That is, it is a normative theory: it is concerned with what character traits we 
should have, what virtues would be best or most appropriate to possess, what kind of person we ought 
to be.  Therefore, it may appear to be a misguided criticism to claim that virtue ethics makes empirical 
claims that are shown to be false by psychological research, as virtue ethics simply is not in the 
business of making descriptive claims about what people are like. The claims of virtue ethics are 
therefore not open to the criticism that they are not in accord with some set of descriptive 
psychological findings. Doris and Stich appear to avoid mentioning this distinction between the 
normative and the descriptive approaches of ethics and psychology in their discussion. For example 
they write that “virtue ethics is marked by a particular interest in moral psychology, an interest in the 
cognitive, affective, and emotional patterns that are associated with the attribution of character 
traits” 373  and that “This interest looks to be an empirical interest, and it’s natural to ask how 
successfully virtue ethics addresses it.”374 But of course, if virtue ethics is a normative theory of the 
kind that has traditionally occupied philosophical ethics, it cannot simply have an ‘interest’ in moral 
psychology. Its concern with moral psychology must be much more specific: it has an ‘interest’ only 
insofar as it makes normative recommendations. It is concerned with ‘ought’ statements saying which 
traits of character best to possess, which virtues to attempt to educate in others, what kind of person 
 
372 ibid, pp. 119-120.  
373 ibid., p. 117.  
374 ibid., p. 117. 
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to aim to be and so on. And recommendations or ought statements are simply not the kind of thing 
to be discovered empirically. 
 
The nature of Doris and Stich’s argument therefore needs clarification to show why it is not vulnerable 
to such an objection (although they themselves provide no discussion in the following terms).  What 
Doris and Stich must be claiming, if their argument is to succeed, is of the form of an ‘ought implies 
can’ statement. That is, they are claiming that people cannot (robustly, consistently), instantiate the 
virtues prescribed by virtue ethics, and therefore it is not the case that they ought to. In short, one 
cannot be morally required to be virtuous, if doing so is impossible. Of course this requires much in 
the way of qualification as ‘possibility’ comes in many flavours. So to be clear, they need to specify 
what they mean by ‘it is impossible’ to be virtuous. Obviously, they do not think it is logically 
impossible to be virtuous – their concern is with empirical evidence and not with showing that virtue 
ethics contains some kind of conceptual contradiction. Nor are they arguing that it is physically 
impossible to be virtuous. Instead, it is a weaker kind of ‘impossibility’ that their argument invokes. 
Their argument must be that the data from psychology shows that no-one is in fact robustly or 
consistently virtuous and from this we can infer that it is unrealistic or unreasonable to expect people 
to be. Thus, they are arguing that it is a kind of psychological impossibility for humans to be virtuous. 
As they summarise their case, it “looks to be the case that the available systematic empirical evidence 
is compatible with virtue being psychologically impossible (or at least wildly improbable), and this 
suggests that the impossibility of virtue is an empirical possibility that has to be taken seriously.”375 
 
In this form their argument could have teeth: if it turns out to be true that it is impossible to be 
virtuous, then virtue ethics as a normative theory is in serious trouble. However, as putting the 
 
375 ibid., p. 121. 
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argument in these terms highlights, it is difficult to establish that virtue is psychologically impossible 
in the sense of being unrealistic and unreasonable to expect from people. To establish this requires 
careful interpretation of the psychological evidence, and also examination of what kinds of claims 
virtue ethics makes, to see if the two do in fact intersect. Doris and Stich list a number of ways in which 
the psychological evidence may be inadequate as support for their argument. They note the following: 
(i) There may be methodological problems with the research that might undermine the results; (ii) The 
experimental contexts might be so distant from everyday contexts that the results do not generalise 
to the “real world” (the world which virtue ethics purports to deal with); (iii) There appear to be very 
few longitudinal behavioural studies that would help assess character traits over long periods of time 
(seemingly important if you want to study the robustness, persistence, and influence over time of 
character traits); and finally, (iv) The experiments may be conceptually irrelevant – character traits 
operationalized may not correspond to the conceptions of character traits in virtue ethics.376 Doris 
and Stich however think that any such criticism would “require evaluating a great deal of psychological 
research”377 and that “making a charge stick to one experiment or two, when there are hundreds, if 
not thousands of relevant studies, is unlikely to effect a satisfying resolution of the controversy.”378 In 
the following section I will briefly examine the five studies that Doris and Stich cite, and argue that 
there are a number of serious problems with using the results of all five of these particular studies to 
establish that virtue is psychologically impossible in the relevant sense. Further, if these five studies 
are in fact representative of the most relevant, striking, or important findings, and all are found 
lacking, then it casts serious doubt on their claim that there are “hundreds, if not thousands of relevant 
studies”379 that will support the same conclusion if their reasoning is the same in each. The burden of 
proof would then be on Doris and Stich to point to other studies out of these many hundreds that they 
claim are relevant, and show why they are not vulnerable to similar objections.  
 
376 Points (i)–(iv) from ibid., pp. 121-122.  
377 ibid., p. 123. 
378 ibid., p. 123.  




6.4.2 Does the evidence show what Doris and Stich claim? 
To begin, I examine whether it is true that the figures cited by Doris and Stich in the psychological 
research are suggestive of psychological impossibility or impracticality with regards to the traits in 
question. The Mathews and Canon study showed that fewer people helped an injured stranger pick 
up some dropped books, in the presence of a loud faulty power lawnmower (measured at 87dB), 
compared to when ambient noise was at normal levels (50dB). In this study, 80 percent of people 
assisted the injured person at normal noise levels, but only 15 percent helped when the lawn mower 
was running nearby. In the Darley and Batson study, passers-by who were in a hurry were less likely 
to help someone in distress than those who were not: 63 percent of people assisted in the no-hurry 
case, but only 10 per cent stopped to give help if they were in a hurry. In the third study cited, 
conducted by Isen and Levin, 88 per cent of people who had just found a dime stopped to help a 
woman who had dropped some papers, compared to only 4 per cent who did not find a dime. The first 
aspect of these results to note that in none of these studies was the percentage of people who 
continued to act in ‘virtuous’/trait-relevant ways (helping pick up dropped books and so on) in the 
more trying circumstances is zero. 
Doris and Stich’s summary of Stanley Milgram’s experiments on authority and disobedience states: 
“Milgram found that subjects would repeatedly ‘punish’ a screaming ‘victim’ with realistic (but 
simulated) electric shocks at the polite request of an experimenter.” While this description has good 
shock value, it omits a number of important details as I shall discuss. However, the important point to 
note for now is that Doris and Stich omit the fact that in Milgram’s original experiment, while 26 out 
of 40 subjects did continue to participate in the experiment till its completion, the remaining 14 




Of the 40 subjects, 5 refused to obey the experimental commands beyond the 300-
volt level. Four more subjects administered one further shock, and then refused to 
go on. Two broke off at the 330-volt level, and 1 each at 345, 360, and 375 volts. 
Thus a total of 14 subjects defied the experimenter.380 
And similarly, Doris and Stich’s summary of the Haney et al. study (commonly known as the ‘Stanford 
Prison Experiment’) omits relevant details. They claim that “college students role-playing in a 
simulated prison rapidly descended to Lord of the Flies barbarism.”381 This sparse description omits 
the fact that there were a range of different reactions from individual participants (both those role-
playing guards and prisoners). The following is taken from the results of the Haney et al study: 
The extremely pathological reactions which emerged in both groups of subjects testify to the power 
of the social forces operating, but still there were individual differences seen in styles of coping with 
this novel experience and in degrees of successful adaptation to it.  Half of the prisoners did endure 
the oppressive atmosphere, and not all the guards resorted to hostility.  Some guards were tough but 
fair (“played by the rules”), some went far beyond their roles to engage in creative cruelty and 
harassment, while a few were passive and rarely instigated any coercive control over the prisoners.382 
Doris and Stich do not mention these differences in response in this study, but since the situational 
factors are supposedly controlled for, a reasonable assumption would be that differences in 
disposition and character account for the observed range of responses. So, while the studies Doris and 
Stich cite show that in a range of contexts it was possible, through relatively small changes in the 
situation, to alter the proportion of people displaying helpful behaviour or behaviour demonstrating 
concern towards strangers, there was still significant variation in individual’s responses. Importantly, 
in all five studies mentioned there were a wide range responses to the various experimental situations, 
and in all studies there were people who did not act differently or ‘non-virtuously’ despite the 
manipulated situational variables.  
 
380 Stanley Milgram, ‘Behavioural study of obedience’, pp. 375-376.   
381 John Doris, Stephen Stich, ‘As a matter of fact: Empirical perspectives on ethics’, p. 118. 
382 C. Haney, C. Banks, and P. Zimbardo, ‘Interpersonal dynamics in a simulated prison’, p. 81.  
202 
 
Given this range of responses in the five cited studies, it is worth considering how strong Doris and 
Stich’s argument about impossibility is. Consider for example, an analogous argument against 
utilitarianism where the numbers or proportions of people acting in accord with what utilitarianism 
dictates, are similar to the numbers or proportions that are not influenced by situational variables to 
‘act against their character’ in the studies cited by Doris and Stich. Suppose that a utilitarian argues 
that we ought to contribute a relatively small amount of money to foreign aid. By contributing what 
would be a fairly insignificant amount (for those living in affluent nations), it would be possible to 
alleviate a great amount of suffering and loss of life at little cost. Now suppose that some empirical 
research is done to find out how many people actually do contribute to such foreign aid, and it is 
discovered that only a very small percentage of the population do. Would such a finding show that 
the utilitarian’s theory was seriously flawed? The utilitarian would surely find such an argument 
underwhelming. The fact that some practice is not widely instantiated is not sufficient for us to infer 
that it is unrealistic to expect that it could become widespread.  The fact that systematic discrimination 
and sexist attitudes towards women were once prevalent should not have caused us to infer that it 
was impossible for men to hold different attitudes. Indeed, for the possibility of moral progress at all 
there must be a difference between the way the world is, and what a moral theory prescribes. If this 
gap becomes too small, the moral theory risks being too conservative and not advocating any change 
at all. If a possibility for change is only considered realistic (and thus not ruled out because we have 
no obligation to do what is impossible) when there is already a majority of people acting in that way, 
then it would be hard to find ways of changing things for the better that are not immediately ruled 
out as psychologically impossible or implausible.  
Doris and Stich however, think that such a reply has questionable applicability in the case of virtue 
ethics. They think that virtue ethics, as it is generally conceived, has a special interest in moral 
education, and that if virtuous character traits are expected to be rare, then “it is not obvious what 
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role virtue theory could have in a (generally applicable) programme of moral education.”383 They point 
out that writing on virtue ethics has traditionally had a distinctive emphasis on moral education, where 
moral education is “construed as aiming for the development of the good character necessary for a 
good life” 384   And thus they think that virtue cannot be restricted to “a few extraordinary 
individuals”385 if it is to fulfil its purported role. Were it true that the evidence shows that only “a few 
extraordinary individuals” display virtue, this may be an adequate response, but it is not clear that the 
evidence does show that virtue is to be found only in “a few extraordinary individuals.” Their use of 
this phrase is questionable based on the numbers in the research they cite: 15% in the Mathews and 
Canon study, 10% in the Darley and Batson study, 4% in the Isen and Levin study and significant 
numbers in the Milgram (arguably 35%) and Haney et al. studies. Proportions in these last two studies 
are not easily quantified in a simple percentage figure, as there was a range of responses to the 
experimental conditions, some displaying more or less susceptibility to situational influences. So, 
whether the figures support Doris and Stich’s claim that virtue is too rare, depends on what proportion 
would be sufficient to play a “generally applicable role in a programme of moral education”, but it 
certainly does not appear that virtue is limited to only “a few extraordinary individuals”386. There are 
however, more significant problems with applying the research Doris and Stich cite to virtue ethics as 
I discuss in the following.  
One such difficulty is that Doris and Stich do not specify which trait or virtue each study purports to 
show to be ineffectual in ensuring virtuous behaviour in the experimental contexts. The problem with 
not specifying what trait is relevant to each experiment is that we cannot evaluate whether such a 
trait is of the kind that virtue ethics actually assumes people do or could have. For example, we could 
guess that for the first three cited studies, Doris and Stich have in mind a trait we might call 
 
383 ibid., p. 120.   
384 ibid., p. 120.  
385 Ibid., p. 120. 
386 Consider for example a small country such as New Zealand with a population of approximately 4.2 million 
people: of these 15% amounts to 630,000, and 4% to 168,000 – these figures appear too high to imply 
psychological impossibility.  
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‘helpfulness’: the propensity or willingness to help others. Thus, if we imagine our perfectly ‘helpful’ 
person, it is possible to think that they might always be helpful to complete strangers, even in 
demanding situations (say, when they were late to fulfil some other obligation, or when they would 
be required to assist someone in front of a running 87dB lawnmower). But it is important to note just 
how demanding this conception is.  While each individual case of helping might not be overly 
demanding, consistently being generous and helpful to everyone at every possible opportunity is very 
demanding. Someone who always helps strangers, at every opportunity, is someone that will have 
very little or no time for their own projects or lives, as there are almost limitless opportunities to help 
others. While some people may live up to this standard, and dedicate all their time and effort to 
helping others (the “Mother Teresa’s” of the world), the number of such people will very likely amount 
to at best, “a few extraordinary individuals”. Thus, it appears that this conception is too demanding to 
realistically be what virtue ethics prescribes for everyone.  
A less demanding conception of ‘helpfulness’ or the ‘helpful person’ may be a more plausible 
candidate for the version of ‘helpfulness’ used in virtue ethics.  Consider the person who is always 
helpful to family members, to those they work with, to those they live with, to friends, and so on. This 
is a character trait that seems like it could be plausibly robust and consistent: people’s commitments 
to their families, friends, and so on, appear to be of the kind we would expect to be unwavering and 
reliable regardless of ‘insubstantial’ changes in the situation. Therefore, it is possible that someone 
might be a generous or helpful person in this more limited sense, and yet only help strangers on rare 
occasions or when the situation is relatively dire. Thus, for the first three studies Doris and Stich cite, 
it is possible that the conception of helpfulness that the studies test for, is too demanding to be the 
kind that virtue ethics is concerned with.387 If Doris and Stich were more specific about which traits 
each study was supposed to inform us about, their argument could be considerably strengthened as 
they would be able to specify what kind of behaviour we would expect those with the traits in question 
 
387 I discuss later in more detail what virtue ethics’ conception of virtues are, but at this point it suffices to note 
that the conception Doris and Stich appear to be assuming, is too demanding.  
205 
 
to display, and we could then straightforwardly see if the psychological experiments confirmed or 
disconfirmed that such a trait was efficacious in producing such ‘trait-relevant’ behaviour. As it stands 
though, we are left to guess at what the traits in question are, and the most obvious guess appears to 
be too demanding to be a trait that virtue ethics assumes.  
The character traits in question therefore, need to be carefully specified, so that it can be clearly seen 
whether the character traits that the psychological experiments tell us about are the same as those 
virtue ethics is concerned with. Further, it must be clear that the studies do not test only for extreme 
versions of character traits: one can be generous without giving away everything one owns, or helpful 
without helping everyone at any possible opportunity. For the first three cited ‘helpfulness’ cases 
therefore, it appears that the conception of virtue that Doris and Stich are arguing against does not 
exist; it is one that is too demanding for virtue ethicists to have claimed should or would be 
widespread. While some virtue ethicists may argue for such extreme versions (just as some utilitarians 
argue we should continue to give aid up to the point just before where we would be sacrificing 
something of equal moral significance) the failure of such a demanding conception of virtue ethics 
cannot be generalised to the failure of all or any possible version of virtue ethics. A more limited 
conception of helpfulness whereby helping is expected towards friends, family, colleagues, 
neighbours, and so on, is a more reasonable form of ‘helpfulness’ to expect.388  
I next consider the Milgram and Haney et al. studies which Doris and Stich take to support their 
argument. The first thing to note is that these studies do not focus on any one particular trait, and as 
discussed for the first three studies, this is a serious problem for Doris and Stich. Beginning with the 
Milgram study, it is not obvious what particular trait-relevant behaviour is being shown to not occur. 
Milgram’s research was aimed at exploring obedience to authority. It involved a naïve subject, the 
experimenter, and a confederate of the experimenter. The test subjects were those who answered a 
 
388 It may be objected that this sets the bar too low for possessing virtue. But of course, there are people that 
fail at these things, and these are precisely those people that virtue ethics would contrast with the virtuous 
person, and label as unhelpful, selfish, self-seeking, uncooperative, uncaring, inconsiderate, un-neighbourly and 
so on.   
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newspaper advertisement looking for volunteers to take part in a psychology experiment ostensibly 
set up to study the effects of punishment on learning and memory. Upon arrival, the volunteer and 
confederate (who the volunteer thought was another willing volunteer) drew slips of paper out of hat 
to determine who would be the ‘teacher’ and who would be the ‘learner’. The draw was rigged so that 
the volunteer would always be the ‘teacher’. With the volunteer in one room with the experimenter, 
and the confederate in an adjacent room, the volunteer would read out lists of word pairs, and ask 
the ‘learner’ to recite them back. If they responded correctly, the volunteer moved on to the next list, 
if they made a mistake, the volunteer was required to push a button on a “shock machine” to shock 
the ‘learner’, starting with the smallest level of shock, and increasing with each wrong answer (the 
‘learner’ pretended to be shocked – no real shocks were administered other than a ‘trial’ shock which 
the volunteer underwent to help convince them of the reality of the study). After a number of 
increases, the ‘learner’ would begin to cry out with each shock and bang on the wall. If the shocks 
continued the ‘learner’ would then complain of a heart condition, and then finally cease making any 
noises. Volunteers were told that the electric shocks are “painful but not dangerous”389 and if they 
questioned if the ‘learner’ was in danger they were reassured by the experimenter that “Although the 
shocks may be painful, there is no permanent tissue damage, so please go on.”390 
As mentioned previously, the result of this study was that 14 of the 40 subjects defied the 
experimenter and ceased to obey the experimenter’s commands at some point before reaching the 
maximum level of electric shock, and the remaining 26 continued to shock the ‘learner’ to the 
maximum level. In the original paper, Milgram provides two examples of remarks, transcribed from 
the tape recordings, made by subjects who refused to continue: 
[0124] “I think he’s trying to communicate, he’s knocking…. Well it’s not fair to 
shock the guy… these are terrific volts. I don’t think this is very humane…. Oh, I 
can’t go on with this; no, this isn’t right.  It’s a hell of an experiment. The guy is 
 
389 Stanley Milgram, ‘Behavioural study of obedience’, p. 378. 
390 ibid., p. 374.  
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suffering in there. No, I don’t want to go on. This is crazy.” [Subject refused to 
administer more shocks.] 
[0123] “He’s banging in there. I’m gonna chicken out. I’d like to continue, but I 
can’t do that to a man…. I’m sorry I can’t do that to a man. I’ll hurt his heart. You 
take your check…. No really, I couldn’t do it.” [Subject refused to administer more 
shocks.] 
Presumably Doris and Stich think that the perfectly virtuous person in this situation (according to what 
virtue ethics might recommend) ought to decline to take part in the study if it were apparent that it 
would involve acting against their character. Or if it were not apparent before participation begins 
that the study involves acting in ‘non-virtuous’ ways, that as soon as it did become apparent, they 
would opt out. Simple participation in the experiment therefore cannot be faulted as being ‘non-
virtuous’ in any sense, as up until the point where the ‘learner’ starts complaining, volunteers think 
that the ‘learner’ was there of their own volition and that shocks were not harmful. Only once the 
experiment was underway, and it appeared that the shocks were more serious than the experimenter 
was letting on, would we expect the ‘virtuous person’ to leap into (virtuous) action. This is not to deny 
that it is surprising and disturbing that 65% of participants did continue to shock the ‘learner’ at the 
request of the experimenter once the ‘learner’ was complaining and banging on the wall. But for the 
purposes of showing that some participants dispositions did not allow them to continue, the 
important fact is that the remaining 35% did opt out of the experiment.  
In addition to it not showing that virtue is impractical or even statistically rare, the other serious 
difficulty with using Milgram’s research is that again we do not know which character traits are 
supposed to be shown to be ineffectual in producing virtuous behaviour. The problem is that it 
appears that there could be a number of possible character traits involved, and further, that these 
could well be in conflict.  If this is the case then the Milgram study is poorly suited to showing that 
character traits do not exist. If there is a choice of what to do, and different choices would be acting 
in accord with different virtues, then the fact that a majority of people take one option over the other 
does not show that both virtues do not exist or are never instantiated. Instead it may be that acting in 
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accord with both virtues is impossible as the required actions are mutually exclusive or that the 
dilemma is one in which there is no ‘correct’ answer – even for someone with perfect understanding 
of virtue and practical wisdom – it may simply be an irresolvable dilemma. In the discussion of the 
cited study, Milgram himself provides thirteen reasons which he thinks contribute to explaining the 
high level of obedience of volunteers in his study and of these, at least eight directly reference conflicts 
of various obligations or character traits. These include the following (numbering from the original 
paper): 
2. The experiment is, on the face of it, designed to attain a worthy purpose – 
advancement of knowledge about learning and memory. [The subjects’] 
obedience occurs not as an end in itself, but as an instrumental element in a 
situation that the subject construes as significant and meaningful. He may not be 
able to see its full significance, but he may properly assume that the experimenter 
does.  
3. The subject perceives that the victim has voluntarily submitted to the authority 
system of the experimenter…He has taken the trouble to come to the laboratory 
presumably to aid the experimental research…Thus he has in some degree 
incurred an obligation toward the experimenter. 
4. The subject, too, has entered the experiment voluntarily, and perceives himself 
under obligation to the experimenter. He has made a commitment, and to disrupt 
the experiment is a repudiation of this initial promise of aid. 
5. Certain features of the procedure strengthen the subject’s sense of obligation 
to the experimenter. For one, he has been paid for coming to the laboratory. 
8. Subjects are assured that the shocks administered to the subject are “painful 
but not dangerous.” Thus they assume that the discomfort caused to the victim is 
momentary, while the scientific gains resulting from the experiment are enduring. 
9. Through Shock Level 20 [out of 30 levels] the victim continues to provide 
answers on the signal box. The subject may construe this as a sign that the victim 
is still willing to ‘play the game.’ 
10. The subject is placed in a position in which he must respond to the competing 
demands of two persons: the experimenter and the victim. The conflict must be 
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resolved by meeting the demands of one or the other; satisfaction of the victim 
and the experimenter are mutually exclusive…Thus the subject is forced into a 
public conflict that does not permit any completely satisfactory solution.  
13. At a more general level, the conflict stems from the opposition of two deeply 
ingrained behaviour dispositions: first, the disposition not to harm other people, 
and second, the tendency to obey those whom we perceive to be legitimate 
authorities.391 
Thus, a reasonable interpretation of subjects’ behaviour, based on Milgram’s discussion, is that 
subjects felt both obligations towards the experimenters, and an obligation to the ‘learner’ to avoid 
harming them. On this interpretation, the results of this study therefore would be not that it shows 
that people do not have robust dispositions of the kind virtue ethics is concerned with, but that they 
have a multitude of such dispositions and that in 35% of the subjects, the disposition to avoid harming 
others was strong enough for them to overcome various other dispositions of character. These other 
dispositions might for example be: helping those to whom one has made a commitment to help (the 
experimenter), not breaking contracts that one enters (being paid for their time), and listening to the 
advice of authority figures, who are in a position of authority due to their knowledge of a subject, 
when they claim something (such as that the shocks are painful but not dangerous).  Thus, looking in 
more detail at the cited study shows that it does not provide good evidence for the fact that virtue 
does not exist.  
In the Haney et al. study, male students responded to a newspaper advertisement to take part in a 
psychological study of prison life. Out of the respondents, the 24 who were “Judged to be the most 
stable (physically and mentally), most mature, and least involved in antisocial behaviour” were chosen 
to take part. The experiment involved half of the volunteers (selected randomly) playing the role of 
guards and the other half playing the role of prisoners in a simulated prison environment constructed 
in the basement of a psychology building. All the volunteers quickly became absorbed in their roles, 
 
391 Stanley Milgram, ‘Behavioural study of obedience’, pp. 377-378. The numbers are from the study, with the 
non-relevant numbers omitted.   
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some taking them far more seriously than had been predicted. The ‘prisoners’ received harsh and 
humiliating treatment from the ‘guards’, with a number of the guards appearing to find it gratifying, 
as Haney et al. write:   
It was clear that they enjoyed the simple act of controlling some other person. 
They were corrupted by the power of their roles and became quite inventive in 
their techniques of breaking the spirit of the prisoners, making them fell 
worthless.392 
 The study was scheduled to run for two full weeks, but was terminated after only six days, due to the 
“unexpectedly intense reactions” produced by the mock-prison situation. Similar criticisms as those 
that apply to the Milgram study (discussed above), also apply to using this study in Doris and Stich’s 
argument against virtue ethics.  As mentioned earlier, there was not a uniform response to the 
experimental conditions, some of the ‘guards’ appeared to take to the role more willingly or with more 
pleasure than others: 
About a third of the guards became tyrannical in their arbitrary use of power... 
Some of the guards merely did their jobs; in fact, the prisoners said they were 
tough, but fair, correctional officers. Several were good guards. By this they meant 
they did small favours, they were friendly; they told the prisoners their names.393 
 Thus, while the Stanford prison study may show that some apparently ‘ordinary’ people who find 
themselves in the ‘wrong’ circumstances may easily end up behaving in less than desirable ways, it 
does not show that they all did. Instead, if anything, it showed there was a range of responses to the 
new roles the prisoners and guards found themselves in. One of the commonly made criticisms of the 
study is that Haney et al. do not adequately explain this variance in response. In addition to this, there 
are a number of problems with the scientific validity of the Stanford prison experiment, which often 
lead psychologists to treat its results with caution as I discuss below.  
 




Firstly, it has been suggested that students who volunteer for a study of prison life are more likely to 
possess dispositions associated with behaving abusively. Thomas Caranahan and Sam McFarland ran 
a study that used a newspaper advertisement virtually identical to that used in the Stanford Prison 
Experiment, and an identical advertisement that simply stated it was for a psychological study with no 
mention of prison life.394 Those who volunteered for the prison study “scored significantly higher on 
measures of the abuse-related dispositions of aggressiveness, authoritarianism, Machiavellianism, 
narcissism, and social dominance and lower on empathy and altruism, two qualities inversely related 
to aggressive abuse”. 395  Caranahan and McFarland conclude that “although implications for the 
Stanford prison experiment remain a matter of conjecture, an interpretation in terms of person-
situation interactionism rather than a strict situationist account is indicated by these findings.”396 So 
it is possible self-selection resulted in a sample of volunteers that already had stronger dispositions to 
behaving abusively than the norm.  
Secondly, there are difficulties with the level of participation by the experimenters and with their 
expectations influencing the volunteers’ behaviour. One of the experimenters’ motivations for the 
Stanford prison experiment was to confirm their situationist view that seemingly ordinary people 
could be easily influenced by ‘bad situations’ to act in less than commendable ways. Thus, 
participation and instructions given by the researchers had the potential to influence the outcome of 
the study in the direction of the desired result. The researchers played an active role in the 
experiment, with Philip Zimbardo – the lead researcher – playing the role of “prison superintendent”. 
The experimenters participated in a number of the events that took place, and although they did not 
actively direct the guards or prisoners much of the time, they made clear their expectations of what 
the guards were to do. The following is an excerpt from the instructions given to guards: 
 
394  Thomas Caranahan, Sam McFarland, ‘Revisiting the Stanford prison experiment: Could participant self-
selection have led to cruelty?’  
395 ibid., p. 603. 
396 ibid., p. 603.  
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You can create in the Prisoners feelings of boredom, a sense of fear to some 
degree, you can create a notion of arbitrariness that their life is totally controlled 
by us, by the system, you, me, and they’ll have no privacy… They have no freedom 
of action they can do nothing, say nothing that we don’t permit. We’re going to 
take away their individuality in various ways. In general what all this leads to is a 
sense of powerlessness. That is, in this situation we’ll have all the power and they’ll 
have none.397 
Thus, it was obvious to volunteers that certain outcomes of their behaviour were expected as part of 
the experiment.  The result of this is that it is not clear how much of the ‘bad’ behaviour of the 
prisoners or guards was due to role-playing which they thought was expected of them. The most 
notorious guard for example, who came to be nicknamed “John Wayne” by the prisoners, modelled 
his harsh and belligerent behaviour on a prison guard from a movie, even going as far as adopting the 
Southern accent of the character he was emulating.398 These points about the possibly biased self-
selection of participants, the active participation by those running the experiment, and the question 
of how much of their behaviour is attributable to role-playing, all weaken both the scientific credibility 
of the Haney et al. study, but also more importantly, they weaken the applicability of study to Doris 
and Stich’s argument. In light of these considerations, it becomes much more difficult to criticise the 
guards, especially those considered “tough but fair” or “good” guards, as acting non-virtuously.  
 
6.4.3 Differing conceptions of virtue 
A final reply to Doris and Stich’s argument is that their conception of what a virtue is differs from the 
conception of virtues used by modern virtue ethicists. Doris and Stich take the following as their 
understanding of virtues: 
As we understand the tradition, virtues are supposed to be robust traits; if a person 
has a robust trait, she can be confidently (although perhaps not with absolute 
 
397 S. Alexander Haslam, Stephen Reicher, ‘Beyond Stanford: Questioning a role-based explanation of tyranny’, 
p. 22. 




certainty) expected to display trait-relevant behaviour across a wide variety of trait 
relevant situations, even where some or all of these situations are not optimally 
conducive to such behaviour.399 
Modern virtue ethicists consider virtues to be what they call “multi-track” dispositions. A multi-track 
disposition is more complex than a “single-track” disposition which is simply a tendency to act 
consistently in some way. Having a multi-track disposition involves having certain patterns of choices, 
desires, attitudes, expectations and sensibilities. It is to have a certain kind of “complex mindset” 
which takes certain kinds of reasons for action as valid reasons. This is best illustrated by an example: 
consider the virtue of ‘honesty’.  To have a multi-track virtue of honesty is not simply to be someone 
who does not cheat and is honest in their dealings. If one does not cheat and is honest simply because 
the agent fears getting caught and subsequent consequences rather, then they are not ‘honest’ in the 
virtue ethicist’s sense. Only if they recognise that ‘to do otherwise would be dishonest’ is the reason 
they should not cheat or lie, could their actions contribute to our attributing them with honesty. As 
Rosalind Hursthouse writes  
An honest person cannot be identified simply as one who, for example, always tells 
the truth, nor even as one who always tells the truth because it is the truth, for 
one can have the virtue of honesty without being tactless or indiscreet. The honest 
person recognises "That would be a lie" as a strong (though perhaps not 
overriding) reason for not making certain statements in certain circumstances, and 
gives due, but not overriding, weight to "That would be the truth" as a reason for 
making them.400 
If this is the conception of virtue that a virtue ethicist holds, then it is unlikely to be shown to be 
psychologically impossible by the psychological research that Doris and Stich cite. We cannot attribute 
a multi-track (or lack of a multi-track) trait, based upon a single action or omission. Thus, it would be 
reckless to ascribe a lack of a demanding trait, such as charity, in cases like the Mathews and Canon 
 
399 John Doris, Stephen Stich, ‘As a matter of fact: Empirical perspectives on ethics’, pp. 118-119.  
400 Rosalind Hursthouse, On virtue ethics, ‘Virtue ethics’, sec. 2.  and Rosalind Hursthouse, ‘Are Virtues the proper 
starting point for morality?’ 
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or Isen and Levin studies, when all the agents have done is “exhibited conventional decency” rather 
than acting in a supererogatory manner in a large percentage of cases.   
 
6.4.4 The success of Doris and Stich’s argument against virtue ethics 
Doris and Stich argue that evidence from social psychology can be used to show that virtue ethics is 
committed to a conception of character traits which are psychologically unrealistic or impossible. They 
present a number of studies which support what is known as ‘situationism’ in psychology. This is the 
idea that people’s behaviour can be easily influenced by situations they find themselves in: although 
we may think dispositions or people’s character plays a large role in how people act, this, according to 
situationism, is false.  
However, as I have argued, the evidence Doris and Stich cite for this conclusion is insufficient to 
establish that people do not or cannot have robust dispositions of the kind they claim virtue ethics 
requires. The research they cite is not strong enough in terms of raw numbers, they are not clear 
enough or specific enough about which virtues in each case matter, and some of the research they 
cite (especially the Milgram and Haney et al. studies) could easily being construed as supporting the 
opposite conclusion: that the best explanation of why some of those behaved as they did, is because 
of their comparatively virtuous character or disposition. Doris and Stich also do not consider that 
virtues may conflict which makes some research, such as the Milgram and Haney et al. studies, 
particularly difficult to draw useful conclusions about robust dispositional traits from. Additionally, 
there are a number of problems with the conception of virtue ethics that Doris and Stich use. No virtue 
ethicist claims that people instantiate perfect virtue: the conception that appears to be in use by Doris 
and Stich is simply too demanding. To have a helpful disposition does not entail one helps everyone 
one comes across to the exclusion of ever doing anything else. Additionally, their conception also 
appears to be too simple in comparison to what a number of modern virtue ethicists claim. Virtues 
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are considered to be complex ‘multi-track’ dispositions, rather than ‘single-track’ tendencies to act in 
a particular way, and this severely limits the applicability of ‘situationist’ argument. 
Thus, I conclude that Doris and Stich’s argument based on the ‘situationist’ findings of moral 
psychology fails to undermine virtue ethics. Nevertheless, Doris and Stich’s attack on virtue ethics is a 
valuable contribution in that it forces virtue ethicists to focus on the psychological possibility of what 
they are suggesting, and hopefully encourages them to engage with and consider how well any of their 






Chapter 7 Further implications for a framework to assess empirical 
approaches to ethics 
In this chapter I continue the undertaking of chapter 4, and further develop the observations and 
guidance based on the presented case studies. The discussions in the previous chapter examined 
arguments put forward by Nichols, Roskies, and Doris and Stich who each attempt to argue that 
empirical findings have important implications for philosophical theories of ethics or metaethics. As 
in chapter 4 I analyse where they were successful, unsuccessful, and what we can learn from their 
approach and results. I summarise these findings at the end of a chapter in a table.  
 
7.1 Are Nichols, Roskies, and Doris and Stitch’s arguments sound? 
Shaun Nichols’ arguments focus on varieties of moral rationalism. In doing so he fails to identify 
perhaps the most important forms of rationalism in the philosophical literature, but nonetheless 
makes interesting arguments against two varieties which he labels empirical rationalism and 
conceptual rationalism. His argument against empirical rationalism faces two problems. Firstly, it is 
only applicable if motivation internalism is true. Secondly, the evidence used to support the 
moral/conventional distinction used in the research he cites is neither robust or reliable. For the 
argument to succeed would require more focused empirical research aimed at establishing what he 
initially argues the evidence shows. Nichols’ argument against conceptual rationalism is also 
unsuccessful, again due to weaknesses in the research cited, but under further examination also due 
to the interpretation and application to metaethics.  
Adina Roskies’ argument focused specifically on motivation internalism rather than more general 
rationalist theories. She cites evidence that initially shows promise for adjudicating between 
motivation internalism and motivation externalism. However, a number of difficulties with the 
evidence prevents Roskies’ argument form succeeding. Firstly, while the test used to indicate the 
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presence of motivation is indicative of some kind of emotional response to stimuli, this does not 
necessarily indicate moral motivation. Secondly, the scenarios presented to VM patients were all 
hypothetical, thus gauging actual motivation based on their responses to these imagined scenarios is 
problematic. Finally, even if these weaknesses in the evidence were able to be addressed through new 
methods and research, there appears to be significant consensus in the wider psychological literature 
that VM patients’ deficiencies include difficulties with making moral judgments and practical 
reasoning.  
Doris and Stich argue that humans cannot realise virtues of the kind virtue ethics hopes for; that its 
picture of virtue is not in accordance with our empirical understanding of human nature. However, 
careful review of the research Doris and Stich cite shows that despite initial appearances, their 
argument does not strongly support the interpretation that virtue cannot exist. Additionally, they are 
not explicit about which specific virtue is relevant in each case study, which makes evaluating the 
relevance of the findings problematic. Indeed, some of the research they cite could even be construed 
as supporting the opposite conclusions to those they reach. Doris and Stich also do not consider that 
virtues may conflict. This makes it particularly difficult to draw useful conclusions where the studies 
include opportunities for multiple virtues to be required or exhibited.  
Further problems for their argument stem from the conception of virtue their argument assumes. In 
many cases it appears much too demanding and would require ignoring all other considerations for 
someone to realise that virtue. Finally, their conception also appears to be too simple in comparison 
to what a number of modern virtue ethicists claim. Virtues are considered to be complex ‘multi-track’ 
dispositions, rather than ‘single-track’ tendencies to act in a particular way, and this severely limits 
the applicability of the ‘situationist’ argument. 
Despite these shortcomings, Doris and Stich’s attack on virtue ethics forces virtue ethicists to focus on 
the psychological possibility of the theories they are suggesting and to engage with, and consider how 
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well virtue ethics’ claims fit, with what moral psychology has to tell us about the kinds of dispositions 
people can and do have. 
 
7.2 Lessons from Nichols on moral rationalism 
Shaun Nichols targets a broad category of positions that fall under the name ‘moral rationalism’ with 
arguments based on empirical considerations and research. He presents a range of quotes from 
different moral rationalists (including Thomas Nagel, Christine Korsgaard, and Michael Smith) who he 
takes to represent the range of moral rationalist positions. From these quotes he extracts two specific 
moral rationalist theses that he calls empirical rationalism and conceptual rationalism.  
One immediate difficulty with Nichols’ argument is that neither of these rationalist theses adequately 
captures the intended ideas of the philosophers he quotes. Instead, the key feature of the rationalist 
theories he quotes is their aim to justify morality through reason or rationality. This highlights the 
need to ensure that when claiming to argue against a particular philosophical position held by 
someone, it is important to characterise those positions accurately if the argument is to successfully 
apply to their theories. Despite this apparent mis-targeting of his arguments, the discussions of the 
forms of rationalism – empirical and conceptual – are nonetheless philosophically interesting.  
However, Nichols’ argument against empirical rationalism, the idea that moral judgments are 
produced by our rational faculties, has a number of problems. Firstly, it assumes a motivation 
internalist conception of moral judgment; that motivation is a conceptually necessary feature of moral 
judgment. Thus, before the impact of potential empirical considerations have a chance to be weighed, 
there is a prior conceptual issue that must be settled as motivation externalists are unlikely to find the 
argument persuasive. Secondly, Nichols’ argument relies on a particular empirically tested distinction 
– the moral/conventional distinction. This distinction originated in developmental psychology 
research using ‘school yard’ type transgressions with primary school aged subjects.  Later research has 
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pointed out significant weaknesses in the application of the same methodology to psychopaths when 
a wider range of transgressions involving a victim being harmed are presented to adult subjects.  
The idea that Nichols identifies as conceptual rationalism will be more familiar to philosophers as the 
theory of moral motivation internalism. Identifying it as such is helpful as it makes clear its 
philosophical context in the literature. There are a number of problems with Nichols’ argument against 
motivation internalism that stem from the content and methodology of the surveys his study used, 
rather than from the validity of the overall approach. Perhaps the most problematic feature of the 
surveys is that their subject – motivation internalism – is not addressed directly or explicitly. The 
survey participants are not told that the characters in the thought experiments they partook in lack 
moral motivation, instead they are told the character John “just doesn’t care if he does wrong things.” 
Additionally, the assumption that John should be imagined as practically rational is not explicitly made. 
Instead participants are told only that the character is of “normal intelligence” – leaving much room 
for impugned irrationality of various kinds to be interpreted in his actions and character. A further 
problem is the source and makeup of the population Nichols surveyed – it is difficult to conclude 
anything definitive about everyone’s view of a concept when only one small slice of a single 
demographic (a class of undergraduate students at one Western university) is surveyed.  
In an attempt to replicate and refine Nichols’ results, Caj Strandberg and Fredrik Björklund undertook 
their own surveys which were revised and expanded to address the issues with Nichols’ research. 
Strandberg and Björklund were explicit in asking whether the characters in their thought experiments 
were morally motivated by the judgments they made, and attempted to account for whether the 
characters were considered practically rational by participants by comparing situations where 
practical rationality would likely be compromised and control situations where they would be 
considered rational. 
Strandberg and Björklund also reduced the likelihood of differing interpretations of the survey 
questions by keeping them simple, atomic, and explicitly about the question of whether motivation 
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was present when a moral judgment was made by a rational (or irrational) subject. Their sample was 
much larger and attempted to control for pre-existing philosophical intuitions by ensuring 
approximately half of the survey participants had some philosophical background and the other half 
did not.  
While the approach of Strandberg and Björklund’s surveys improved on the methodology of Nichols’ 
survey, there are still issues with the overall argument due to their interpretation of the results and 
conclusions they reach. The survey results showed that in most cases the majority of respondents 
thought it was possible to be rational and make moral judgments without those judgments being 
motivating. This evidence showed that a higher proportion of respondents had intuitions that 
supported moral motivation externalism. Their interpretation of this evidence however was that any 
kind of majority of responses should be considered as showing motivation externalism to be 
conceptually true. This leap from a mixed response (with a majority) to a wholesale or decisive victory 
is a misconstrual of the actual evidence and does not support the strength of the conclusion they 
reached.   
The mixed responses to the survey could indicate either that respondents’ understanding of the 
concepts simply were varied, or it could indicate that some respondents interpreted the scenarios and 
questions differently from each other. Or, a combination of these two options could further confound 
the results. While Strandberg and Björklund’s surveys did attempt to control for varying 
interpretations, there is no easy way to determine if this was successful and if it was conceptions of 
moral judgment and moral motivation that varied or if the results were due to the survey design and 
its interpretation.  
 
7.3 Lessons from Adina Roskies on moral motivation internalism 
Adina Roskies argued that subjects with brain injuries to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VM 
patients) are real-life ‘rational amoralists’ that provide counter examples to moral motivation 
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internalism.  Unlike Nichols, Roskies explicitly locates her argument as targeting the philosophical 
‘internalist thesis’ of the literature. Roskies indicates how her argument differs from similar previous 
counter examples to motivation internalism, and addresses why some of the common objections to 
prior attempts are not applicable. For example, she illustrates why it is more difficult to argue that VM 
patients only make inverted commas moral judgments than it is for the traditional rational amoralist. 
Unlike the prototypical amoralist from earlier literature, VM patients do not have any reason to be 
deceptive, and in almost all cases, it is not disputed that prior to their injuries, they had a normal 
mastery of moral concepts.  
However, despite the theoretical promise, Roskies’ argument faces a number of difficulties. The first 
is that the testing methodology used to measure VM patients’ motivation following moral judgments 
is flawed. Roskies takes Skin Conductance Response (SCR) tests as an indication of the presence of 
moral motivation. But this interpretation is not backed up by the intended usage of SCRs in the 
research she cites or the wider theoretical understanding of SCRs within psychology and neuroscience. 
Secondly, all of the research that Roskies cites involved questioning VM patients about hypothetical 
moral situations, then attempting to measure their motivation following the judgments they made. 
This testing therefore would not assess actual motivation to act on a moral judgment made by the VM 
patient, but instead at best could evaluate whether they imagine they would be motivated in the 
hypothetical situation. This is an important difference as it means the testing Roskies cites does not 
adequately operationalize the phenomenon of moral motivation in response to moral judgment. 
Instead, as Kennett and Fine identify in their response to Roskies’ argument, correct operationalization 
would require a testing procedure where a first person in situ moral judgment is made by VM patients 
and their motivation to act on that judgment be measured.       
Roskies accepts these criticisms, but responds that both of these problems are methodological issues 
due in part to the original purpose of the research, which was not intended to support an argument 
about motivation internalism. With the right methodology for testing the presence of motivation and 
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using in situ first person moral judgments instead of hypothetical scenarios, it would be possible to 
remedy these shortcomings. This is a valid response, and the argument would be worth pursuing 
further if there were no further issues.  
However, in response to the suggestion that methodological issues could be solved, Kennett and Fine 
also draw attention to a different difficulty with Roskies' use of VM patients as the 'rational amoralist' 
of the literature. Namely, that VM patients do not display a normal capability for making moral 
judgments. In contrast to Roskies' claims and the evidence she cites, the moral and social judgments 
VM patients make as part of their everyday lives are often dysfunctional. Phineas Gage is cited as one 
example of a VM patient but his case is unreliable. Apart from it being unclear whether he actually 
counts as a VM patient, his example is illustrative of the tendency to read into or interpret very well-
known case studies as results that support your conclusions. Gage's story has been used to support a 
large number of theories, despite the actual evidence and documentation about his case-history being 
very limited. More generally it is clear that VM patients do not have the well-functioning ability to 
make moral judgments that Roskies’ argument requires. The established view in the psychological 
literature is that VM patients have general and social decision-making deficiencies. Roskies’ 
interpretation of their moral judgment making capabilities was taken from selected studies rather 
than the wider literature, so her interpretation of that evidence is not necessarily wrong, but it is an 
incomplete picture. Establishing VM patients do have a normal capacity for judging is one of the key 
premises of the argument, so looking more widely to establish this premise would have been 
advisable.   
 
7.4 Lessons from Doris and Stich on virtue ethics 
Doris and Stich claim that virtue ethics is committed to a characterisation of human psychology which 
features robust character traits. They argue that ‘situationist’ research from social psychology shows 
this view of psychology to be incorrect, that people do not have these kinds of robust character traits 
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and therefore virtue ethics is based on false assumptions. Their conclusion is that at best virtue ethics 
requires serious revision to be a viable theory and at worst should be rejected outright.   
It may be tempting to respond to this argument that virtue ethics' focus is on the kind of virtues people 
should aim to manifest rather than its legitimate concern being with the kind of virtues people 
currently do possess. However, once the form of Doris and Stich's argument it is clarified, it becomes 
apparent that this objection is inadequate. The form of Doris and Stich's argument is a 'cannot implies 
ought not' argument, which argues that if virtues of the kind virtue ethics recommend are impossible, 
it cannot be the case that we ought to embody those virtues. This is a valid argument and one of the 
most promising ways in which empirical results might plausibly result in normative or metaethical 
conclusions.  
There are however two problems that Doris and Stich’s argument faces. Firstly, the conception of 
virtue which they put forward is a very basic one and not one that is representative of the conceptions 
of virtue supported by modern virtue ethicists. Instead more sophisticated ‘multi-track’ dispositions 
are put forward as a more nuanced view of the character traits people have. These multi-track 
dispositions are much better suited to describing both what people are in fact like and accommodating 
the empirical evidence Doris and Stich cite. 
Secondly, even if virtue ethics did use the basic conception of virtue and character traits that Doris 
and Stich suggest, it is questionable that the evidence they cite in support of such traits not existing 
actually shows that virtue is impossible. Their interpretation of the evidence is optimistic in how 
strongly it supports their argument. Doris and Stich claim that the research shows that no-one is 
virtuous, but in fact the evidence shows the opposite; that some people are comparatively more 
virtuous than others. It may be somewhat disappointing that the proportions of people displaying 
virtue were lower than one might imagine in much of the evidence that is cited, but nonetheless it 
does not show that character traits or virtue cannot exist.  
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This result however, is not itself without merit from the point of view of the importance of empirical 
research for ethical theory. Doris and Stich's argument is a valuable contribution that highlights that 
environmental effects on behaviour can be very powerful, and that in many cases virtue or character 
traits are not as influential as our folk conceptions of them might lead us to believe. Their argument 
pushes virtue ethics towards further developing a more realistic multi-track account of character that 
includes fewer supererogatory characteristics, and the resulting virtue ethics is a more robust theory 
for it. 
 
7.5 Additions to a framework for assessing empirical approaches to morality 
Drawing from the above considerations from each of the discussions of Shaun Nichols, Adina Roskies, 
and John Doris and Stephen Stich, the following ideas are provided as additional guidelines for 
assessing empirical and evolutionary approaches to morality. 
Lesson / guideline  Case study / source  
Identify philosophical theses carefully and be 
aware of overly general theories or terms. Often 
talking about philosophical positions using broad 
terms such as ‘rationalism’ may be too non-
specific to usefully characterise a position.   
§6.2.1 ‘Are Nichols’ rationalisms positions held 
by philosophers’  
 
Nichols argues against an idea he identifies as 
‘moral rationalism’ but cites a range of 
divergent sources talking about similarly 
divergent ideas.  
Asses what philosophical assumptions your 
argument makes. The conclusion or importance 
of the argument may be significantly weakened 
if it is dependent on philosophical theories or 
premises being true that are themselves 
controversial or that your argument has not yet 
established.  
§6.2.2.1 ‘What is wrong with psychopaths?’ 
 
In arguing against empirical rationalism, 
Nichols assumes that motivation internalism is 
true. If this assumption turned out to be false, 
he would not be able to attribute an 
undisturbed capacity for moral judgment 
making to psychopaths and his argument 
would not succeed.  
225 
 
Evaluate carefully that the methodology of the 
empirical research is robust and appropriate for 
the philosophical argument it is used in.  
 
§6.2.2.2 ‘The moral/conventional distinction’ 
 
The research that introduced the 
moral/conventional distinction was 
undertaken in developmental psychology. 
Because of this context, schoolyard 
transgressions were used that may not have 
had the moral importance required to 
distinguish them from the conventional in the 
later research undertaken on psychopaths. 
Where possible use standard names and 
terminology for philosophical positions to make 
them more easily recognisable and to better 
contextualise them within the literature.  
§6.2.3 ‘Conceptual rationalism and moral 
motivation internalism’ 
  
Nichols’ conceptual rationalism is a form of 
moral motivation internalism but this is not 
initially clear from his description of the 
position. In contrast, Roskies’ argument is 
immediately clearer than Nichols’ due to her 
identifying that her argument targets moral 
motivation internalism. 
Surveys need to be targeted to the specific 
desired philosophical outcomes when crafting 
survey questions. Concepts that you wish to 
distinguish between need to be carefully 
addressed and targeted in the 
surveys/questions.  
§6.2.3 ‘Conceptual rationalism and moral 
motivation internalism’ 
 
The questions in Nichols’ surveys left a lot of 
room for interpretation by participants and in 
some cases did not even mention the target 
concepts explicitly, resulting in it being unclear 
whether participants had the concepts Nichols 
was investigating in mind when responding.  
Be wary of drawing conclusions from limited or 
uniform samples – especially if you’re trying to 
conclude something that is supposed to apply to 
a whole population or the concept used by 
everyone. 
§6.2.3 ‘Conceptual rationalism and moral 
motivation internalism’ 
 
Nichols draws conclusions that are supposed 
to apply to all usages of a concept from a 
survey of a single sample of undergraduate 
students at one western university.  
Surveys that show mixed results should not be 
interpreted as conclusive support for an 
argument without analysis to support that 
conclusion. The analysis should acknowledge 
and explain the distribution of responses as part 




§6.2.3 ‘Conceptual rationalism and moral 
motivation internalism’ 
 
Surveys showing a 42/58% split of responses 
such as responses to Strandberg and 
Björklund’s ‘psychopath’ vignette, should not 
be interpreted as decisive or conclusive 
evidence. Such a result seems more likely to 
indicate either a lack of shared conception or a 




Lack of consensus may not be due to survey 
methodology or interpretation; an 
understanding of a concept not being uniformly 
shared or applied by differing individuals or 
groups may be a reality philosophy has to live 
with. Arguments should be open to the result 
that there is diversity in how a concept is used or 
understood.    
§6.2.3 ‘Conceptual rationalism and moral 
motivation internalism’ 
 
The conclusion of Strandberg and Björklund’s 
surveys is that there is considerable variability 
of concepts of moral judgment and the 
modality of the link between moral judgment 
and moral motivation within philosophically 
untrained undergraduates. This may imply 
that there is no definitive or single answer to 
the question of whether moral motivation is a 
necessary feature of moral judgement.  
Make clear how the argument being presented 
differs from the previous attempts or similar 
arguments made in the literature and why the 
new approach avoids previous objections or 
difficulties.  
§6.3 ‘Adina Roskies and motivation 
internalism’ 
 
Roskies indicates how her argument differs 
from similar previous counter examples to 
motivation internalism, and addresses why 
some of the common objections to 
prior attempts are not applicable. For 
example, it is more difficult to argue that VM 
patients only make inverted commas moral 
judgments. Unlike the prototypical amoralist 
from the previous literature, VM patients do 
not have any reason to be deceptive, and in 
most cases, it is not disputed that prior to 
their injuries, they had a normal mastery of 
moral concepts. 
 
Ensure that the research methodology correctly 
and robustly assesses the concepts you are 
trying to test.  
  
§6.3 ‘Adina Roskies and motivation 
internalism’ 
 
The testing methodology Roskies used to 
assess VM patients’ motivation following 
moral judgments was flawed. Roskies takes 
Skin Conductance Response (SCR) tests as an 
indication of the presence of moral 
motivation. But this interpretation is not 
backed up by the intended usage of SCRs in 
the research she cites or the wider theoretical 





Ensure that the research cited is testing the 
same precise concepts that the argument in 
philosophy requires. Often empirical research 
that is suggestive of philosophical conclusions 
requires revision and explicit targeting to be 
applicable to the philosophical arguments it 
prompts.  
§6.3 ‘Adina Roskies and motivation 
internalism’ 
 
Roskies cites research that used hypothetical 
moral scenarios. These are not sufficient for 
assessing motivation in response to a moral 
judgment. Instead the research would require 
first person in situ moral judgments be tested 
for subsequent moral motivation.  
Just because particular examples of research are 
unsuccessful in supporting an argument does 
not mean the approach is flawed if the problems 
with the research could be remedied or 
generated in more reliable ways. 
§6.3 ‘Adina Roskies and motivation 
internalism’ 
 
Roskies’ evidence is shown not to support the 
argument, but the argument is still potentially 
sound if the evidence can be found elsewhere 
or further research that addresses the 
methodological issues is undertaken.   
 
Ensure that your interpretation and 
understanding of philosophical or conceptual 
distinctions or assumptions is representative of 
the wider theoretical understanding within 
psychology or the relevant field of research. If 
the interpretation you adopt is not 
representative of the wider literature, this 
difference in understanding should be 
adequately justified.  
§6.3 ‘Adina Roskies and motivation 
internalism’ 
 
Roskies interpretation of the deficits of VM 
patients suited her argument but is not 
representative of the general understanding 
of VM patients within neuropsychology which 
understands VM patients as having serious 
deficits in moral judgment making capabilities 
within the context of their own lives.  
Be wary of very well-known examples or case-
studies that have more mythology than 
substance to them and have been interpreted to 
support conclusions or popular ideas that the 
evidence does not actually support.   
§6.3 ‘Adina Roskies and motivation 
internalism’ 
 
Phineas Gage is well known but the actual 
documentation of his case history is limited, 
and it is unclear if he fits the typical VM 
patient profile.  
It’s important that the structure of the argument 
is clear to avoid it being misinterpreted as 
something obviously unsound. 
§6.4 ‘Social Psychology and Empirically based 
arguments against virtue ethics’ 
 
The form of Doris and Stich’s argument is a 
‘cannot implies ought not’ argument, which 
tries to show that virtues of the kind virtue 
ethics recommend are impossible therefore it 
cannot be the case that we ought to embody 
those virtues. If this structure is not made 
explicit it is easy to misinterpret their 
argument as being a misguided interest in how 
things are instead of how they ought to be.  
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Concepts that empirical research shows to be 
inaccurate need to be the same concept as used 
by the philosophical theory to make the 
argument stick. 
§6.4 ‘Social Psychology and Empirically based 
arguments against virtue ethics’ 
 
Doris and Stich’s argument targets an overly 
simple conception of virtue ethics which is not 
held by any actual virtue ethicists.  
Arguments that overall are not successful can 
still contain important but more modest 
conclusions that are important and move 
debates along. 
§6.4 ‘Social Psychology and Empirically based 
arguments against virtue ethics’ 
 
Doris and Stich’s argument may not result in 
the rejection of virtue ethics, but they do force 
it to adopt a more robust empirically based 








Chapter 8 Conclusion 
8.1 Empirical approaches to moral philosophy 
In this thesis I have answered the question ‘What are the implications of our growing understanding 
of the science of morality for ethics?’ I have argued that there is no a priori principle that allows us to 
either rule out empirical research having implications for moral philosophy or to discern whether there 
are important implications for moral philosophy.  
I have examined a number of case studies which attempt to derive important implications for moral 
philosophy from empirical research into morality. I have examined a representative rather than 
comprehensive sample of attempts, as the number of potential case studies far exceeds what can be 
covered in a single thesis. The case studies I have looked at include arguments about the evolutionary 
origins of morality made by E.O Wilson, Richard Joyce, and Sharon Street. I tentatively concluded that 
Joyce and Streets’ arguments were successful in establishing that an entirely mind independent moral 
reality is unlikely, and that their arguments should constrain the possible metaphysics of morality to 
more naturalistic and contingent varieties.  
I have also examined a range of research conducted on moral psychology into how moral judgments 
are made by researchers such as Joshua Greene, Marc Hauser, Jonathan Haidt, and Shaun Nichols. I 
have discussed Shaun Nichols’ arguments about the implications such models have for a number of 
positions he terms ‘moral rationalism’. I argue that while there is nothing wrong in principle with 
Nichols’ approach, ultimately his arguments are unable to establish that the various forms of 
rationalism are incorrect due to a stalemate of sorts because of the indeterminate nature of some of 
the concepts involved.  I also looked at Adina Roskies’ attempt to use empirical research to show that 
motivational internalism is false. I argue that again the concepts employed are not sufficiently 
determinate to establish her conclusion and that empirical evidence she presents is not as robust as 
it first appears.  
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Finally, I looked at attempts by John Doris and Stephen Stich to show that research into ‘situationist’ 
social psychology can be used to undermine Virtue Ethics by showing that the concept of Virtue that 
Virtue Ethics attributes to people is not possible. While I conclude that their argument is unsuccessful 
in showing that Virtue Ethics is fatally flawed, they are successful in pushing Virtue Ethics towards 
more realistic and detailed pictures of what human virtue is like. Thus, their argument is still a highly 
valuable contribution.  
Thus, a number of the case studies I have examined have been successful in limited but still important 
ways. The overall trend is that an empirical approach often precipitates refinement and adjustment 
of philosophical theories to accommodate the additional scrutiny on the philosophical and factual 
assumptions moral philosophy makes. My overall conclusion is positive, that while the relation 
between ethics and empirical approaches to ethics is indeed an “alluring swamp in which any number 
of scholars have floundered”401 there is nevertheless much to be gained by interdisciplinary work of 
this nature and integrating the insights of empirical research into morality with moral philosophy. 
 
8.2 Framework for assessing empirical approaches to ethics 
In addition to the above conclusions, I have assessed what we can learn in general from each of case 
studies’ attempts to draw conclusions for ethics from empirical research. I presented these lessons in 
the tables chapter 4 and chapter 7.  As noted in §1.1 the intended audience of this guidance is non-
philosophers working on interdisciplinary research involving philosophy, philosophers supplementing 
philosophy’s methodology with the methods and tools of the sciences, or simply non-philosophers 
who discover their research appears to have philosophical conclusions. While a comprehensive 
framework based on this approach is too large for a single thesis, the below at least provides a 
beginning and a direction in which this could be further developed. The guidelines provided in 
 
401 Philip Kitcher, ‘Biology and Ethics’, p. 163. 
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chapters 4 and 7 have been categorised into the following themes based upon the general type of 
guidance provided: 
A. Philosophical context – considerations about the existing literature, terminology, arguments, 
and established philosophical knowledge.  
B. Bridging the empirical and philosophical – considerations about the forms of arguments used 
to try to draw conclusions in moral philosophy based on empirical considerations. This 
includes the ‘is-ought gap’ and existing philosophical arguments about deriving normative 
conclusions from the way the world is.   
C. Soundness and philosophical method – general considerations around the philosophical 
method and ensuring arguments are sufficiently well developed and are valid and true.  
D. Scientific method and evidence quality – factors around the quality and applicability of the 
empirical research used.  
E. Peer review and engagement – considerations around feedback and the need to engage fully 
with the philosophical literature and community.  
Using these categories, that are intended to be followed loosely in the order presented in the diagram 
below, a basic pathway is provided that can be used to assist in raising the quality of attempts to draw 
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Appendix: Consolidated lessons / guidance 
The table below is compiled from the guidance provided in chapter 4 and chapter 7. The numbers shown on the left relate to the diagram presented in the 
conclusion of the thesis.  
 
No. Lesson / Guideline Case study / Source Summary of guidance used in diagram 
1 
Removing some area of philosophy entirely from the 
context of philosophical discourse, with the hope of 
revolutionising it with some new insight from another field 
of inquiry, is unlikely to be a successful project without the 
provision of good reasons for that rehoming of the problem. 
§3.1.1 ‘The metaphysics of morality’  
Wilson argues ethics will be revolutionised by 
treating it as a biological problem but does not 
describe how this will happen or provide any 
reasons for thinking it would be successful. 
Removed from the context of the existing discourse 
it is hard to see what form this revolution takes.   
Understand why the problem has 
traditionally been considered a philosophical 
problem and why other methodologies might 
not be suitable. 
 
2 
Examine the philosophical literature to ensure that the 
problem that empirical research purportedly solves is a 
genuine problem of philosophy, and is not a seemingly 
similar, but philosophically uninteresting or unrelated, 
problem. 
§3.1.2 ‘The problem of altruism’  
Wilson argues that altruism is possible, but the kind 
of altruism he argues is possible is a biological 
conception of altruism rather than a philosophically 
interesting moral one.  
Ensure the problem you are proposing to 
solve is the same problem as the 
philosophical literature deals with. 
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No. Lesson / Guideline Case study / Source Summary of guidance used in diagram 
3 
Examine the current state of philosophical debate on the 
topic in question, both within literature and via 
engagement with philosophers with expertise in the 
particular area. There is not much to be gained (for 
philosophy anyway) in re-solving problems which 
philosophy has already moved on from. 
§3.1.2 ‘The problem of altruism’  
It is well accepted that some forms of altruism exist. 
If Wilson had engaged with the philosophical 
literature on the topic, he would have recognised 
that the problem he was proposing to solve was 
already settled.  
Ensure the problem is not already considered 
resolved within philosophy. Philosophical 
peer review may be helpful in assessing this. 
 
4 
Ascertain the relationship between what you are 
attempting to argue and well-known philosophical rules, for 
example, rules about deriving an ‘ought from is’ or about 
the relationship between naturalness and goodness. If 
one’s argument appears to be an exception to a particular 
rule, then examine exactly how and why it is an exception 
and make this explicit. Arguments should not attempt to 
rehash old or well-accepted positions unless they have 
something new to contribute to the debate or have 
discovered a clear problem with the received view. 
§3.1.4 ‘Naturalness and morality’  
Wilson appears to leap uncritically from what is 
natural to what we ought to do without awareness 
of the existing literature or that philosophers 
generally consider this argument fallacious.  
 
Find out if there are well-known reasons why 
the proposed argument will not work or if 
there are known objections in the literature 




No. Lesson / Guideline Case study / Source Summary of guidance used in diagram 
5 
Present a full argument, including review and response 
from philosophers: one way to ensure an unsuccessful 
attempt to integrate evolutionary or biological 
considerations into philosophy is to have no engagement 
with pre-existing philosophical dialogue. 
§3.1.1 ‘The metaphysics of morality’  
Wilson suggests that taking a scientific approach 
and “removing ethics from the hands of 
philosophers” will clarify the metaphysics of 
morality. However, he does not provide any 
indication of how or what this would look like. The 
arguments advanced here would all have benefited 
from engagement with the existing philosophical 
dialogue and ensuring they were complete enough 
to say something philosophically significant.  
 
 
Ensure your argument is made explicitly and 
is sound. The premises should be clear and 
the logical form valid.  
 
6 
Arguments need to be complete, including establishing the 
premises are true and how they lead to the conclusion. 
Where the conclusion is a general one, it is helpful to 
provide specific examples that demonstrate the general 
point, rather than simply asserting the general conclusion 
without context.  
 
§3.1.1 ‘Naturalness and morality’ 
Wilson’s argument that the naturalness of certain 
behaviours is relevant to their ethical status was 
incomplete, and lacked both clear premises, a clear 
logical form, or any specific examples of how the 
ethical status was established.   
Provide concrete examples of the 
implications where possible to aid in 
understanding the argument. 
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7 
Ensure that discussion includes potential responses to likely 
objections based on existing philosophical theories and 
actual objections from other philosophers and researchers. 
§3.2 ‘Richard Joyce’s evolutionary debunking 
argument’ 
Joyce integrates evolutionary considerations into 
the existing philosophical debate on moral error 
theory.  
Include anticipated and real responses from 
philosophers to your arguments.  
 
8 
Provide the context of the argument by discussing similar 
arguments, whether solely philosophical or also attempting 
to incorporate empirical considerations.  Make clear how 
the argument differs from previous arguments.  
 
§3.2 ‘Richard Joyce’s evolutionary debunking 
argument’ 
Joyce compares his arguments with those of Mackie 
and other error theorists to show where the 
similarities lie and how his argument differs.  
Situate your philosophical claims within the 
existing literature and be explicit about how 
your argument differs to existing arguments. 
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9 
Where possible, make clear the role of empirical 
information or empirical considerations in the argument in 
question.  
 
§3.3 ‘Sharon Street’s Darwinian Dilemma’ 
Street discusses how our evaluative attitudes are 
shaped and thoroughly saturated with evolutionary 
forces – they would have not been recognisable as 
the kinds of things they are without that 
evolutionary influence. She is explicit about how the 
empirical facts constrain the possibilities for realism 
and the impact these have for the metaethical 
status of moral realism.  
 
 
Be explicit as to what role empirical 
considerations play in your arguments. 
 
10 
Consider seriously potential and actual responses made to 
arguments based on both empirical and philosophical 
grounds and revise the position accordingly if necessary.   
 
§3.2 ‘Richard Joyce’s evolutionary debunking 
argument’  
Joyce has engaged in ongoing dialogue over the 
years and has revised his conclusions from the 
strong forms of moral scepticism to a more limited 
conclusion that moves the burden of proof to the 
moral realist and challenges them to come up with 
a plausible account of naturalism. 
Be willing to revise your position based on 
both philosophical responses or if the 
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11 
Applying epistemological standards from other disciplines 
can shed light on stubborn problems if done carefully. 
However, to do this, analysis is required to determine 
whether the epistemic standards are appropriate to the 
argument and philosophical work is required to analyse the 
implications.  
§3.1.1 ‘The metaphysics of morality’  
Wilson attempts to apply scientific methodology to 
establish the existence of certain philosophically 
interesting phenomena – in this case altruistic 
behaviour. However, his analysis of the phenomena 
is insufficient meaning the argument targets an 
apparently similar but philosophically less 
interesting sense of the concept altruism.  
Have your interpretation of the concepts 
reviewed by those with expertise in the 
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12 
Often when empirical considerations are applied to moral 
philosophy, the goals of the arguments are sweeping and 
revolutionary. It is easy to overlook sound and potentially 
noteworthy philosophical conclusions that are revealed 
when arguing for these sweeping or revolutionary goals. 
These limited and more easily established and defended 
conclusions can often themselves be premises or 
assumptions in other philosophically interesting arguments 
or positions that are overlooked by focusing on the more 
revolutionary or dramatic conclusions.  
§3.2 ‘Richard Joyce’s evolutionary debunking 
argument’ 
§3.3 ‘Sharon Street’s Darwinian dilemma’ 
These arguments initially tried to show that moral 
error theory or scepticism was true and that the 
entire practice of ethics needed a fundamental re-
evaluation. However, while these conclusions may 
not have been conclusively established, more 
limited and potentially interesting considerations 
about certain aspects of moral naturalism, such as 
the mind-independence of moral truth or the 
contingent nature of morality, have been uncovered 
as part of those arguments.  
  
  
Do not overlook minor but defensible 
conclusions if your argument does not 
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13 
Identify philosophical theses carefully and be aware of 
overly general theories or terms. Often talking about 
philosophical positions using broad terms such as 
‘rationalism’ may be too non-specific to usefully 
characterise a position.   
§6.2.1 ‘Are Nichols’ rationalisms positions held by 
philosophers’  
 
Nichols argues against an idea he identifies as ‘moral 
rationalism’ but cites a range of divergent sources 
talking about similarly divergent ideas.  
Be careful of philosophical terms that are so 
broad that they cover a range of 
philosophical positions that cannot all be 
addressed by the same arguments. 
 
14 
Asses what philosophical assumptions your argument 
makes. The conclusion or importance of the argument may 
be significantly weakened if it is dependent on philosophical 
theories or premises being true that are themselves 
controversial or that your argument has not yet established.  
§6.2.2.1 ‘What is wrong with psychopaths?’ 
 
In arguing against empirical rationalism, Nichols 
assumes that motivation internalism is true. If this 
assumption turned out to be false, he would not be 
able to attribute an undisturbed capacity for moral 
judgment making to psychopaths and his argument 
would not succeed.  
Check that your argument does not make 
controversial philosophical assumptions or if 
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15 
Evaluate carefully that the methodology of the empirical 
research is robust and appropriate for the philosophical 
argument it is used in.  
 
§6.2.2.2 ‘The moral/conventional distinction’ 
 
The research that introduced the 
moral/conventional distinction was undertaken in 
developmental psychology. Because of this context, 
schoolyard transgressions were used that may not 
have had the moral importance required to 
distinguish them from the conventional in the later 
research undertaken on psychopaths. 
Check that the concepts used in the 
empirical research precisely match the 




Where possible use standard names and terminology for 
philosophical positions to make them more easily 
recognisable and to better contextualise them within the 
literature.  
§6.2.3 ‘Conceptual rationalism and moral 
motivation internalism’ 
  
Nichols’ conceptual rationalism is a form of moral 
motivation internalism but this is not initially clear 
from his description of the position. In contrast, 
Roskies’ argument is immediately clearer than 
Nichols’ due to her identifying that her argument 
targets moral motivation internalism. 
Adopt existing philosophical terminology to 
make it easier to understand and 
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17 
Surveys need to be targeted to the specific desired 
philosophical outcomes when crafting survey questions. 
Concepts that you wish to distinguish between need to be 
carefully addressed and targeted in the surveys/questions.  
§6.2.3 ‘Conceptual rationalism and moral 
motivation internalism’ 
 
The questions in Nichols’ surveys left a lot of room 
for interpretation by participants and in some cases 
did not even mention the target concepts explicitly, 
resulting in it being unclear whether participants 
had the concepts Nichols was investigating in mind 
when responding.  
Where empirical results are suggestive of 
interesting philosophical conclusions, it may 
be worth replicating the experiments but 
explicitly target the argument in doing so.  
 
18 
Be wary of drawing conclusions from limited or uniform 
samples – especially if you’re trying to conclude something 
that is supposed to apply to a whole population or the 
concept used by everyone. 
§6.2.3 ‘Conceptual rationalism and moral 
motivation internalism’ 
 
Nichols draws conclusions that are supposed to 
apply to all usages of a concept from a survey of a 
single sample of undergraduate students at one 
western university.  
Ensure population samples are 
representative and you are not generalising 
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19 
Surveys that show mixed results should not be interpreted 
as conclusive support for an argument without analysis to 
support that conclusion. The analysis should acknowledge 
and explain the distribution of responses as part of the 
argument supporting the conclusions reached.  
 
 
§6.2.3 ‘Conceptual rationalism and moral 
motivation internalism’ 
 
Surveys showing a 42/58% split of responses such as 
responses to Strandberg and Björklund’s 
‘psychopath’ vignette, should not be interpreted as 
decisive or conclusive evidence. Such a result seems 
more likely to indicate either a lack of shared 
conception or a question that can be interpreted in 
multiple ways. 
Do not automatically interpret a majority 
response to surveys as conclusive in the case 
of empirical conceptual analysis. 
 
20 
Lack of consensus may not be due to survey methodology 
or interpretation; an understanding of a concept not being 
uniformly shared or applied by differing individuals or 
groups may be a reality philosophy has to live with. 
Arguments should be open to the result that there is 
diversity in how a concept is used or understood.    
§6.2.3 ‘Conceptual rationalism and moral 
motivation internalism’ 
 
The conclusion of Strandberg and Björklund’s 
surveys is that there is considerable variability of 
concepts of moral judgment and the modality of the 
link between moral judgment and moral motivation 
within philosophically untrained undergraduates. 
This may imply that there is no definitive or single 
answer to the question of whether moral motivation 
is a necessary feature of moral judgement.  
Do not assume all concepts will all have 
definite meanings amenable to conceptual 
analysis or will be used in uniform ways both 
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21 
Make clear how the argument being presented differs from 
the previous attempts or similar arguments made in the 
literature and why the new approach avoids previous 
objections or difficulties.  
§6.3 ‘Adina Roskies and motivation internalism’ 
 
Roskies indicates how her argument differs from 
similar previous counter examples to motivation 
internalism, and addresses why some of the 
common objections to 
prior attempts are not applicable. For example, it is 
more difficult to argue that VM patients only make 
inverted commas moral judgments. Unlike the 
prototypical amoralist from the previous literature, 
VM patients do not have any reason to be 
deceptive, and in most cases, it is not disputed that 
prior to their injuries, they had a normal mastery of 
moral concepts. 
 
Be explicit about how the argument 
presented differs from previous attempts 
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22 
Ensure that the research methodology correctly and 
robustly assesses the concepts it aims to test.  
  
§6.3 ‘Adina Roskies and motivation internalism’ 
 
The testing methodology Roskies used to assess 
VM patients’ motivation following moral judgments 
was flawed. Roskies takes Skin Conductance 
Response (SCR) tests as an indication of the 
presence of moral motivation. But this 
interpretation is not backed up by the intended 
usage of SCRs in the research she cites or the wider 
theoretical understanding of SCRs within 
psychology and neuroscience. 
Check that the methodology used in the 
empirical research is robust and replicable.  
23 
Ensure that the research cited is testing the same precise 
concepts that the argument in philosophy requires. Often 
empirical research that is suggestive of philosophical 
conclusions requires revision and explicit targeting to be 
applicable to the philosophical arguments it prompts.  
§6.3 ‘Adina Roskies and motivation internalism’ 
 
Roskies cites research that used hypothetical moral 
scenarios. These are not sufficient for assessing 
motivation in response to a moral judgment. Instead 
the research would require first person in situ moral 
judgments be tested for subsequent moral 
motivation.  
Ensure empirical research targets the precise 
concepts needed, and if not consider 
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24 
Just because particular examples of research are 
unsuccessful in supporting an argument does not mean the 
approach is flawed if the problems with the research could 
be remedied or generated in more reliable ways. 
§6.3 ‘Adina Roskies and motivation internalism’ 
 
Roskies’ evidence is shown not to support the 
argument, but the argument is still potentially 
sound if the evidence can be found elsewhere or 
further research that addresses the methodological 
issues is undertaken.   
 
An unsuccessful argument usually just shows 
that particular argument does not succeed, 




Ensure that your interpretation and understanding of 
philosophical or conceptual distinctions or assumptions is 
representative of the wider theoretical understanding 
within psychology or the relevant field of research. If the 
interpretation you adopt is not representative of the wider 
literature, this difference in understanding should be 
adequately justified.  
§6.3 ‘Adina Roskies and motivation internalism’ 
 
Roskies interpretation of the deficits of VM patients 
suited her argument but is not representative of the 
general understanding of VM patients within 
neuropsychology which understands VM patients as 
having serious deficits in moral judgment making 
capabilities within the context of their own lives.  
Ensure your interpretation of the research’s 
results is in line with the wider 
understanding of those results within that 
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26 
Be wary of very well-known examples or case-studies that 
have more mythology than substance to them and have 
been interpreted to support conclusions or popular ideas 
that the evidence does not actually support.   
§6.3 ‘Adina Roskies and motivation internalism’ 
 
Phineas Gage is well known but the actual 
documentation of his case history is limited, and it is 
unclear if he fits the typical VM patient profile.  
Be wary of extremely well-known case 
studies and anecdotes - they may be more 
mythology than substance.  
 
27 
It’s important that the structure of the argument is clear to 
avoid it being misinterpreted as something obviously 
unsound. 
§6.4 ‘Social Psychology and Empirically based 
arguments against virtue ethics’ 
 
The form of Doris and Stich’s argument is a 
‘cannot implies ought not’ argument, which tries to 
show that virtues of the kind virtue ethics 
recommend are impossible therefore it cannot be 
the case that we ought to embody those virtues. If 
this structure is not made explicit it is easy to 
misinterpret their argument as being a misguided 
interest in how things are instead of how they ought 
to be.  
Ensure your argument is made explicitly and 
is sound. The premises should be clear and 
the logical form valid. 
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28 
Concepts that empirical research shows to be inaccurate 
need to be the same concept as used by the philosophical 
theory to make the argument stick. 
§6.4 ‘Social Psychology and Empirically based 
arguments against virtue ethics’ 
 
Doris and Stich’s argument targets an overly simple 
conception of virtue ethics which is not held by any 
actual virtue ethicists.  
Ensure your interpretation of philosophical 
concepts figuring in your argument are the 




Arguments that overall are not successful can still contain 
important but more modest conclusions that are important 
and move debates along. 
§6.4 ‘Social Psychology and Empirically based 
arguments against virtue ethics’ 
 
Doris and Stich’s argument may not result in the 
rejection of virtue ethics, but they do force it to 
adopt a more robust empirically based conception 
of virtue, and this is still a notable conclusion. 
 
Do not overlook minor but defensible 
conclusions if your argument does not 
support your initial more consequential 
conclusions. 
 
 
 
